Do you have besa? What about institutions?
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“It’s the governance, stupid”
BESA is perhaps the most serious conceptual effort ever to come out of an Albanian government to reflect on the very mode of governance. It acknowledges something unusual for a government that has been in power for three mandates: the problem is trust.
Besa bluntly states that the flamingo protest was not an expression of “ingratitude,” as the fabricated mayor describes it in the introductory anecdote, but the expression of a society that has entered a new phase of development. This admission, in itself, is a step back from the arrogance of recent statements and overshadows the stories about agencies, algorithms, and the “enemies of the day.”
But the 40-page document understands the symptom better than the diagnosis and ignores the elephant in the room: BESA speaks at length about trust, but hardly at all about the reasons why it has been consumed. Trust is like an eraser; it shrinks after every mistake.
There is almost no reflection on corruption as a systemic problem, the concentration of power, the personalization of decision-making, the weakening of institutions in the face of the executive, conflicts of interest, or clientelism.
The word “corruption” appears only once, in the context of justice reform and the past, and not as a “gangrene” that must be fought.
The beautifully written document makes you believe that the main problem is the administration, while those on the boulevard (and not only them) believe the problem is the very model of governance.
BESA acknowledges that the instruments—public consultation, impact assessment, performance plans—have existed in law for years; the problem has only been their formal implementation. But if that is so, why haven’t they worked until now? Was BESA missing?
BESA somewhat resembles Shqipëriaqeduam.al: problems are solved by overcoming bureaucracy and intervening from above, not by letting the institutions function themselves. BESA claims it does not intervene but coordinates, but Albania does not go to the European Union with special units attached to the Prime Minister’s office, no matter how well-argued on paper. It goes with strong institutions, independent of the political cycle of any government, with procedures that are respected, not reminded to be respected by a coordinating dome; with real checks and balances and accountability that produces consequences, not a report that is read and forgotten. A new unit, however much called “coordinating” and not “decision-making,” risks turning into a mechanism of control and dictation.
The document’s self-criticism has a clear limit, like with Hosteni at the end of the ’80s: criticism goes up to the director, but no higher. It is admitted that the administration has not listened, has not communicated, and has not properly assessed the consequences, but the question is not raised as to who built this model and who bears the political responsibility for it.
If the administration brought about the protest, who built this administration? If communication failed, who designed the communication model? If decision-making was centralized, who centralized it? A document that speaks so much about trust would gain real credibility only if it dared to speak about its causes, not just its symptoms. After all, the administration does not set prices, does not raise wages, does not lower the cost of living, nor does it replace the institutions that guarantee accountability.
BESA reduces the crisis to an administrative problem, leaving out three fundamental challenges: democracy, the economy, and demography.
James Carville knew this when he formulated the slogan that helped Bill Clinton win the 1992 elections: in Albania, one could say “it’s the economy, stupid.” Not a single word about the economy! People demand not just a more beautiful Albania, but a normal and livable country.
Trust is not produced by listening better, but by limiting power, increasing genuine transparency, and building institutions that survive a change of government. But the real difference from the American voter lies not only in the government’s rhetoric, but in the voting mechanism itself. A good part of the electorate does not punish the government for the price of bread and eggs, for the quality of life, because the vote often measures not performance, but identity and clientelism, employment, party affiliation, fear of the alternative. When the vote is not linked to the bills you pay, the government has all the space and luxury to speak about “trust” and “national capital,” sure that the bill will not be demanded where it truly hurts.
Albania is emptying at the fastest rate in the region; 27,628 fewer inhabitants just in 2025, roughly half a million fewer inhabitants between 2011 and 2023, the average age went from 35.5 to 44.3 years within a decade. Yes, we have more tourists, but fewer inhabitants. Albania looks more beautiful, but it is more empty, older, and more expensive.
None of the seven indicators proposed by BESA measures these.
And precisely here lies the central void of the entire architecture of the document: seven measurement mechanisms, zero consequences. The “post-action review” analyzes the mistake, but the document itself explicitly says it “does not seek culprits.” There is no standard or criterion that leads to resignation, no consequence for breaking one’s word, no consequence even for repeating the same mistake.
BESA remains a document with modern ideas about listening, evidence, and measurement, but it reads more like a manual for the administration than a reflection on the political model that produced the trust crisis itself.
The country has already proven how much good words are worth when the stones remain in the bag and the elephant, as always happens, remains in the room even when one speaks at length about everything but it.
Besa is the given word. And the given word is measured in only one way: it is kept or broken. Therefore, the question is not who asks for Besa, but who keeps it.
By: Lutfi Dervishi
