How much could protests and threats affect the court’s decision on the former KLA leaders?

Just 24 hours before the verdict is announced against Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi, the public atmosphere has been heightened by protests, warnings of unrest, statements about “setting Kosovo ablaze” and calls for citizens to arm themselves.

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But how much could these developments affect the judges’ decision in The Hague?

The legal answer is: they should have no bearing whatsoever on determining the defendants’ guilt or innocence.

The verdict must be based solely on the evidence admitted during the trial, the testimony, the documents, the individual responsibility of each defendant, and the final arguments of the prosecution and the defense.

A citizen’s protest, a former fighter’s statement or a threat by someone outside the proceedings cannot be used as evidence against the defendants unless there is a concrete and proven link between them. So far, there is no public information indicating that the four defendants ordered or coordinated the latest statements.

The verdict has most likely been finalized

A practical fact must also be kept in mind: a verdict of this magnitude is not written overnight.

It includes an assessment of thousands of documents, testimonies and legal arguments. For this reason, the essential part of the decision must have been completed and approved by the trial panel well before the protests and statements of recent days.

Judges cannot legally change a finding of guilt simply because protests have been announced outside the courtroom or threatening language has been used.

If they did so, they would seriously undermine the principles of a fair trial and individual responsibility.

Peaceful protests are a right, not legal pressure

The protests in Pristina and the one announced outside the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague may have political and media impact, but they have no evidentiary weight.

Peaceful gatherings are a democratic right. They may show how deep dissatisfaction with the Specialist Chambers runs and how sensitive every attempt remains in Kosovo to portraying the KLA’s war outside the context of Serbian aggression and repression.

Neither the number of protesters nor the strength of public reactions can replace an analysis of the evidence.

Therefore, protests cannot secure the defendants’ acquittal, but neither can they be used as a reason to convict them.

Threats could damage the public cause

The situation is different when it comes to statements about “setting Kosovo ablaze,” escalation, or calls for people to arm themselves.

These statements are not evidence against Thaçi, Veseli, Selimi or Krasniqi either. Nevertheless, they could seriously damage the public cause of a fair trial.

The Specialist Chambers has repeatedly justified pretrial detention by citing the risk of influencing witnesses and obstructing the proceedings. In the past, Hysni Gucati and Nasim Haradinaj were convicted of offenses related to obstructing the administration of justice and intimidating witnesses.

In this climate, threatening statements give supporters of the Court an opportunity to argue that pressure and intimidation remain a problem.

They could affect security measures, the way the hearing is organized and, potentially, future assessments regarding pretrial detention. But they cannot legally change the answer to the question of whether the alleged crimes have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Could they affect the length of the sentences?

In principle, the severity of the sentences should not increase because of the conduct of third parties.

To worsen a defendant’s position, his or her personal responsibility must be proven. A court cannot punish someone for statements made by his or her supporters.

Recent developments could have a greater impact on decisions about extending pretrial detention after the verdict than on the verdict itself. If the court assesses that there is a risk of unrest, obstruction or interference with the appeals process after the verdict is announced, it may take a more cautious approach to the question of release.

Here too, however, concrete and individualized reasons must exist.

How might the court rule?

Without access to all the confidential materials and closed-session testimony, no one outside the trial panel can predict the verdict with certainty.

Nevertheless, given the length of the proceedings, the large number of witnesses, the complexity of the indictment and the differences in the alleged roles of the four defendants, the most likely scenario appears to be a mixed verdict.

This means that the court could reject some parts of the prosecution’s theory while accepting others. The decision also does not necessarily have to be identical for Thaçi, Veseli, Selimi and Krasniqi.

The prosecution has requested 45 years in prison for each of them, while the defense has sought their full acquittal. These are the two extremes of the proceedings. The court could end up somewhere in between: acquitting them on some charges and convicting them on others, or reaching different outcomes for each defendant.

In my assessment, an identical 45-year sentence for all four appears less likely than a verdict that individualizes responsibility. At the same time, the full acquittal of all four on every count remains possible, but cannot be considered the most certain outcome.

The most realistic prediction is that the court will limit or reject a broad part of the prosecution’s allegations, but may find responsibility for some specific counts or events. After that, an appeal by the dissatisfied party will almost certainly follow.

The verdict is not a judgment on the KLA

Regardless of the outcome, the verdict should be treated as a decision on the individual responsibility of four people, not as a ruling on the character of the Kosovo Liberation Army’s war.

The KLA’s war was waged against the repression of Serbian forces, while the overwhelming majority of the victims and those expelled were Albanians. No decision concerning individuals can change this historical reality.

For precisely this reason, statements about fire, weapons and unrest are dangerous. They do not help the defendants, they do not change the verdict and they may shift attention from the evidence to fears about security.

Tomorrow, the court will speak through its verdict. Peaceful protest remains a democratic right; threats of violence, by contrast, only damage Kosovo and the argument for justice.

Editorial note: This is an analytical assessment based on the judicial proceedings, publicly available information and recent developments. It does not present inside information from the Court, nor is it a certain prediction of the outcome.

Sources: Kosovo Specialist Chambers; Reuters – the verdict and the prosecution’s request; AP – the protests and proceedings against the four defendants; U.S. Embassy – notice concerning the demonstrations


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