Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Glauk Konjufca’s call for the country to move from observer status to full membership in the Adriatic Charter has brought Kosovo’s role in regional security structures back into focus.
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During the association’s meeting, Konjufca linked the request to the concrete threats Kosovo has faced, citing the terrorist attack in Banjska and the attack on the Ibër-Lepenc canal. According to him, Kosovo withstood both incidents and “triumphed,” demonstrating its ability to confront security risks.
However, full membership in the Adriatic Charter depends not only on security arguments. The step also requires the political and diplomatic consent of member states, while Kosovo’s lack of recognition by several countries, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, could create obstacles.
Kosovo already has observer status in this mechanism, so the request to transform A5 into A6 represents an effort to move to a higher level of involvement. But how feasible is this, and what steps must Pristina take?
Dashnim Hebibi, president of the Swiss Scientific Institute for Southeastern Europe, based in Zurich, tells Bota sot that the objective is achievable as a diplomatic goal. However, he says it cannot be achieved through public statements alone.
Hebibi says Kosovo’s current status as an observer provides Pristina with an institutional basis for seeking full membership. He also considers the security situation cited by Minister Glauk Konjufca important, as the attacks in Banjska and on the Ibër-Lepenc canal show that Kosovo is facing direct threats.
However, the expert stresses that the need for security alone is not enough to guarantee membership. According to him, the decisive condition is building a political consensus among the member states.
For Hebibi, the main difficulty remains political and diplomatic. He recalls that Kosovo previously submitted a request for full membership, but the process was not completed. One of the most complicated issues has been the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which does not recognize Kosovo’s independence.
He therefore believes that Pristina should reformulate its approach and not rely solely on the argument that Kosovo deserves membership. The goal should be to convince partners that Kosovo’s inclusion would strengthen the Adriatic Charter and regional cooperation in the field of security.
One of Hebibi’s proposals is to establish a special diplomatic group for A6, representing the Presidency, the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to him, this mechanism should have a clearly defined mandate to identify the states that need to be persuaded, the arguments to be used, the obstacles to be overcome and the deadlines for each action.
In this process, he considers support from the United States essential. Pristina, he says, should hold direct consultations with Washington and seek clear expression of American support for Kosovo’s integration into regional security mechanisms.
The United States is part of A5 and a strategic partner of Kosovo, so according to Hebibi, this relationship should be used more actively in Pristina’s diplomacy.
Coordination with Tirana could also play a special role. Hebibi says Albania can support Kosovo within A5 structures, as well as through bilateral contacts with member states. The message that should be conveyed, he says, is that Kosovo’s membership is not intended to target any state, but to contribute to strengthening regional security.
Given that Croatia will hold the A5 presidency during 2026, he calls on Kosovo to pursue intensive diplomacy with Zagreb and ensure that its issue remains on the discussion agenda. According to Hebibi, this represents a diplomatic opportunity that Pristina should take advantage of.
He also considers engagement with Montenegro and North Macedonia necessary, with Kosovo seeking their support and diplomatic coordination for its membership.
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains one of the most difficult, but also most important, issues for Kosovo’s diplomacy. Hebibi suggests that Pristina work directly with Sarajevo, without accusations or ultimatums, conveying the message that Kosovo’s membership in A5 would not constitute an action against Bosnia and Herzegovina, but rather part of regional security cooperation.
He also proposes identifying institutional and political actors within Bosnia who could help find a formula acceptable to all sides.
According to Hebibi, Kosovo should enter this process not only with a request to be admitted, but also with a concrete offer of regional cooperation. This offer could include combating hybrid threats, protecting critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, combating terrorism and organized crime, information exchange, training and joint exercises, civil-military cooperation, and a joint response to crises.
Such an approach, he says, would change the diplomatic narrative surrounding the A6 request. The attack in Banjska and the attack on Ibër-Lepenc should be presented to international partners professionally, not merely as political accusations, but as cases demonstrating the importance of protecting critical infrastructure and of regional security cooperation.
Hebibi argues that if the threats are regional, then security mechanisms should also be as inclusive as possible.
In this context, he also emphasizes KFOR’s role. Kosovo, he says, must show that KFOR’s presence and its partnership with NATO and the United States do not place it solely in the position of a security beneficiary.
On the contrary, Pristina should demonstrate that it aims to transform itself from an actor seeking security into one that contributes increasingly to the security of the region. Hebibi considers this a stronger argument at the diplomatic table.
The expert also suggests drafting a joint policy document entitled “Kosovo A6 Initiative.” The document should define the reasons for the membership request, the contribution Kosovo can make, the benefits for regional security, Pristina’s commitments, and ways to address the concerns of states that have reservations.
Hebibi stresses that such a strategic issue requires the broadest possible political coordination in Kosovo. According to him, differences, criticism and divergent positions are natural, but broad coordination must exist on security, Euro-Atlantic integration and strengthening Kosovo’s international position.
He believes the debate should not focus on the question of who is responsible, but on identifying the partners who need to be persuaded, the contribution Kosovo can make to the region, ways to secure American support, the use of the Croatian presidency, and overcoming the political obstacle posed by Bosnia and Herzegovina.
For Hebibi, the A6 request should not remain merely a statement by the foreign minister, but should become a state diplomatic project. He summarizes his approach as requiring less division, accusations and rhetoric that closes doors, and more diplomacy that creates new opportunities.
According to him, Kosovo should pursue membership firmly, but build it through patience, arguments, alliances and sustained diplomatic work. This would help partners see Kosovo’s presence as a factor that strengthens collective security.
“No one can build the future alone. Security and peace are more sustainable when they are built together,” Hebibi emphasizes.
Expert Shefqet Avdimetaj considers Foreign Minister Glauk Konjufca’s request for Kosovo’s full membership in the Adriatic Charter reasonable, especially because of the security situation in the region.
Avdimetaj says the attack in Banjska and the attack on the Ibër-Lepenc canal demonstrate that the threats against Kosovo are real. According to him, the country’s security is directly linked to regional security, so Kosovo should not have only a peripheral role, but should contribute to joint security mechanisms.
However, he acknowledges that fulfilling this request will not be easy. The main obstacle, he says, is political and diplomatic, particularly because Bosnia and Herzegovina does not recognize Kosovo and because consensus within the Adriatic Charter is necessary.
Avdimetaj believes Kosovo’s arguments in the field of security are important, but they must be accompanied by strong diplomatic engagement and coordinated support from international partners.
According to him, Konjufca’s initiative can also be seen as an effort to bring Kosovo back to the center of discussions on the regional security architecture.
Avdimetaj tells Bota sot that full membership is not impossible, but requires political consensus and diplomatic work. If Pristina manages to secure broader support from member states and Euro-Atlantic partners, then the A6 request could gain a more concrete prospect of being realized.
