Security expert Gurakuç Kuçi believes that the Western Balkans is entering a period of heightened risk of escalation, particularly ahead of electoral processes.
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According to Kuçi, the strengthening of Serbia’s military capabilities, developments in The Hague, elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, as well as Russia’s influence, could create conditions for tensions and “gray-zone” activities.
He emphasizes that NATO’s main challenge is not the outbreak of an open war, but the possibility that the response to and coordination over limited incidents could be delayed. In this situation, an escalation in northern Kosovo or in Bosnia and Herzegovina could gradually undermine the region’s security architecture.
Kuçi calls for a clear definition of the response mechanism, monitoring of illegal activities and punishment of actors that may financially support destabilization.
The Western Balkans is not necessarily facing the threat of a conventional conflict, but rather a growing risk of asymmetric escalation. NATO’s prevention of an open war could, paradoxically, give actors room to operate in the “gray zone.”
Serbia’s display of military power, including the deployment of advanced air-defense systems, the “Pobednik 2026” exercises and new defense procurement packages, is not necessarily linked to an intention to confront NATO directly. Rather, these developments could serve to create a “strategic umbrella.”
Such a situation could lead local hard-line structures to believe that they have greater room to act below the threshold of an international response. As in the dynamics surrounding Banjska, the display of military capabilities could be interpreted by state-linked structures as a signal of support for limited confrontations without crossing into a conventional war.
These factors are compounded by other developments that could affect stability. The trials in The Hague of former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army could fuel radical narratives and efforts to revise history.
Meanwhile, elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by those in Serbia, could create incentives for nationalist mobilization, the political use of security issues and the possible manipulation of electoral processes.
At the same time, Russian influence operations, supported by energy dependence, media and political networks, and forms of direct or indirect financing, could deepen local grievances and strengthen anti-Western narratives.
In this environment, NATO’s potential weakness lies not in its military capability, but in the risk of delays in coordination and decision-making. “Gray-zone” activities, ranging from cyberespionage targeting critical infrastructure to limited paramilitary incursions, can unfold within hours, while determining responsibility and coordinating a political response take more time.
For KFOR, according to this analysis, NATO’s strategic decision-making must be separated from the mission’s operational responsibilities. However, any ambiguity in assessing the situation or defining the response threshold could create room for gradual provocations.
An escalation in northern Kosovo or in Bosnia and Herzegovina is more likely to gradually weaken the region’s security architecture than to immediately lead to an open war.
To prevent this scenario, clearly defined red lines, concrete procedures for KFOR’s response, controls on illegal transfers and sanctions against entities financing destabilization are needed. The time remaining before the elections is crucial for clearly defining the costs and consequences before wrong steps are taken.
