The European Commission has reiterated the need for proper coordination and meaningful consultations between the affected municipalities and Kosovo’s central institutions before the Ibar Bridge is opened. The main bridge over the Ibar River connects South Mitrovica, where Albanians make up the majority, with North Mitrovica, which is inhabited mainly by Serbs.
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European Commission spokesperson Anita Hipper told a press conference on August 18 that the European Union’s position on the issue remains clear.
According to her, the Kosovo Police must ensure the safety of all communities by acting in accordance with democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law, so that every citizen feels protected.
Hipper recalled that the bridge is currently open to pedestrians, while vehicle traffic is still not permitted. She said steps had been taken on the issue, but the EU continues to expect effective coordination and meaningful consultations, which she said need to improve.
The European Commission’s position was made public after KFOR announced on August 10 that it had begun the “gradual transition” of its permanent presence on the bridge.
The NATO peacekeeping mission linked the decision to an improvement in the security situation, emphasizing that the process would proceed in stages and depend on conditions on the ground. However, KFOR will continue to maintain a visible presence in South Mitrovica, North Mitrovica and northern Kosovo in general.
Security expert Fidair Berisha told “Bota sot” that opening the bridge to vehicles is of strategic importance to Kosovo, even though it is happening late and without any particular reason for the delay. He summed up the situation with the phrase “better late than never.”
Berisha believes no provocation is expected from the Albanian side, as the main objective is to guarantee freedom of movement and uphold the rule of law. At the same time, he expects that various destabilizing scenarios could emerge from the Serbian side.
According to him, Serbia may try to obstruct the process or close the bridge through provocations and diplomatic channels. Berisha says political structures in Belgrade know that the Kosovo Police and other security institutions have the situation under control and will not allow actions that undermine security in Kosovo.
Among the possible scenarios, the expert mentions staged interethnic provocations, roadblocks in the north using heavy vehicles, disinformation campaigns and staged incidents in which Serbian citizens could be portrayed as being endangered by Albanians or the security authorities.
Berisha believes the Kosovo Police have sufficient personnel and logistical capacity to guarantee public order and keep the situation under control, regardless of the nature of any provocations. He also considers tactical coordination with KFOR and EULEX important in order to avoid misunderstandings and send a clear message of unity.
Regarding a coordination plan before the opening, the expert proposes fixed monitoring points on both sides of the bridge, a direct line of communication between the two Mitrovica municipalities and the establishment of a joint operational center that would operate in real time.
He believes that, in the long term, opening the bridge could help reduce tensions and facilitate the integration of the north. However, Berisha identifies a deliberate attack on vehicles as the most dangerous scenario, as it could subsequently be used by Serbian structures and Serbia to seek the reinstatement of blockades through the international community.
The expert adds that Kosovo’s security institutions are prepared and capable of responding professionally. For this reason, he believes that any scenario will be detected in time and successfully managed.
Analyst Eduard Gashi says the EU’s demand for coordination should not become an obstacle to Kosovo exercising its sovereignty. According to him, the main question is no longer whether the bridge should be opened, but how it should be opened and what political message the decision will convey.
Gashi interprets the European Commission’s call for “effective coordination and meaningful consultations” not as a veto on opening the bridge, but as a demand for a politically and institutionally controlled process. He emphasizes that this demand should not be used as a formula for indefinite delay.
According to the analyst, Kosovo has the right to exercise its sovereignty, but a serious state should not demonstrate that sovereignty by surprising its allies. He notes that the EU has emphasized that the bridge should serve all communities and that the Kosovo Police must guarantee security for everyone.
Gashi recalls that only a few days earlier, the EU had confirmed that the conditions it had previously deemed necessary for opening the bridge had been met. At the same time, KFOR had begun the gradual withdrawal of its permanent presence from the bridge, linking the development to improved security.
He emphasizes that coordination is not permission and consultation does not constitute a veto. According to him, Kosovo’s institutions cannot make their sovereignty conditional on the approval of a municipality or a Serbian political party. Nevertheless, in a sensitive area such as North Mitrovica, listening to residents and local authorities is part of good governance.
Gashi considers it unacceptable for the Serbian List or Belgrade to have the power to grant or withhold consent for the bridge’s opening, as this would create a right of veto over the functioning of the Republic of Kosovo’s authority and infrastructure.
The analyst recalls that the bridge issue is not new. As part of the EU-mediated dialogue, Kosovo and Serbia agreed in 2015 that the bridge and the surrounding area would be revitalized, with the aim of opening it to all traffic no later than June 2016. According to Gashi, it is now 2026 and, ten years later, its opening is still being discussed.
He believes this situation demonstrates the weakness of European policy in the Balkans, as technical issues that are not resolved in time turn into political problems, then into security issues, and require even greater diplomatic engagement.
Gashi emphasizes that cooperation with the US, NATO and the EU should not be viewed as an infringement of sovereignty, but as a way to increase Kosovo’s strength. He underlines that a small state that is not yet a member of the UN, NATO or the EU multiplies its influence through alliances, and that Kosovo did not achieve its current position alone.
According to him, even if Kosovo has the legal right to open the bridge, state decision-making must take into account the consequences that the manner of implementation could bring. The question, he emphasizes, is not only whether an action is permitted, but also what is gained, what is put at risk and who will stand by Kosovo the day after the decision.
A unilateral opening contrary to the position of key international partners could provide Kosovo with immediate domestic benefits, but at the same time could cost it diplomatic capital in Brussels and other decision-making centers.
The analyst considers the concerns of the Serbian community in the north important and says Serbian citizens must feel safe if the bridge is opened. However, he distinguishes between listening to that community and granting it a political veto over the operation of the Republic of Kosovo’s roads, bridges and institutions.
Gashi says a Serbian resident of North Mitrovica should feel just as safe crossing the bridge as an Albanian resident from the south. According to him, guaranteeing that safety is Kosovo’s responsibility, but no community should decide which parts of the Republic’s infrastructure or institutions may function.
He calls on the EU to provide greater clarity about what “meaningful consultations” entail. If further consultations are needed, he says Brussels should specify with whom they will be held, what they will include and the deadline by which they must be completed, so that they do not turn into an endless process.
Gashi believes the ultimate goal should be for the Ibar Bridge to no longer be treated as a political issue, but simply to serve as a link between the two parts of the city. For this reason, he proposes immediate consultations, concrete security guarantees, coordination with KFOR and the EU, and a clear deadline for the opening.
“Kosovo should open the Ibar Bridge, but it should not burn political bridges with its allies in the process,” the analyst concludes, describing this approach as statecraft rather than weakness.
The main bridge over the Ibar was blocked after the 1999 war and over the years became one of the main flashpoints of ethnic tension.
Kosovo and Serbia agreed to open it as part of the EU-mediated dialogue. The implementation plan, agreed in 2016, stipulated that the bridge would open to traffic in January 2017.
Work to revitalize the bridge, in which around 1.5 million euros was invested, was completed in 2018. Despite this, it was never opened to vehicles.
In 2024, initiatives by the Kosovo government to open the bridge were opposed by local Serbs. At the time, the international community demanded that any action be taken in coordination.
