There is little time left before the constitutional deadline for electing a new president expires, while the meetings announced by the political parties in recent days have yet to take place.
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According to the latest decision by the Constitutional Court, the 60-day period for electing the president began on August 8, 2026, and ends on October 6, 2026.
This means that the Assembly must complete the procedure for electing the president by October 6. If this does not happen within the constitutional deadline, the Assembly is dissolved and the country goes to new elections.
In such a scenario, November 8 or 15 are the dates that could be considered for holding the elections.
On Sunday, a meeting was held between LVV leader Albin Kurti and PDK leader Bedri Hamza, but according to the parties, the issue of the president was not part of the discussion.
However, during the day, PDK leader Bedri Hamza said that if the bill amending and supplementing the law on the Specialist Chambers of Kosovo in The Hague is approved, the country’s largest opposition party is open to discussing other issues with LVV.
In a statement to the media before Monday’s session of the Kosovo Assembly, Hamza said he had also discussed the bill with Prime Minister Albin Kurti during Sunday’s meeting.
According to Hamza, the issue of electing the president was also discussed at the meeting with LVV leader Kurti, but they did not focus on potential candidates.
He stressed that they had not reached the issue of names and had not discussed them, adding that if the law is approved, his party is also open to other topics.
Political scientist Ramadan Gjanaj believes that the time remaining is very short, but he thinks there is still an opportunity for a political agreement.
According to him, the PDK has already changed its position on the election of the new president, which, in his assessment, is an important development.
Gjanaj told “Bota sot” that very little time remains, but that it would be premature to say an agreement is impossible. According to him, the situation requires clear political will from all parliamentary parties, both the majority and the opposition. The coming days will be decisive, as the constitutional framework leaves very little room after October 6. The essential question, he said, is not only whether an agreement can be reached within thirteen days, but whether the parties are ready to make the necessary compromises to avoid a new institutional crisis. In this regard, the conviction of four former KLA leaders by the Specialist Chambers in The Hague has, in a way, created an additional window of opportunity for Albin Kurti. According to Gjanaj, the PDK has now officially changed its position on the election of the new president. In its latest political statement, it highlighted the issue of defending the four convicted individuals and reviewing the legal framework related to the Specialist Chambers. This development, he said, is important because it changes, to some extent, the current political configuration.
Gjanaj says there is real room for dialogue between LVV and PDK and expresses optimism about dialogue and compromise between the two parties.
According to him, until now the LDK appeared to be the main decisive factor in the presidential process. However, given its position and demands for the formation of a stable government, an agreement between LVV and LDK on the election of the president had become particularly difficult, even almost impossible. The LDK would certainly not agree to serve merely as formal support in the presidential election, guaranteeing LVV, if not its vote, then at least the presence of its deputies in the Assembly on voting day, without a broader political return. In this context, the PDK’s new position could open another possibility. In his view, there is now real room for dialogue between LVV and PDK, all the more so because the latter has not, to this point, publicly conditioned its possible support on participation in the next government. This could create an opportunity to seek an agreement on the election of the president while maintaining the stability of the current governing majority. However, it should not be forgotten that the PDK appears to want the defense of the four convicted individuals in The Hague and a review of the legal framework for the Specialist Chambers to be important elements of any political discussion. The question, therefore, will be whether LVV is prepared to make the necessary compromises on these issues in order to reach an agreement. He therefore believes that a real opportunity for dialogue and compromise still exists. But given the extremely short deadline and the political demands of each side, there is currently nothing to suggest that an agreement is certain. The election of the president requires a considerable parliamentary majority and, above all, the effective participation of deputies in the electoral process. By its very nature, this process makes the pursuit of a compromise necessary.
According to Gjanaj, the approaching October 6 date should push the parties to prioritize dialogue rather than a logic of confrontation.
He stresses that there is still room for political compromise, but this space is rapidly narrowing as time passes. The proximity of the October 6 deadline should precisely encourage the parties to prioritize dialogue rather than confrontation. According to him, Kosovo cannot regard institutional deadlock as a normal situation. Recent years have already shown how long the absence of a political agreement can last and how much it can delay the normal functioning of institutions. However, he recalls that a compromise can work only if it is based on mutual willingness. If the parties maintain completely incompatible positions until the last moment, the risk of a new deadlock becomes much more concrete. At this stage, he says, both scenarios remain open: there is still a possibility of compromise, but the time available to build it is extremely limited.
The political scientist believes that a nonpartisan candidate could genuinely offer an opportunity for compromise, precisely because such a candidate could be more easily accepted by parties that do not want to give the impression that they are directly supporting another party’s candidate.
But he emphasizes that a nonpartisan character, in itself, does not guarantee consensus.
In the current context, Gjanaj explains, a candidate capable of easing different political sensitivities would have a greater chance of facilitating a compromise than a candidate strongly identified with a single political camp. This does not necessarily mean that the candidate must be entirely outside politics, but the person’s profile, integrity and ability to represent all citizens should be at the center of the discussion. A nonpartisan candidate could genuinely provide an opportunity for compromise, precisely because such a candidate could be more easily accepted by parties that do not want to appear to be directly supporting another party’s candidate. However, he says, being nonpartisan in itself does not produce consensus. What matters most is the candidate’s credibility, experience, respect for institutions and ability to exercise the office of president as a function that transcends the interests of a single party. He warns that it should not be assumed that the profile of a particular male or female candidate alone would be the most decisive element in this situation. The process of electing the president, he says, is subject to very clear constitutional requirements: in the first two rounds, a two-thirds majority of all deputies is required, while in the third round the candidate must receive a majority of all deputies, meaning at least 61 votes. The issue of parliamentary attendance and quorum is also decisive for the process to actually take place. Today, the political conditions to guarantee this participation are not secured and, according to him, this has caused the institutional deadlock. Only a sustainable and workable political compromise is the key to ensuring the election of the next president. The PDK’s new political position, he adds, is an opportunity that should not be neglected if the aim is genuinely to avoid new elections.
In conclusion, Gjanaj discusses the consequences of failing to elect the president within the prescribed deadline.
According to him, failure in the presidential election would have significant institutional and political consequences. The Constitution provides that if the president is not elected within 60 days of the start of the procedure, the Assembly is dissolved. Article 82 is clear on this point: when the 60-day deadline for electing the president expires without a president being elected, the Assembly must be dissolved. Such a scenario would mean that Kosovo once again entered an electoral cycle, with the political, institutional and economic consequences this entails. It would prolong uncertainty at a time when institutions should be focused on the country’s priorities. Gjanaj says attention must also be paid to the legal consequences that could arise from exceeding the constitutional deadlines and from the interpretations applied to them. The Constitutional Court has set October 6 as the limit of the 60-day period for electing the president. In addition, the Constitution stipulates that the acting president cannot exercise the office for more than six months. According to him, it cannot be said with certainty today that exceeding these deadlines would automatically lead to a breach of institutional continuity, but it would be immature to assume that the situation would not create legal difficulties. The main risk would be the emergence of competing interpretations of the constitutional situation created after the deadlines expire.
He adds that various political actors could then try to challenge before the Constitutional Court the acts adopted during this period, whether the dissolution of the Assembly, the announcement of elections or the exercise of other presidential powers. The country could thus enter a new phase of institutional disputes, in which every decision could become the subject of challenges. This, he says, would risk not only prolonging legal uncertainty, but also delaying the electoral process itself and, consequently, postponing even further the search for a political solution to the current crisis. This is precisely where the main risk lies: the problem would no longer be only how to interpret the constitutional consequences of failure, but how to prevent this uncertainty from turning into a new political and legal confrontation before the Constitutional Court. Therefore, according to Gjanaj, October 6 should not be viewed merely as a procedural date, but as a moment of institutional responsibility. Political actors still have room to seek an agreement and should use the time remaining to prevent disagreement from turning into a new institutional crisis. The challenge, he concludes, goes beyond electing a president: it also concerns preserving the continuity, stability and predictability of Kosovo’s institutional functioning. The aim should be to prevent a political crisis after October 6 from becoming a legal and constitutional crisis that would further delay the return of institutions to normal functioning.
