The institutional crisis in Kosovo is continuing, while clashes between the governing side and the opposition have intensified over the path that should be followed to unblock the institutions.
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Although the PDK and AAK are calling for the Assembly to be constituted, they have refused to participate in dialogue on electing a consensus president. This position has raised questions about their strategy and the political objectives they seek to achieve.
The question is why these two parties are seeking to make the Assembly operational but refuse to sit at a table where a consensus president could be negotiated. It remains unclear whether this is merely a procedural dispute or a broader political battle.
Political analyst Zejnullah Jakupi spoke to “Bota sot” about the situation, saying that the current problem is not limited to technical and procedural aspects. According to him, the clash is also linked to control over the political order that will emerge after the Assembly is constituted.
Jakupi recalled that the PDK and AAK declined the meeting called by acting President Albulena Haxhiu, even though one of the announced topics was reaching an agreement on a consensus president. The PDK described the invitation as an attempt to manipulate the deadlines and called for a solution to be found within the Assembly.
The analyst argues that if constituting the Assembly is the main objective of the PDK and AAK, then a political agreement on the president could serve as one way to overcome the deadlock. However, according to him, these parties want the process to take place in the Assembly while simultaneously refusing to attend the meeting where the political formula that would enable a solution could be negotiated.
For Jakupi, this demonstrates that the clash is not merely procedural or technical, but is a battle for control over the political order after the legislative institution is constituted.
Analyzing the PDK’s approach in particular, Jakupi said the party may be pursuing several objectives in parallel. One of them, according to him, is to leave the Vetëvendosje Movement with responsibility for the crisis while the PDK maintains a more favorable political position.
According to the analyst, the message the PDK is trying to convey is that it is present in the Assembly and wants the work to be carried out there, while responsibility for the failure to unblock the institution rests with Vetëvendosje.
Jakupi believes that this line is more politically advantageous for the PDK than becoming involved in an agreement with Kurti or Haxhiu. A potential compromise, according to him, would weaken the opposition’s narrative that the LVV is responsible for the crisis.
He recalled that the PDK has specifically stated that Haxhiu should approach Avni Dehari about convening the session rather than inviting political parties for consultations.
Another objective, according to Jakupi, may be to avoid an agreement that Kurti could present as a political success. If Kurti manages to broker the election of a consensus president, the constitution of the Assembly and the subsequent establishment of the institutions, he would appear to be the person who brought the crisis to an end.
Such an outcome would be unfavorable for the opposition. For this reason, Jakupi believes the PDK may prefer a scenario in which public pressure on the LVV increases and responsibility for every failure continues to be attributed to it.
In the case of the AAK, the analyst sees a different political interest. According to him, the party does not want to become involved in an agreement that would strengthen the LVV unless it secures a clear political benefit in return.
Jakupi emphasized that the AAK, based on recent reports, has also interpreted the situation as a deliberate stalling tactic by Vetëvendosje. For this party, a mere invitation to elect a consensus president is not enough.
According to the analyst, the fundamental questions are who would regard the president as consensual, who the candidate would be, what agreement would be reached on the institutions, who would assume the Assembly chairmanship, what guarantees the opposition would receive and what would happen to the government.
If these questions remain unanswered, Jakupi believes that the formula of a “consensus president” could be seen as an agreement through which the opposition gives the LVV what it needs to unblock the system without receiving anything comparable in return.
However, the analyst also points to the weakness of this opposition strategy. If the PDK and AAK genuinely regard constituting the Assembly as their sole priority, then their categorical refusal to engage in political dialogue becomes difficult to explain, according to him.
Jakupi emphasized that parliamentary politics itself relies on negotiations. This is especially important for the election of the president, as the Constitution requires a very large majority: in the first two rounds, two-thirds of all MPs, or 80 votes, are required, while the third round requires a majority of all MPs.
For this reason, a genuinely consensus president cannot be elected by one side alone.
As for the actions outside the Assembly, Jakupi believes they should be seen more as tools for exerting political pressure and communicating with the public than as concrete attempts to resolve the crisis.
Through these actions, the opposition aims to convey the message that it is present, wants the Assembly to function and opposes the institution being held hostage.
According to the analyst, this approach serves the opposition by shifting the focus of the debate. Instead of asking why the parties are failing to reach an agreement, the issue is framed as a question of why the LVV is not opening the Assembly. Jakupi describes this as a major distinction in political terms.
He also commented on the statement by Avni Dehari, who chairs the constitutive session. According to Jakupi, Dehari is trying to steer the debate away from the procedural clash and toward reaching a political agreement.
In essence, Dehari’s position is that if all parties say they want to unblock the Assembly, they should sit down together and find a compromise. According to Jakupi, this confronts the PDK and AAK with the uncomfortable question of why they refuse to sit down if they are genuinely interested in a solution.
However, the analyst does not believe that one should immediately conclude that the PDK and AAK do not want a consensus president. He sees the problem as being more about their opposition to the method through which such an agreement is being sought.
According to Jakupi, a more accurate formulation is that these parties do not want a consensus president to become a mechanism for providing the LVV with a way out of the crisis without a broader political agreement.
He emphasized that this is an important distinction, as the opposition may fully support a consensus president while opposing the way in which the LVV is trying to achieve this.
Jakupi also linked this to the history of the crisis. During previous processes as well, the unilateral nomination of a presidential candidate caused clashes, while the opposition called for a consensus candidate.
Taking all these elements together, the analyst interprets the PDK and AAK strategy as an attempt to constitute the Assembly without giving the LVV a political agreement “for free.” According to him, they want to force the LVV to take the first step, preserve the narrative that Vetëvendosje bears responsibility for the crisis and enter any potential agreement from a stronger negotiating position.
At the same time, they seek to avoid a compromise that would portray Kurti as the architect of the solution to the crisis.
Jakupi also mentioned a longer-term objective. If no agreement is reached, new elections could prove more favorable for the opposition than a quick compromise that would stabilize the LVV.
Albulena Haxhiu has warned that, in the absence of an agreement, the country could once again head toward elections. She has also criticized the PDK and AAK for refusing dialogue.
In conclusion, Jakupi told “Bota sot” that the paradox is evident: the PDK and AAK are publicly calling for the Assembly to become operational immediately, yet they refuse to use one of the channels that could produce the political compromise needed for it to function.
According to him, this shows that the battle is not merely about constituting the Assembly. The clash is also linked to the terms of the agreement and the question of which side will emerge as the political winner from the resolution of the crisis.
