Analyst and publicist Nehat Hyseni says Kosovo is facing more than just political difficulties in constituting the Assembly and establishing new institutions. According to him, the country is facing a broader crisis linked to the interpretation, observance and implementation of the Constitution.
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Hyseni says every decision by officials exercising constitutional functions must be assessed not only on the basis of its political objective, but especially on the constitutional support that legitimizes it.
“The Republic of Kosovo is now facing one of the most complicated institutional situations of the post-war period,” Hyseni told ‘Bota sot’.
He considers dialogue between the political parties necessary, but raises questions about the institutional status and capacity on the basis of which acting President Albulena Haxhiu invited the opposition parties to a meeting.
According to him, the essence of the problem lies in the institutional position of the person who issued the invitation, the legal powers under which she is acting and the institutional manner of communication.
“The main issue is to determine in what capacity Albulena Haxhiu invited the political parties,” Hyseni says.
He explains that an invitation issued in her capacity as a party’s member of parliament would constitute a party political initiative. If the invitation was issued in her capacity as acting President, then, according to him, a much higher level of institutional neutrality is required.
Hyseni emphasizes that in a constitutional republic, the function determines the authority, and the latter sets the limits of action.
“The logic that because the goal is good, every means is permissible cannot be accepted. It is precisely this kind of reasoning that the Constitution seeks to prevent,” he says.
Another issue requiring clarification, according to Hyseni, is the relationship between the status of a member of the Assembly and the temporary exercise of the presidential function.
Referring to Articles 72 and 90 of the Constitution, he says that in this case there is a “clear normative tension” that must be analyzed systematically.
Hyseni underlines that this situation does not automatically imply a constitutional violation, but may indicate the existence of an exception or a special constitutional mechanism that must be interpreted as a whole.
According to him, this issue should also be examined by the Constitutional Court.
“The question should not be limited merely to whether an action is permitted or not. It must be determined which powers may be exercised by a member of parliament who temporarily also holds the presidential function and which of them require full institutional neutrality,” he says.
Hyseni describes Albulena Haxhiu’s role in the current circumstances as a “political paradox.”
“The acting President must represent the state institution and not serve as an instrument of a political party,” Hyseni emphasizes.
He calls for it to be made clear, if the invitation to the parties was issued in the name of the Office of the President, what the constitutional basis for this initiative is.
Hyseni asks whether, by using the authority of the acting President to mediate an agreement between the parties, Albulena Haxhiu is acting as an institutional arbiter or as a political actor.
“In a normal republic, the President should contribute to resolving the crisis, but cannot be part of one side of the crisis,” he says.
Speaking about the constitutional deadline for constituting the Assembly, Hyseni recalls that the final results of the June 7 elections were certified on July 8, while the 30-day deadline expired on August 7.
“This is a legal fact,” he emphasizes.
However, Hyseni rejects the interpretation that the expiry of this deadline automatically entails the dissolution of the Assembly or the loss of members’ mandates.
“The Constitution does not establish such an outcome,” he says.
According to him, the Constitutional Court should provide an authoritative answer on the legal status of members of parliament after the expiry of the 30-day deadline, the continuation of the constitutive session, the authority to convene it and the possibility of electing the Assembly’s bodies.
“These are issues of constitutional interpretation, not topics for television debates,” Hyseni says.
Regarding the demand that the constitutive session be held at frequent intervals, including every 48 hours, he says the issue should be viewed beyond the political clash.
“Holding the session every 48 hours is not a solution in itself,” Hyseni says.
He explains that constitutionality is not linked only to the fact that the Assembly meets, but also to whether the meeting is convened by the competent body, at the time and in the manner prescribed, and in accordance with constitutional rules.
“Repeating the sessions cannot replace constitutional authority. An unlawful session does not become lawful merely because it is held several times,” he emphasizes.
Hyseni cites Belgium as an example, noting that after the 2010 elections it remained for a long period without a fully formed new government, but institutional continuity was not interrupted.
“Political conflict must not turn into a crisis of state continuity,” he says.
In the case of the Netherlands as well, according to Hyseni, caretaker governments have been used as a mechanism to guarantee the functioning of the state.
“The parties may be in conflict, but the institutions must continue working. Even if the parties fail to form a coalition, the state cannot be left without functioning mechanisms,” he says.
Referring to Spain and Italy, Hyseni argues that political crises must be overcome through constitutional procedures and not through improvisation.
He also warns against personalizing the Constitution and using it according to the interests of political actors.
“The Constitution is not the property of Kurti, Haxhiu, Abdixhiku, Krasniqi, Haradinaj or any other leader. It stands above everyone,” Hyseni says.
According to him, the Assembly must not become an “arena of party warfare,” while the interpretation of the Constitution cannot change depending on the political position of those interpreting it.
Hyseni reiterates that sessions every 48 hours are not a solution in themselves and adds that procedure cannot replace a political agreement.
As a way out, he proposes an “institutional pact” that would include urgent constitutional interpretation, a clear separation of functions, inter-party dialogue, consultations on a consensual president, a reduction in confrontational rhetoric and constitutional reform after the crisis ends.
“PDK, LDK, AAK and LVV must sit down for dialogue. This dialogue must have a clear agenda: the constitution of the Assembly, the formation of the institutions and then the normal functioning of the state,” Hyseni says.
He believes that the issue of the president should also be discussed now, so that it does not become the next source of deadlock.
“If the election of the President risks becoming the new knot in the crisis, the parties must begin consultations in advance on a candidate who enjoys broader trust,” he says.
In conclusion, Hyseni says that no side can be declared the winner if political conflict results in damage to state institutions.
“Kosovo does not need a winner of the crisis, but an end to the crisis itself,” he emphasizes.
According to him, weakening the Constitution cannot be presented as a political success.
“If a leader retains power but the Constitution is damaged in the process, this is not a state victory. Likewise, if the opposition blocks the majority and the functioning of the Republic is damaged as a result, this does not constitute a democratic victory,” Hyseni says.
He believes that Albulena Haxhiu’s invitation to dialogue could serve as an opportunity to resolve the crisis, but only if it is based on clear institutional principles.
“If dialogue is used to bypass constitutional ambiguities, then a new paradox may be created: the state would be seeking to break the deadlock while deepening constitutional uncertainty,” Hyseni concludes.
His closing message is that a mandate to govern is not a license to block, a mandate to represent is not authorization to seize institutions, and an election victory gives no one the right to place the party above the Constitution.
