Acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti called on political party leaders to engage in an agreement regarding the election of the president, describing as unforgivable the possibility that Kosovo might face elections again.
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His call was followed by a development that further aggravated the situation. Bekim Sejdiu, involved in the political agreement reached between LVV and LDK, withdrew his candidacy after it became clear that he did not have the necessary number of votes in the Assembly.
This decision has brought back question marks over the possibility of a new political agreement and has highlighted the difficulty of finding a candidate who enjoys broad parliamentary support. Particularly problematic was the statement by six LDK deputies that they would not vote for Sejdiu, putting the agreement between Albin Kurti and Lumir Abdixhiku in difficulty.
After Sejdiu’s withdrawal, several issues remain open: can a political compromise still be reached, will a new consensual name be found, and which entity should take the first step? Also, it remains unclear whether the parties will be willing to make concessions to avoid another institutional crisis.
Alickaj: The clash of the six deputies is keeping the state in blockade
Albanian activist Agim Alickaj, in a statement for “Bota sot”, assessed the constitution of the Assembly and the formation of the Kurti IV Government as important developments for Kosovo. However, he stresses that the issue of the election of the president has still not been resolved.
According to him, Bekim Sejdiu’s withdrawal has made the process more complicated and unpredictable. Alickaj describes Sejdiu as a suitable candidate, with personal integrity, skills, and high professional qualifications.
He assesses that the Democratic League of Kosovo, led by Lumir Abdixhiku and supported by former president Vjosa Osmani, as well as Prime Minister Albin Kurti with his team, showed prudence and wisdom during difficult negotiations. In his judgment, the parties reached a compromise in the interest of the state.
However, Alickaj is critical of the six LDK deputies who refused to support Sejdiu. He claims that their opposition is related to personal grudges, career interests, and influences from external forces that continue to politically oppose Kurti.
The Albanian activist says that, together with the PDK and AAK, these deputies are contributing to the continuation of the institutional blockade, with the aim of removing Kurti from the political life of Kosovo.
Alickaj argues that the refusal to vote for a candidate like Sejdiu cannot be justified simply by political differences. According to him, such behavior is taking on an antidemocratic character and is causing harm to the state, while Kurti, on the contrary, is showing readiness for maximum compromise.
He adds that the opposing deputies have not presented an alternative and have not demonstrated willingness to compromise. At the same time, Alickaj calls on opposition parties to understand that power is not won through insults, slander, deceit, accusations, and baseless criticisms, but through the vote and trust of the citizens.
According to him, the parties must convince the citizens that they are better than Kurti and his coalition, composed of LVV, Guxo, Alternativa, and PSHDK. He raises the question whether the leaders of these entities have worthy advisers who place the country’s interest above personal and party interests.
Alickaj warns that the current clash does not harm only the prime minister, but also the state itself. He emphasizes that without a strong state, neither political parties nor the secure future of Kosovo’s children can have value.
Another concern raised by him relates to Serbia. Alickaj says that racist and hegemonic Serbia awaits every weakness and internal division in Kosovo, in order to use them against the state and Albanian national interests.
For this reason, he assesses that the responsibility of the deputies is greater than their personal or party interests. In this context, he sees Kurti’s call for finding a solution as evidence of his efforts to avoid other elections, which he considers unnecessary and costly.
Alickaj also praises the LDK leaders, who, according to him, have understood the seriousness of the situation and have oriented themselves toward a more constructive approach to democracy and state-building.
However, he asks that LDK review its relationship with the group of six deputies if the latter continue with actions that contradict the party’s political stance. According to him, such a decision may temporarily weaken LDK, but in the long term it would transform it into a more serious and constructive force, which Kosovo needs.
He hopes that Kurti and Abdixhiku will find, in the coming days, a new consensual candidate, with integrity and ability to exercise with dignity the duties of the president of the Republic of Kosovo. The new candidate, according to him, must secure the support of the necessary majority of deputies.
Such an agreement, according to Alickaj, would spare Kosovo fourth elections, which he considers completely unnecessary and without reason. If a new compromise is not reached, the decision would return to the citizens again through elections.
Alickaj assesses that the responsibility for the institutional blockade is becoming increasingly visible. He warns that PDK, AAK, and the LDK deputies whom he calls saboteurs may face severe punishment from the citizens’ vote.
He predicts consequences for the political entities as well. According to him, PDK risks fragmentation and a significant decline, AAK may remain below the electoral threshold, while the unprincipled group within LDK may end up on the margins of the political scene.
As a way out, Alickaj asks these forces to reflect, change approach, and contribute to the election of the president. He emphasizes that political compromise is not a sign of weakness when done in the interest of the country, but evidence of maturity, wisdom, and state responsibility.
He adds that Kosovo needs strong and constructive parties, which confront each other through ideas, programs, and results, but unite when the functioning of the state is called into question.
Jakupi: The first initiative belongs to Kurti, but the agreement requires everyone’s engagement
Political analyst Zejnulla Jakupi analyzes Kurti’s call on two planes: the institutional and the political.
In the institutional aspect, Jakupi says that Kosovo has just emerged from a long period of blockade, having managed to constitute the Assembly and form the new government. Failure to elect the president, according to him, would return the country to the cycle of crisis and elections.
Jakupi notes that Kurti himself has linked the risk with repeated elections, which have hindered the regular functioning of institutions. On the political plane, he sees the prime minister’s call as an appeal, but also as an attempt to distribute the responsibility for a possible crisis among all parties.
LVV has 53 deputies, while LDK has 18. The agreement between Kurti and Lumir Abdixhiku on the candidacy of Bekim Sejdiu proved that compromise is possible, but at the same time showed that the leaders’ agreement is not enough without concrete votes in the Assembly.
The fact that six LDK deputies declared that they would not vote for Sejdiu made it impossible to secure the necessary threshold. For Jakupi, after the candidate’s withdrawal, the space for agreement has not disappeared, but has narrowed significantly.
He assesses that Sejdiu’s withdrawal showed that the obstacle did not lie only in the candidate’s name, but also in the lack of political consensus and discipline within the parties. For this reason, the process must start from scratch with a figure who is not perceived only as a candidate of LVV or of a bilateral agreement.
According to Jakupi, the new candidate must be able to secure broader parliamentary support. He recalls that Sejdiu withdrew precisely because he did not have the necessary support and because the process had turned into a political clash.
Jakupi thinks that the first step must be taken by the largest parliamentary force and by Prime Minister Albin Kurti. With 53 deputies and control of the government, LVV, according to him, holds greater responsibility for proposing a compromise formula.
However, he emphasizes that responsibility cannot be left solely to Kurti. LDK must unite its deputies around an agreement, while PDK and AAK must clarify whether they truly seek an institutional solution or whether new elections remain their political alternative.
In a polarized climate, Jakupi warns that a compromise cannot be realized if only one side agrees to make concessions.
Regarding new elections, he considers the risk real. For the election of the president, a two-thirds majority is required in the first two rounds, which translates to 80 votes in the 120-member Assembly.
If the vote fails even in the third round, the constitutional mechanism leads to the dissolution of the Assembly and the organization of new elections. For this reason, the election of the president is not only a symbolic matter, but a process that can determine whether Kosovo will continue with the existing institutions or will enter again into an electoral crisis.
Jakupi sees as one possible route that LDK propose a figure capable of getting votes not only from its own deputies, but also from other opposition parties. In the political discussion, he mentions the names of Lumir Abdixhiku, Vjosa Osmani, and Lutfi Haziri.
Vjosa Osmani, according to him, may have a special advantage. She has been president of Kosovo and has previously managed to secure support beyond a single political grouping.
Jakupi emphasizes that, if 80 votes are aimed for in the Assembly, a figure must be elected who is not seen only as a product of the LVV–LDK agreement, but as a candidate acceptable to a broader part of the political spectrum.
In case the election of the president fails again and Kosovo is forced to go to elections, according to Jakupi, it will no longer be enough for the parties to blame each other. He calls for opening a serious debate on changing the constitutional rules that have enabled such an institutional blockade.
One of the changes that should be examined, according to him, is the obligation for deputies to remain in the hall during the president election procedure. Jakupi considers it unreasonable that a minority of deputies, by not participating in the session, can block the functioning of a constitutional institution and lead the country toward new elections.
He also proposes that, after the failure of the first two rounds, in the final round, 61 real votes would suffice for the election of the president, and that the absence of deputies could not be used as a blocking tool.
The Constitution already determines the majority of 61 votes in the third round. The problem, according to Jakupi, lies in the interpretation and the rules on presence in the hall, which can make this majority practically insufficient to conclude the process.
For him, the formulation must be legally and democratically clear: 61 deputies present must constitute the quorum for the third round, and deputies must have the obligation to participate in the vote. This would avoid the idea that the president can be elected with 61 votes in a situation where 59 deputies are outside the hall.
Jakupi links this proposal to the current situation, as Kosovo is facing the risk of another election due to the impossibility of electing the president.
