The Supreme Court of Kosovo did not examine Blerim Isufaj’s appeal against the decision of the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council (KPC) to dismiss him from leading the Special Prosecution Office. It declared the appeal inadmissible, reasoning that the KPC’s decision was an administrative act rather than a disciplinary measure, and that its legality must therefore be challenged through an administrative dispute.
In ruling A.A. no. 40/2026, issued on October 27, 2026, and obtained by KosovaPress, the Supreme Court clarified that it did not have direct jurisdiction to examine decisions of this nature.
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The case was handled by a panel consisting of presiding judge Delushe Halimi and members Faton Ademi and Nenad Lazic.
“The appeal of B.I., Chief Prosecutor of the Special Prosecution Office of the Republic of Kosovo, filed against the decision of the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council in Pristina, KPC/No. 695/2026, dated October 2, 2026, is dismissed as inadmissible,” the operative section of the ruling states.
On October 2, the KPC decided to remove Isufaj from his leadership position. The Council cited mismanagement of the Special Prosecution Office, incompetence at work, failure to perform responsibilities and failure to meet performance standards.
According to the KPC’s decision, each of these circumstances constituted, in itself, a legal basis for removing him from the post of chief prosecutor. However, Isufaj did not lose his status as a state prosecutor and continued working as a prosecutor at the Special Prosecution Office.
In the appeal filed through his lawyer, Artan Qerkini, Isufaj claimed that procedural provisions had been violated during the proceedings, that the law had been incorrectly applied and that the facts had not been fully established.
He argued that the decision had been prepared before it was adopted, that he had not been given the opportunity to be heard, and that the Council’s quorum, composition and voting procedure could not be confirmed.
Isufaj also raised concerns about the impartiality of the decision-making body and a conflict of interest. He also challenged the use of a performance assessment which, he said, had not taken final form.
The appeal also contested the interpretation of the provisions establishing the criteria for exercising the function of chief prosecutor. Isufaj said that a “satisfactory” assessment was not negative and, consequently, did not justify his removal from the position.
He also questioned the findings of mismanagement, claiming that they were not supported by concrete facts. Regarding the report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Isufaj claimed that it reflected systemic problems rather than personal responsibility.
Isufaj asked the Supreme Court to amend the KPC’s decision and allow him to continue his mandate as chief prosecutor until its regular completion. Alternatively, he requested that the decision be annulled and the case returned to the KPC for reconsideration and a new decision.
He also requested that the appeal have suspensive effect, so that the decision to remove him and the decision to appoint an acting official would not produce legal consequences until a final decision was issued.
The KPC, for its part, opposed the Supreme Court examining the appeal. According to the Council, the decision to remove Isufaj was not disciplinary, either in substance or in form.
The Council explained that the decision was based on Article 22, paragraph 5, of the Law on the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council, which defines the authority to remove chief prosecutors from leadership positions. The KPC requested that the appeal be declared inadmissible or, alternatively, rejected as unfounded.
In its reasoning, the Supreme Court distinguished between proceedings concerning the disciplinary responsibility of prosecutors and the KPC’s powers to administer the prosecutorial system.
According to the Court, the Law on the Prosecutorial Council gives the KPC the right to remove a chief prosecutor from a leadership position on the basis of performance, mismanagement, incompetence or failure to perform duties. The exercise of this authority, however, is not the same as disciplinary proceedings, which are regulated by a separate law.
The ruling emphasizes that removal from the position of chief prosecutor for reasons related to performance is not defined as a separate disciplinary sanction. Likewise, ending the exercise of a leadership function does not, in itself, turn the decision into a disciplinary measure.
For a decision to have a disciplinary character, according to the Supreme Court, it must contain a finding of disciplinary responsibility and legal consequences arising from it. In this case, the Court found that the KPC had not acted through disciplinary proceedings.
For this reason, Article 15 of the Law on the Disciplinary Responsibility of Judges and Prosecutors, which allows direct appeals to the Supreme Court against disciplinary decisions, could not be applied in Isufaj’s case.
The Court characterized the KPC’s decision to remove him from his leadership position as an individual administrative act. Its legality may be reviewed by the competent court through administrative dispute proceedings.
The Supreme Court emphasized that its jurisdiction to directly handle appeals against disciplinary decisions could not be extended to other categories of KPC decisions.
It also assessed that Isufaj could not rely on a previous Supreme Court judgment dated December 16, 2025, because the two cases had different legal natures.
In conclusion, the panel found that there was no legal basis to examine the appeal directly and declared it inadmissible. The Court did not take a position on whether the KPC’s allegations of mismanagement and poor performance were well founded.
The ruling addressed only the Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of the appeal, while leaving open the possibility of judicial review through an administrative dispute.
