The Special Prosecution Office of Kosovo has indicted Fatmir Sheholli, accusing him of suspected cooperation with Serbia’s Security and Information Agency (BIA), as well as blackmailing an individual for an amount exceeding 13,000 euros.
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Sheholli is facing charges of “espionage” and “blackmail.”
The case has reopened a sensitive debate over Kosovo’s national security: whether espionage networks disappeared after the end of the war, or whether, 26 years later, they have adapted their methods, forms and objectives.
Speaking to “Bota sot,” retired General Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj analyzed the issue. According to him, the end of the war did not also bring an end to the activities of espionage networks.
Racaj says the main change concerns the way they operate and the instruments used to collect information and exert influence.
“Espionage networks have not disappeared 26 years after the war, but have taken other forms. The Sheholli case has brought back into focus the question of whether these networks ended with the war, or whether their methods, forms and objectives changed over these 26 years. It should also be examined whether Kosovo’s institutions, the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, the Kosovo Police and other structures have been strengthened to detect and combat secret services operating against Kosovo and within it,” Racaj said.
The retired general believes that Kosovo’s security should not be analyzed solely through the lens of one particular state or service. According to him, the presence of numerous international actors in the country also brings different intelligence interests, some of which may conflict with Kosovo’s interests.
“A limited perspective, which links intelligence activities to only one state or service, should not be used. The many embassies and diplomatic missions also imply the presence of different intelligence interests. Alongside the services of friendly countries that cooperate with Kosovo’s institutions on security, there may also be foreign actors whose interests conflict with those of the state of Kosovo.
Contemporary espionage should be understood as part of a broader geopolitical competition, in which information has become a fundamental instrument of power. In addition to the traditional recruitment of people, social networks, disinformation, influence over public opinion, economic pressure, political influence, cyber operations and institutional weaknesses are now being used,” Racaj said.
He emphasizes that today’s threats to national security are not linked solely to classic espionage. Information and influence, he says, have become important tools in the confrontation between various powers and geopolitical actors.
“Information warfare and influence operations can be just as dangerous as traditional threats. If classified information falls into the wrong hands, an operation, an institution or even the strategic interests of the state may be harmed,” he stresses.
Referring directly to the case of Fatmir Sheholli, Racaj called on Kosovo’s institutions to address it with seriousness, professionalism and care, distinguishing suspicions from facts proven during legal proceedings.
“The Sheholli case should be handled with institutional responsibility, professionalism and restraint. It is not in Kosovo’s interest to create panic or rely on unconfirmed allegations. However, any suspicion of unlawful intelligence activity must be investigated by the competent authorities and, if proven, dealt with according to the law.
The Kosovo Intelligence Agency has a particular responsibility in this regard. Detecting and preventing activities that threaten national security is one of its main challenges. When security institutions identify and neutralize such networks or activities, this should not be seen only as a problem, but also as an indication that counterintelligence mechanisms are functioning and that Kosovo is building more sustainable capacities to protect its interests,” Racaj said.
According to him, confronting espionage cannot rely solely on a response after a case has been uncovered. Institutions must work continuously on prevention, capacity building and the protection of security structures.
“Counterintelligence requires prevention, professionalism, control of classified information, protection of strategic institutions, awareness among officials and continuous cooperation with international partners.
The 1999 war has ended, but the clash of interests surrounding Kosovo continues. Today it appears in more sophisticated forms, through information, intelligence, cyberspace, diplomacy and political influence,” the retired general said.
Racaj considers Kosovo’s institutions’ ability to detect and prevent intelligence threats an important indicator of the state’s strength and maturity.
“The main question should not only be ‘Who is spying on Kosovo?’ but also ‘How capable are Kosovo’s institutions of detecting, preventing and neutralizing any activity that threatens national security?’
The answer to this question is one of the most important measures of the maturity of the state of Kosovo. In the 21st century, protecting the state is not carried out only at the borders and through military means; it also requires protecting information, institutions and citizens’ awareness,” Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj concluded in an interview with “Bota sot.”
