President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic has announced that he will send a letter to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, asking him not to allow the opening of the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica.
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Vucic said the letter would be sent this evening and expressed hope that the NATO chief would consider his request.
The Serbian president reiterated that Serbia would continue to oppose the opening of the bridge, declaring that he would “fight as much as he can” over the issue.
Meanwhile, KFOR earlier began a gradual process to change its presence at the main bridge over the Ibar.
According to reports, this development is linked to the improvement in the security situation and the gradual adjustment of NATO’s mission in Kosovo.
Islami: Vucic is trying to move the bridge issue from the local to the international level
Avni Islami, a professor of security sciences, told “Bota sot” that Aleksandar Vucic has intensified his rhetoric against plans to open the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica.
According to him, the Serbian president is expected to send Mark Rutte an official letter requesting that the bridge not be opened to traffic.
“Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, a former propaganda minister during the time of Milosevic, has toughened his position toward plans to open the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica.
He has announced that he will send NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte an official letter with the clear request that the bridge’s opening to traffic be prevented,” Islami said.
He assesses that this approach aims to increase international pressure on Kosovo and directly involve KFOR in decision-making concerning the Ibar Bridge.
Islami believes that Belgrade is trying to create the impression that opening the bridge could endanger the security of Serbs in Kosovo. In this way, according to him, Vucic’s narrative as the “protector” of this community is also reinforced.
“This move clearly demonstrates Vucic’s strategy of shifting the issue from the local level to the highest international and diplomatic arena.
By addressing the NATO chief directly, Belgrade aims to strip Kosovo of its decision-making authority and place NATO and KFOR face-to-face with direct responsibility for maintaining the status quo.
The warning that an official letter will be sent represents a new political escalation and is accompanied by a dangerous security equation. Through this rhetoric, Vucic is pursuing three main objectives: pressuring KFOR and directly implicating NATO troops in blocking the sovereign decisions of Kosovo’s institutions.
At the same time, the aim is to construct a narrative in which the opening of the bridge is portrayed as a threat to the security and stability of the Serbian community, using fear as a tool of pressure. The third objective is to strengthen the image of the “protector” through domestic propaganda claiming that Belgrade remains the sole guarantor of the security and existence of Serbs in Kosovo,” Islami concluded to “Bota sot.”
Shala: The bridge is not merely a road, but a symbol of Mitrovica’s division
Security expert Drizan Shala said in a conversation with “Bota sot” that Vucic’s opposition to the opening of the bridge cannot be explained solely by security arguments, as it also contains political and strategic elements.
According to Shala, the bridge represents the division of Mitrovica, while its opening would weaken this reality and narrow Belgrade’s sphere of influence in northern Kosovo.
“Aleksandar Vucic’s statement that he will address Mark Rutte with a request that the main bridge over the Ibar in Mitrovica not be opened should be analyzed beyond the symbolic importance of the bridge itself.
The first reason Vucic opposes the opening is linked to the fact that the Ibar Bridge is not simply an infrastructure facility. For more than two decades, it has become a symbol of Mitrovica’s physical, political and psychological division.
Opening it would have consequences far broader than allowing vehicles to pass, because it would weaken the bridge’s role as a dividing line.
For Belgrade, preserving this division is politically important. A divided Mitrovica can more easily be presented as evidence of a reality that has not yet been consolidated and as an argument for Serbia’s continued intervention in the affairs of northern Kosovo.
Therefore, opposition to the opening should not be viewed solely as concern for the security of the Serbian community. It has a clear political and strategic background,” Shala said.
He considers Belgrade’s request for NATO involvement in the bridge issue an attempt to intervene in an area that falls under the jurisdiction of Kosovo’s institutions.
Shala emphasizes that Serbia has the right to express security concerns, but it cannot transfer to NATO the authority to decide whether infrastructure in Kosovo should be opened or not.
“If the purpose of the request is for an external authority to stop a decision concerning the operation of territory and infrastructure located under the jurisdiction of Kosovo’s institutions, then we are dealing with interference.
Serbia’s concerns about the security of Serbs in Kosovo can be expressed, and NATO/KFOR should treat them seriously. Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between raising a security concern and requesting that the fate of infrastructure in Kosovo be determined.
In this case, Belgrade is attempting to shift decision-making from Kosovo’s institutions to NATO. This is the issue that must be carefully examined,” he said.
According to Shala, NATO should seriously assess Vucic’s request, but it should not be turned into a political veto over Kosovo’s institutions.
He adds that, in the absence of concrete security threats, the bridge should not continue to remain a symbol of political division.
“NATO should neither disregard the request nor treat it as a political order.
The most professional approach would be to hear it and analyze it from a security perspective, while any attempt to use KFOR as an instrument of Belgrade’s political decision-making should be rejected.
KFOR is responsible for security and stability, but this does not mean that it should assume the powers of Kosovo’s institutions.
The European position has also been that the bridge should be opened, but in coordination with security partners. For this reason, the main question should not be whether Vucic wants the bridge opened, but whether there is a concrete and verifiable threat that would justify keeping it closed.
If there is a concrete threat, it should be addressed with concrete security measures. If no such threat exists, then the security argument cannot be used to preserve a political division.
Belgrade opposes the opening in an area where Kosovo’s institutions have responsibility because the bridge carries symbolic weight far greater than its physical function.
Its opening would convey the message that northern Mitrovica should not be treated as a separate political zone isolated from the rest of Kosovo. This message directly contradicts Belgrade’s political narrative.
From a security perspective, reducing the issue to an Albanian-Serb confrontation must be avoided. The main problem is whether public infrastructure can be kept closed indefinitely simply because it has become a symbol of a political conflict.
The message from the perspective of national security must be clear: Kosovo’s institutions should have primary responsibility for public order and the functioning of infrastructure in Kosovo’s territory. KFOR should guarantee security within its mandate, while political issues should be addressed through political dialogue.
A model must not be allowed to emerge in which every decision by Kosovo’s institutions in the north is blocked through the political pressure Belgrade exerts on NATO. Such a practice would create a dangerous precedent.
Ultimately, the Ibar Bridge is not merely a matter of concrete, asphalt and traffic. It is a test to determine who establishes normality in northern Kosovo. If security can be guaranteed, free movement should be the objective. If threats exist, they must be neutralized, but security must not be used as a pretext for preserving political division.
For this reason, Vucic’s request should be treated with diplomatic seriousness, but it must not be allowed to turn into a political veto over Kosovo’s institutions,” Drizan Shala concluded to “Bota sot.”
