Relations between Ukraine and Serbia are not strategic in nature, but the reciprocal interests that have brought them together are also influencing Kyiv’s approach to the issue of Kosovo’s independence, according to experts consulted by Radio Free Europe.
Të lidhura
None found
The issue came to the fore after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s first official visit to the Serbian capital, where he stressed that he respects the territorial sovereignty of partners and that Ukraine’s position on Kosovo’s declaration of independence “has not changed.”
Kateryna Shymkevych, a specialist at the Ukraine-based Analytical Center for Balkan Studies, believes that Kyiv regards cooperation with Belgrade as beneficial for securing ammunition, maintaining relations with Brussels and efforts to draw Serbia, however slightly, toward the West.
She adds that Serbia, for its part, wants closer ties with Germany and France and sees Ukraine as a gateway to the EU, while Ukraine has concrete arms needs and wants to maintain a channel of dialogue with a state that has traditionally been loyal to Russia.
“Ukraine knows very well that Serbia is a pro-Russian country, but telling the EU that you will not cooperate with Serbia is not a realistic solution,” Shymkevych told Radio Free Europe.
Yevhen Mahda, executive director of the Institute for World Politics in Kyiv, takes a similar view.
He notes that Ukraine and Serbia cannot be described as strategic allies, suggesting that it was Serbian President Aleksandar Vuciq who benefited most from Zelensky’s visit.
Nevertheless, Mahda does not rule out the possibility that Ukraine also gained from the relationship.
“In short, [Ukraine has received] ammunition supplies and the possibility that Serbia could serve as a bridge for talks with Russia,” he told RFE.
The issue of Kosovo is also part of this mosaic of interests, with Ukraine’s non-recognition of Kosovo becoming a subject of discussion during Zelensky’s stay in Belgrade.
What is holding Ukraine back from recognizing Kosovo?
Kyiv justifies its non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence by invoking the principle of territorial integrity under international law and fears that recognizing Kosovo could be instrumentalized by Russia in relation to the Ukrainian territories it has occupied.
However, official Pristina responds that this comparison does not stand: in 2010, the International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was in accordance with international norms.
In a study published this week by the Kosovo Centre for Security Studies, analyst Ramadan Ilazi notes that Kosovo and the Ukrainian areas occupied by Russia are entirely different cases and that Ukraine has no reason to invent artificial comparisons between them.
He explains that the state of Kosovo was created after years of repression, armed conflict, NATO’s humanitarian intervention and a broad international process to determine its status. Crimea, by contrast, was seized and annexed through Russian military aggression.
Gëzim Visoka, a lecturer in peace and conflict studies at the University of Dublin, also focuses his criticism precisely on this fundamental distinction.
He stresses that “there is no parallel whatsoever between Kosovo and the Ukrainian territories under occupation” and that Ukraine would be better off recognizing Kosovo rather than giving the Kremlin an opportunity to justify the occupation of its territories.
“In these circumstances, I believe Ukraine’s futile and decidedly unfriendly objection to Kosovo’s independence not only legitimizes Serbia’s obstructive position, but also gives an additional pretext to the five EU members that continue to withhold recognition from Kosovo,” he told Radio Free Europe.
Glauk Konjufca, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora of Kosovo, reinforced the same position, stating that the Kosovar state was born from the people’s liberation war after “many years of systematic oppression and a genocidal campaign by the Milošević regime.”
“What followed was not occupation, annexation or violent conquest, but a process of international supervision under the aegis of the UN and diplomatic mediation to resolve the final status,” Konjufca said a few days ago.
Continuing his analysis, Visoka adds that Pristina has done enough for Ukraine for Kyiv to have every reason to reconsider recognition, although he notes that such a decision could depend on the outcome of the conflict and the country’s future strategic course.
“Kosovo’s disappointment and reaction following Zelensky’s statement in Belgrade are restrained and understandable. Unconditional support for Ukraine has a limit, and it appears that Kosovo may have already reached that threshold,” Visoka concludes.
Since the beginning of Russia’s aggression, Kosovo has firmly stood by Ukraine, joining international sanctions, providing aid and hospitality to Ukrainian refugees, and offering continued political support.
But Kateryna Shymkevych of the Analytical Center for Balkan Studies sees the other side of the coin and considers the reaction to Zelensky’s words “exaggerated.”
“The Ukrainian leadership has made no promise whatsoever to recognize Kosovo. It may be a bitter pill to swallow, but this is the reality,” she told Radio Free Europe.
Shymkevych explains that Ukraine’s concern is not only related to Serbia, but also to the fact that Russia constantly uses the Kosovo case as a precedent. According to her, Moscow has referred to the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on Kosovo to support its own claims regarding Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk. The latter two regions, located in eastern Ukraine, have been declared annexed by Russia but are universally recognized as Ukrainian territory.
Kyiv therefore faces a genuine dilemma: recognizing Kosovo might not have any visible consequences for its relations with the majority, but it would provide Moscow with another weapon in its propaganda war.
“This risks bringing even deeper chaos to the international arena, with consequences including civil wars, further erosion or even the complete collapse of the fundamental principles of international law,” she warns.
Meanwhile, Mahda cites as the only possible consequence a deterioration in relations with the EU members that still do not recognize Kosovo.
“Within Ukrainian society, recognition of Kosovo’s independence would have no negative effect whatsoever,” he adds, saying that he came to this conclusion during a visit to Kosovo at the end of last year.
Nevertheless, Shymkevych stresses that the lack of formal recognition has not prevented Ukraine from gradually strengthening its ties with Kosovo.
She cites as examples the participation of Ukrainian peacekeepers in KFOR until 2022, the recognition of Kosovo documents for humanitarian matters, trade relations and networks of specialists fighting propaganda and disinformation.
During 2025, Ukraine also appointed a representative of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry for Albania and Kosovo.
In a conversation held on Monday with Radio Free Europe, the chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee in the Ukrainian parliament, Oleksandr Merezhko, suggested that the position on Kosovo’s independence could be reviewed after the war, depending “on the position of the EU and its member states.”
