Security expert Gurakuç Kuçi reacted to statements by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, saying that his calls for the “protection of Serbs in Kosovo” contradict the support that, according to him, Belgrade continues to give to people linked to the Banjska attack and criminal networks.
According to Kuçi, Milan Radoičić is not being prosecuted for political reasons, but over serious charges, including war crimes and terrorism. He recalls that Radoičić is under US sanctions, is wanted by Kosovo’s justice system and, through his lawyer, has taken responsibility for the attack in Banjska.
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Kuçi assesses that the political and financial support Serbia gives to people linked to this network shows that the issue is not only connected to organized crime, but to its use as an instrument of state policy toward Kosovo.
“The real division is not between Serbs and Albanians, but between justice and crime,” he concludes.
Kuçi titled his reaction with the question: “Protection for Serbs, or protection for Radoičić?”
He says this is where the greatest paradox of Serbian policy toward Kosovo lies: while Vučić asks KFOR and NATO for “protection for Serbs in Kosovo,” according to him Belgrade is at the same time protecting and relativizing individuals linked to organized crime, attacks on KFOR, the terrorist attack in Banjska and the destabilization of northern Kosovo.
According to him, security for a community cannot be sought while political support is being given to structures that produce terrorism for all communities.
Kuçi stresses that the case of Milan Radoičić and Zvonko Veselinović is not simply a criminal story, but rather the way organized crime, state nationalism and Vučić’s politics merge into a single mechanism of pressure against Kosovo.
He then lists the facts one by one.
First, Kuçi says that Radoičić is suspected of the killing of 106 Albanian civilians and the mistreatment of 300 others in Gjakova. He recalls that in April 2025, the Basic Court in Pristina issued an arrest warrant for Radoičić and 19 other people suspected of war crimes in Gjakova.
Second, he underlines that before Vučić and the SNS came to power, Serbian institutions had identified Radoičić and Veselinović as figures linked to criminal networks involving drugs, weapons, oil, usury and money laundering. Later, the US Treasury Department described Veselinović’s network as a criminal organization involved in trafficking goods, money, narcotics and weapons between Kosovo and Serbia.
Third, according to Kuçi, Radoičić and Veselinović are also linked to the murder of Oliver Ivanović in 2018, as the indictment in Kosovo described them as leaders of an organized criminal group which, according to the prosecution, was responsible for that murder.
Fourth, he recalls that in 2021, the United States imposed sanctions on Radoičić and Veselinović, along with individuals and companies linked to them. OFAC emphasized that this network was involved in corruption and in the illegal trafficking of goods, money, narcotics and weapons.
Fifth, Kuçi brings up the events of May 29, 2023, when violent Serbian groups attacked KFOR members in Zvečan, leaving 30 peacekeepers wounded, 11 Italians and 19 Hungarians. KFOR described these attacks as unprovoked. It was later reported that a Hungarian soldier lost his leg as a result of the injuries he suffered.
Sixth, he mentions the September 24, 2023 attack in Banjska, when an armed group attacked the Kosovo Police, in which Sergeant Afrim Bunjaku was killed, while three Serbian attackers were later killed. Kuçi emphasizes that Milan Radoičić admitted responsibility for the events in Banjska through his lawyer, Goran Petronijević. In Serbia he was temporarily arrested, but was later released.
Seventh, Kuçi says that in December 2023, Interpol issued an international arrest warrant for Radoičić in connection with the Banjska attack.
Eighth, he stresses that in September 2024, the Kosovo Special Prosecution filed an indictment against 45 people over the Banjska attack, including Milan Radoičić. According to him, the indictment includes terrorism, undermining the constitutional order, financing terrorism and money laundering.
Ninth, Kuçi says that even after the indictment over the Banjska attack, Serbia’s institutions have continued to finance networks linked to the case. He refers to a revelation by Radio Free Europe, according to which the company “Rad 028,” owned by Radulle Stević, who is under US sanctions and accused in Kosovo of involvement in the Banjska case, has benefited from multimillion-euro contracts from Serbian institutions. Since the beginning of 2026 alone, the company has signed 10 contracts worth more than 1 million euros, while during 2025 it won more than 30 contracts worth over 6.4 million euros. According to Kosovo’s indictment, Stević, through his companies, helped Milan Radoičić launder money. For Kuçi, this proves that Belgrade’s connection to the Banjska network is not only political and propagandistic, but also financial and institutional.
He also recalls that US Ambassador Jeffrey Hovenier described Radoičić as a criminal and demanded that he face justice. Likewise, former US envoy Gabriel Escobar called for accountability for Banjska and stressed that there were financial and organizational ties to the Serbian state.
According to Kuçi, the European Parliament has also condemned the Banjska attack and called for those responsible to be held accountable. He adds that on June 3, 2026, the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, AFET, expressed regret that Serbia had not prosecuted those responsible for the Banjska attack, especially Milan Radoičić, and called for cooperation with Kosovo to bring the perpetrators to justice.
Kuçi also mentions the position of the United Kingdom, which in October 2025 called at the UN Security Council for Serbia to play its role in bringing those responsible for Banjska to justice, including Milan Radoičić. He adds that in April 2026, the United Kingdom repeated this demand and also called for justice over the attacks on KFOR and the Kosovo Police in May 2023.
He also notes that NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has likewise asked Serbia for accountability for the Banjska attack and for the attack on KFOR troops in Zvečan.
Kuçi stresses that the German Embassy and representatives of partner countries have repeatedly called for accountability for the Banjska attack. According to him, the German ambassador to Kosovo underlined that Radoičić and all those involved in Banjska must face justice.
Finally, he turns to Vučić’s latest statement, for which he says the Serbian president once again came to Radoičić’s defense by declaring that he is not being prosecuted “for crime,” but “for Kosovo and Metohija.” For Kuçi, this is not an incidental statement, but political protection for a figure sanctioned by the United States, wanted by Interpol, indicted in Kosovo and who has accepted responsibility for Banjska. At the same time, he says Radio Free Europe’s reporting shows that Serbian institutions continue to award multimillion-euro contracts to companies linked to people accused over Banjska. According to him, this protection is not limited to statements, but is also manifested through public money, tenders and state contracts.
For this reason, Kuçi raises the question that when Vučić asks for “protection for Serbs in Kosovo,” the real dilemma is: protection from whom?
Is it about protection from Kosovo’s institutions that seek order and law?
Or, as he puts it, from the criminal and paramilitary structures that Belgrade itself has nurtured, protected and used for years?
According to Kuçi, Kosovo Serbs are not endangered by justice, but by Belgrade’s political instrumentalization, by criminal structures speaking in their name and by a regime that presents violence as patriotism.
He adds that security is not built by protecting criminals.
Peace, he continues, is not built by amnestying attacks on KFOR, the Kosovo Police and the constitutional order.
According to him, justice cannot be applied selectively: either Radoičić and his network face justice, or Serbia openly admits that organized crime is part of its state policy toward Kosovo.
Kuçi concludes that when a state does not prosecute networks of violence, but continues to feed them through public contracts, then the problem no longer remains only organized crime. According to him, the problem is the state itself using crime as a political instrument.
In the end, he sums up his position with the assessment that the real division is not between Serbs and Albanians, but between justice and crime.
