Top Secret 2” and Serbia’s “war” to strike at the Republic from within

Prof. Dr. Fadil MALOKU

In recent days, an unnecessary and utterly nonsensical “uproar” has been taking place in the media sphere, as well as in the (non-)public sphere, over a publicly known secret. All sorts of “boxes” are being opened in the debate over the indictment filed by the Prosecution in the case of Fatmir Sheholli, which refers to a “document” bearing the inscription “Top Secret 2.” It is written in extremely poor Serbian (!) and allegedly concerns funds collected “from Islamic embassies in Belgrade, which will be invested in the construction of mosques in Kosovo.”

Among other things, this supposed anti-Albanian “conspiracy” explicitly states that “the leaders of the Islamic communities of Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosmet [Kosovo] are under our control…,” allegedly meaning under the control of the BIA and other Serbian services.

First of all, this “document,” as the indictment rightly states, should be treated “only as an allegation,” since the Prosecution has provided no further clarification and the court has not yet put its seal on a verdict. As such, besides being treated with reservation and suspicion, it is an issue that the Prosecution and the courts must see through to the end—not the “uproar” stirred up across social media.

Meanwhile, the consequences and repercussions that such a document could undoubtedly cause in an environment contaminated by various anti-Albanian narratives may create not only bewilderment and confusion, but also a sense of insecurity and danger over what might supposedly happen to us in the future.

If we follow the “(self-)accusations,” as well as the mutual accusations made by all religious and non-religious camps, and by the broad, ignorant public on social media, we can observe an unrestrained proliferation of statements “pro et contra” this “document,” with the Islamic Community of Kosovo also being targeted.

Citizens, as well as religious communities, together with civil society and especially the media “cartels,” must understand that the “architects” of this project and this narrative may have goals that are not only devilish in their intention to create a kind of interfaith “chaos” in Kosovo, but also to advance an atmosphere of insecurity and suspicion among ordinary people in the statehood achieved through sacrifice. By continuously producing political polarization—and, especially lately, interfaith polarization as well, something that has never “dwelt” in Albanian lands—these “cartels” seek, through our religious triad, to “promote” the Republic as a failed project that Albanians do not deserve.

Since the tendency—which still has no definitive judicial verdict concerning the involvement of a religious institution and community in this “allegation”—appears, among other things, to have taken on as its imperative not only the damaging, smearing, contesting and weakening of that institution and community, but also the simulation of a new prejudice and stigmatization, far more powerful than those after the war, which were likewise launched for this purpose.

Albanian citizens must never forget that in the religious institutions of all faiths, besides the norm of institutional belief, what “sustains” them, nourishes them and even cultivates their social status in society are the norms and code of their moral faith.

And now, when this code and this moral norm are being attacked by radical and extremist groups of every kind and color, they naturally undermine the formal authority of our heritage of centuries-old tolerance. And those who “licensed” this “document” surely had precisely this fact about our heritage in mind. For it is well known that stigma and criminal responsibility, everywhere in the world and under our laws as well, can only be individual, never collective. This raises another question: could this collective stigma that is being considered for attachment to our religious institutions also influence perceptions at the collective level? Based on the experience of other countries where this formula has been “tested,” the chances of that happening are more than real.

In our case, however, there is a very high risk that such an alleged “document”—that is, an indictment and an individual case—could be transformed into a much broader narrative. Because when “someone is suspected of illegal activity,” the likelihood that such stigma will spread with dizzying plausibility over an entire religious or even secular community becomes real.

All in all, this tendency, or this stereotyping “spirit” with an anti-Albanian background, in which individual responsibility is allegedly transferred and articulated publicly exclusively as collective blame, carries with it other unpredictable and confrontational risks. It is plainly evident that this “document,” together with its devilish architects, is seeking to achieve precisely that objective.

However, there is also another hypothesis here, which I believe will likewise remain unresolved for some time. It concerns the degree of defensive reaction within the Muslim community itself, which this “document” clearly attacks as a majority. And if the Prosecution does not quickly expose it, it will continue circulating like a nebula and create threatening situations that could activate an uncontrolled, chain-reaction mass defense. I say this because, bearing in mind that the younger generation—or the “TikTok generation,” as I have sociologically identified it—is much more inclined and disposed to obtain fragmented and truncated information, even information deliberately taken out of context, such as the material of hybrid warfare and “fake news” circulating on social networks, rather than valid, verified information authorized by the Republic’s national security institutions.

Also, in this odyssey of chain “reactions,” another fact must be emphasized: the tendency to create interfaith distrust. When it spreads at lightning speed, it is highly likely to produce divisions within the Muslim community itself, because people may begin looking for “internal culprits,” distrusting their institutions or religious figures, and also trading blame among themselves.

Nevertheless, when this virus of suspicion enters a group or community, whether religious or sociopolitical, and systematically attacks it while it continues to be perceived as a community that threatens others, the other community does not hesitate to activate the code of “defensive solidarity” (known in the sociology of religion as an altruistic mechanism) in order to disrupt and challenge the superstructure of our centuries-old tolerance—tolerance of which we used to boast to others.

In such situations, individuals begin to form stronger ties and show much greater solidarity than before the attack. By entering the spiral of “defensive solidarity,” other members of the group readily tend to draw closer to one another and homogenize their shared identity—in this case, their religious identity.

Finally, if the “Top Secret 2 document” is ever confirmed by the Prosecution and the Judiciary to be authentic, both the ignorant reader of the “uproar” and the serious one must understand that Serbia’s ultimate objective and target was not only religion, nor merely our historic interfaith relations of tolerance. It was—and remains—our alliance, now powerfully crowned by the West. Therefore, everyone must understand that the aim, ambition and long-term strategy of Serbia’s old narrative still remain the weakening of the “capillaries” of our commitment to Euro-Atlantic values. Through the viruses of radicalization, Islamophobia and anti-Western sentiment, an attempt is being made to widen the “gap” of internal division within Albanian societies in the region and the diaspora.