One party has been left without a leader, while the other is being challenged by voices calling for the dismissal of its head.
In the ranks of the Democratic Party of Kosovo, the departure of Bedri Hamza has created a vacuum that awaits filling with a new leadership figure. Meanwhile, in the Democratic League of Kosovo, Lumir Abdixhiku is under pressure from party members, among whom the mayor of Pristina, Përparim Rama, stands out — he has openly expressed his ambition to take the reins of the political entity.
Të lidhura
None found
Both opposition forces together hold 40 seats in the Assembly of Kosovo. Yet, as they are consumed by internal clashes, the question arises as to how much capacity remains for them to put pressure on the Government led by Albin Kurti.
The issue does not revolve solely around the names that will emerge at the helm. For the PDK, the discussion touches the core of its political identity after the era of Hashim Thaçi. For the LDK, attention is focused on electoral results, the decisions of the current leadership, and the path the party should follow in the future.
Political analysts assess that these divisions could undermine the two parties’ ability to coordinate actions, exercise oversight over the executive, and offer citizens a clear political option.
Two parties, two fronts for internal power
In the parliamentary elections of June 7, 2026, the PDK secured 19.44 percent of the vote and 22 seats in the Assembly, while the LDK achieved 16.69 percent and 18 seats.
Compared with the December 2025 elections, the PDK suffered a modest decline in support, from 20.19 to 19.44 percent, but managed to retain its number of seats. The LDK, on the other hand, marked significant progress, rising from 13.24 to 16.69 percent and gaining three additional seats.
Nevertheless, this growth was not enough to calm discontent within the LDK, which continued to remain the third political force on the Kosovar scene.
After the June elections, several party branches, including those in Peja, Lipjan, and one in Pristina, called for Abdixhiku’s resignation, judging the result as far from expectations.
Abdixhiku rejected these calls and denounced what he described as organized actions against him by certain structures, while receiving support from other figures within the party.
However, tensions continued to remain present.
On October 22, the mayor of Pristina, Përparim Rama, formalized his intention to run for the post of LDK chairman and demanded that Abdixhiku resign.
Rama justified this ambition by referring to his success in Pristina, where he had been reconfirmed as mayor.
LDK deputy chairman Lutfi Haziri called for the leadership debate to be moved within a regular electoral process. He wrote on social platforms that 2027 would be the year of the party’s internal elections and that early discussion about candidates, without an official race, does not serve internal democracy.
Abdixhiku, who has led the LDK since 2021, had submitted his resignation after the December 2025 parliamentary elections, but had received the party’s confidence to remain at the helm.
He won another vote of confidence in July of this year.
In the PDK, meanwhile, the change of leadership has become an irreversible reality.
Bedri Hamza submitted an irrevocable resignation on October 21, less than a year after taking over the party’s leadership.
He stated that this move was aimed at opening the way for internal elections and new figures, but provided no details on the timeline of this process.
The PDK had earlier announced the start of internal elections in September, but they were not held.
Radio Free Europe attempted to obtain reactions from PDK and LDK representatives regarding these internal developments, but received no response by the time of this article’s publication.
The PDK after the Thaçi era, the LDK facing discontent
For nearly two decades, the PDK was closely tied to the figure of Hashim Thaçi, and later to Kadri Veseli.
Thaçi led the party from its founding in 1999 until 2016, when he was elected president of Kosovo. After him, Veseli took the reins, but resigned in November 2020, following the confirmation of the indictment against him, Thaçi, Jakup Krasniqi, and Rexhep Selimi by the Specialist Chambers in The Hague.
Since that period, the PDK has gone through several leadership changes, while the influence of former leaders remains a hot topic in discussions about the party’s future.
On September 16, the Specialist Chambers found all four former leaders guilty of war crimes. This ruling is of first instance and can be appealed.
Now, after Hamza’s resignation and the judicial decision in The Hague, the PDK is once again faced with the dilemma of who will lead it and on what ideological basis.
Donika Emini, from the Balkan Policy Advisory Group in Europe, assesses that the PDK is going through a crisis of political identity and repositioning.
According to her, the tensions between traditional structures and a new generation aiming for a different political profile demonstrate that replacing the leadership is not enough to resolve the question of the party’s direction.
She adds that the judicial process in The Hague constitutes another factor that could influence the PDK’s future.
“The consequences of this process have already begun to be felt, but I believe its impact on the structures, internal balances, and future orientation of the party could be even deeper than what we see today. Therefore, the PDK’s crisis cannot be read solely through the current debate over leadership,” Emini tells Radio Free Europe.
In the LDK, the situation presents itself differently.
The party has a chairman who has withstood internal votes of confidence and has recorded growth in the latest elections, but this has not stopped the internal opposition against him.
The calls for Abdixhiku’s removal, then, are not tied solely to the electoral result, but also to the way he has managed the party.
Emini mentions the management of the post-election period, relations with the Vetëvendosje Movement and Albin Kurti, as well as debates about a possible return of former president Vjosa Osmani to the party.
“Instead of these developments helping the party consolidate, they have highlighted its weaknesses and divisions even more,” she emphasizes.
According to Emini, the LDK must decide not only who will lead it, but also what political offer it will present to voters.
Political scientist Dritëro Arifi identifies a common problem in both parties: the lack of a long-term strategy.
He notes that some LDK structures still harbor distrust toward Abdixhiku’s leadership, while Hamza’s resignation, in his view, shows a lack of readiness for a genuine transition in the PDK.
“It seems there has been no strategy, because if there had been, the chairman’s resignation should have been followed immediately by several serious candidates for the post, who would enter the race without delay to solve the problem,” Arifi tells Radio Free Europe.
For him, changing names at the helm is not enough unless accompanied by changes in policies and in the way the parties function.
When the opposition finds common ground with the government
Only a few weeks after securing the support of the Vetëvendosje Movement for amendments to the Law on the Specialist Chambers, the PDK requested that the law be returned to the Assembly.
This request came one day after Bedri Hamza’s resignation from the post of chairman.
The PDK stated that it aimed to prevent possible obstacles in the implementation of the law. However, Përparim Gruda, who had been the initiator of the changes, insisted that they contained no defects.
The contradictory positions raised questions about the decision-making process within the party, precisely at a moment when it is preparing for the election of new leadership.
On October 6, the PDK had insisted that the Assembly approve the changes to the Law on the Specialist Chambers before proceeding with the election of the country’s president.
The Vetëvendosje Movement supported these changes, despite reservations expressed by Prime Minister Kurti about the lack of sufficient legal analysis.
In the final vote, the law received 88 votes, while LDK deputies did not participate in the vote.
The LDK had opposed the initiative, questioning its legal consequences.
These developments demonstrated that the PDK and the ruling party can find common ground on certain issues, even when the LDK chooses not to engage in the decision-making process.
Nevertheless, disagreements over a law do not necessarily imply a lack of opposition coordination. Parties may hold different positions on legal and political matters without being obliged to act as a single bloc.
For Emini, the main challenge of the opposition goes beyond individual votes.
She believes that opposition parties have failed to build a common political cause and a convincing alternative to Kurti’s governance.
“Naturally, these divisions within opposition parties hinder them from building a joint strategy. But the problem is even deeper. They are preventing the opposition from creating a political cause around which it can unite the electorate,” she says.
Arifi also assesses the lack of coordination as an obstacle to a more effective opposition.
According to him, when one opposition party raises an issue while others do not support it or engage around it, the possibility of exerting joint pressure on the Government weakens.
He assesses that this could give a political advantage to the Vetëvendosje Movement, relieving it from pressure by opponents.
“Divisions and a lack of understanding or support for certain principles are being observed. When one opposition party raises an issue, the other shows no interest, and vice versa. This significantly weakens the opposition’s voice, not only currently but also in the long term, portraying these parties as incapable of exercising more rigorous oversight over the Government,” Arifi emphasizes.
What does the opposition lose by focusing on itself?
Internal conflicts are not always a sign that a party is losing its capacity for political action.
Leadership races, calls for accountability, and disagreements over political orientation can be part of healthy democracy within a party.
In the PDK, this will be put to the test through the upcoming internal elections and the ability to define its political direction after Hamza.
In the LDK, it remains to be seen how the calls for change will be handled and whether the upcoming electoral process will resolve the disagreements between structures.
However, even if leaderships change, this does not guarantee that the parties will become more effective as an opposition.
Analysts agree that the challenges go beyond names and are tied to strategy, political orientation, and the ability to build support.
Emini warns that the lack of an active and coordinated opposition could affect oversight of appointments to boards and independent agencies, the justice sector, control of public finances, and the evaluation of ministries’ work.
Arifi, meanwhile, thinks that the lack of opposition pressure could make it easier for the Government to make decisions without facing sufficient parliamentary scrutiny.
He emphasizes that the challenge remains not only the adoption of laws, but also their implementation, for which the opposition must demand accountability.
“The opposition is a kind of oversight power. When this oversight power is very fragile, inactive, and inconsistent in raising its voice for reforms, for laws, for improvements and so on, then it will also be easier for the Government to make mistakes along the way, because it will not be challenged by anyone,” says Arifi.
Emini also sees a longer-term risk: the loss of citizens’ trust that through elections they can bring about a different governing alternative.
“Therefore, I think the greatest risk is not simply the blockade or delay of reforms. It is the weakening of democracy through the lack of a credible political alternative,” says Emini.
She sees no signals that opposition parties are ready for radical changes in their political orientation and warns that the continuation of the current state could prompt departures and new alignments of political figures.
According to her, these moves do not necessarily imply a shift to the ruling party, but could also include departure from party politics or joining other entities, as has happened before in Kosovo.
