Milaim Zeka in the Sheholli Indictment: The Path of Materials from Serbia’s BIA to “Pa Rrotulla” and the Responsibility of the Media

The indictment against Fatmir Sheholli has once again put journalist Milaim Zeka’s name at the center of attention, in a case involving Serbia’s BIA, compromising materials, payments for publication and suspected efforts to influence public opinion ahead of the elections. Zeka has not been charged in this case, but the inclusion of his name in the indictment raises questions about his role and the responsibility of the media that, for years, have given him a platform to make accusations against other people.

The Special Prosecution has charged Fatmir Sheholli with espionage and blackmail. According to the materials made public, the actions and communications described in the case file are linked to the interests of Serbia’s BIA.

Milaim Zeka is also mentioned in the document. The media have reported that, according to the Prosecution, Sheholli obtained the materials in coordination with BIA official Bojan Dimiq, after which they were passed on to Zeka for publication on the “Pa Rrotulla” program.

At this stage, there is no indication that the Prosecution has accused Zeka of knowing that the materials originated from the BIA. Nevertheless, the content of the indictment contains elements that warrant separate examination.

The path of the materials to the program

According to the indictment, the materials were intended to discredit Minister Nenad Rashiq and his associates ahead of the 2025 local elections.

The Prosecution claims that Sheholli acted in cooperation with Bojan Dimiq, the BIA official, and that the materials were subsequently handed over to Milaim Zeka. At the end of September 2025, the “Pa Rrotulla” program had announced that they would be published.

According to this version, the chain of events is presented as follows:

BIA – Sheholli – materials – Milaim Zeka – publication.

If this sequence is confirmed by the court, the issue would not be limited to the relationship between Sheholli and Zeka. At its core, it would concern the penetration into Kosovo’s and Albania’s media space of materials produced, directed or distributed by the intelligence service of a state that continues to regard Kosovo as an enemy.

The debate over the €2,000

One of the most sensitive points in the case file concerns the alleged payment.

According to the indictment cited by the media, during the investigation Milaim Zeka stated that Fatmir Sheholli had told him that “the German GIZ” had allocated €2,000 for the publication of the materials. Based on this statement, Zeka received €1,000, while he was to receive the remaining amount after publication.

After the indictment was published, Zeka offered a different explanation. He stated that the €1,000 had been paid for translating the materials from Serbian and that he later returned the money to Sheholli.

This creates a clear discrepancy:

Was the money intended for publication or for translation?

If the first version is correct, the payment is directly linked to the publication of the materials. If the second explanation is accurate, it remains to be understood why the statement included in the indictment explicitly mentions “publication.”

This is not merely a matter of political interpretation, but a discrepancy arising from the statements made public.

What connection did GIZ have to the materials?

Another aspect requiring clarification is the way the materials were presented to Zeka. According to the published information, Sheholli had told him that they came from a source linked to German GIZ.

If Zeka accepted this version, several professional questions arise: Was the origin of the materials ever checked? Was GIZ contacted? Was it verified whether the organization had any connection to the materials or to the alleged €2,000?

In journalism, verifying the source is just as important as the content of the information, especially when compromising materials are involved. When publication takes place on the eve of elections, the requirements for checking and confirmation should be even stricter.

Who wanted the materials published sooner?

The indictment also mentions a communication through which Sheholli conveyed to Zeka another person’s request that the publication be made as quickly as possible. The Prosecution claims that this person was Bojan Dimiq.

The communications made public do not show that Zeka necessarily knew that the person in question was a BIA official. Nevertheless, they suggest that a third party was interested in the timing of the broadcast.

The question therefore remains open as to whom Zeka thought “that friend” was—the person who wanted the publication expedited. This part of the story also requires clarification.

The “Znaçka” episode

Milaim Zeka’s name has previously been involved in public controversies linked to Serbia. In 2017, Kadri Veseli, then speaker of the Assembly and former head of SHIK, addressed him from the podium with the words:

“Milaim, where is your znaçka?”

The meaning of the word was never fully clarified. There is no basis for presenting it as evidence of an intelligence nickname or as proof of cooperation with any service.

Nevertheless, the episode became even more unclear when Zeka, years later, stated that “he knows who Znaçka is” and left the explanation to Kadri Veseli.

If “Znaçka” was merely an emblem or patriotic symbol, as was initially stated, Zeka’s later declaration did not close the matter but made it even more ambiguous.

Now, when his name appears in a case file in which the Prosecution claims that materials linked to a BIA official were sent for publication on his program, the old episode has returned to the spotlight. Not as evidence, but as a question that still has no answer.

Who gives him a platform?

Nevertheless, the debate should not focus solely on Milaim Zeka. Responsibility also extends to the media that have repeatedly invited him.

For years, Zeka has appeared on major television programs in Kosovo and Albania, where he has often made serious accusations against Albanian political, intellectual, public and national figures.

The language used during these appearances has often been harsh, while well-known individuals have been labeled “collaborators of Serbia,” “spies,” “traitors” or with other labels that could seriously damage their reputations.

This raises an important question about editorial standards: By what criteria is a person given a platform to make such accusations?

When a professor, writer, journalist, politician or national figure is publicly accused of being a collaborator of Serbia, are evidence and documents required? Is the speaker confronted with the person he is accusing? Is the accused guaranteed the right of reply? Or is the accusation turned into a television spectacle because of conflict, clicks and ratings?

This question is even more important now, as Zeka’s name appears in a case file in which the Prosecution describes a flow of materials that begins with a BIA official and ends up on his program.

This does not automatically make Zeka a BIA collaborator. But it creates a paradox that cannot be ignored: How can a person be repeatedly invited to label others “collaborators of Serbia” while his own name appears in a case file describing materials linked to Serbia’s BIA that end up on his program?

The media is not merely a microphone

The media have the right to invite controversial figures, as this is part of pluralism. But pluralism does not mean abandoning professional standards.

Television is not a space where everyone can say whatever they wish without being questioned. The editorial team decides whom to invite, how much time to give them, what questions to ask and whether a serious accusation will be treated as fact, opinion or a claim that must be proven.

This responsibility increases when major national television stations in Kosovo or Albania are involved. The authority of a public figure is built not only by the person speaking, but also by the screens that invite him, the moderators who introduce him, the panels that treat him as an authoritative source and his repeated presence in the media.

Therefore, the question remains direct: who opens the doors for him?

A person may seek to appear on television every day, but without the decision of the editorial team, producer, moderator and media executives, he cannot take the microphone.

The authority and responsibility of the media

The issue goes beyond Milaim Zeka’s persona. Albanian media have often displayed a model in which people who generate conflict, accusations and spectacle receive more airtime than those who bring arguments, documents and expertise.

A scandalous statement produces headlines, a serious accusation generates clicks and a confrontation increases the audience. But after several years, every media outlet must also examine the type of public authority it has helped create.

When someone appears repeatedly on screen, the public begins to see that person not merely as a guest, but as someone who “knows.” This is how authority is built. If that authority is later used to damage the reputations of others without evidence, responsibility cannot rest solely with the speaker.

Can a medium be exploited without its knowledge?

The Sheholli case also raises another dilemma. An influence operation does not necessarily require the journalist or media outlet to be collaborating with the service that produced the information. A journalist can also be used without realizing it if the true source is kept hidden.

It is enough for the material to be presented as “exclusive,” accompanied by a ready-made narrative, and for the interests of the party that produced it to coincide with the media outlet’s interest in audience and sensationalism.

It is precisely at this point that editorial responsibility begins. When compromising material comes from an unclear source and is published on the eve of elections, the media must determine who produced it, why it was produced, why it is being published at that particular moment and who benefits from it.

An issue affecting more than one person

The Sheholli case should not be reduced to the name of Milaim Zeka. If the Prosecution’s claims are proven in court, Kosovo will face a much broader problem: the penetration of BIA interests into the country’s information, political and media space.

In such an operation, different roles may involve different levels of knowledge. Someone may be informed, someone may be unaware, someone may act for money, someone for influence and someone for an audience.

For the public, however, the consequence may be the same: a narrative produced abroad enters the domestic debate and begins to be treated as local information. For this reason, every link in the chain must be examined.

Questions requiring answers

The indictment against Fatmir Sheholli does not accuse Milaim Zeka of espionage, and this must be clearly emphasized. But it is equally undeniable that his name appears in an important part of the case file.

For this reason, several specific questions remain: Why does the statement cited in the indictment refer to €2,000 “for publication,” while the €1,000 was later explained as payment for translation?

Was the claim that the materials were connected to GIZ ever checked? Who, according to what Zeka knew, was “that friend” who wanted the publication expedited? How did materials that the Prosecution links to a BIA official end up on a television program in Kosovo?

Beyond these questions, there is also a broader issue: Why do people who make serious accusations without evidence receive so much airtime on the largest Albanian television stations? Who builds their authority and who opens the doors for them?

Freedom of expression remains a foundation of journalism, but it does not eliminate editorial responsibility. When a case involves the BIA, compromising materials, money, elections and people’s reputations, the microphone cannot be treated as a tool without accountability.