DW/ Can KFOR’s Presence in Northern Kosovo Be Reduced?

On an ordinary day in August, Italian Carabinieri dismantled their tents on the northern side of the bridge over the Ibar River. For the first time in many years, the KFOR checkpoint was temporarily removed altogether.

The move signaled the start of a gradual reduction in KFOR’s permanent troop presence. The NATO-led international military mission has been in Kosovo since the end of the war in 1999, with the aim of preventing conflict.

The “improved security situation in Kosovo” was cited as the reason, while it was stressed that troops could return to the area if future developments make it necessary. KFOR told DW that, once the process is complete, it will maintain a robust presence in North Mitrovica and throughout northern Kosovo, continuing to help provide a safe environment for all communities.

However, KFOR did not say whether the Kosovo Police would assume responsibility for security on the bridge between South and North Mitrovica. For decades, this location has been a flashpoint for tensions and interethnic clashes.

Meanwhile, Interior Minister Xhelal Sveçla said that the transfer of responsibilities from KFOR to the police had already begun and that the process should lead to the reopening of the main bridge to traffic.

Regarding the Visoki Dečani Monastery, KFOR’s response was more direct: the Kosovo Police will gradually be integrated into the security structures protecting the monastery.

What happened before this decision?

The announcements came after several incidents in northern Kosovo that caused concern among local Serbs and the European Union.

Over the course of one month, the public enterprise “Ibër-Lepenci,” acting on a decision by Kosovo’s Ministry of Environment, demolished 17 holiday homes belonging to local Serbs near Ujman/Gazivoda Lake, in the municipality of Zubin Potok. Kosovo authorities said the buildings had been constructed without permits on land administered by the company and had therefore requested that the “usurped property be vacated.”

Many of the owners say they have documents proving their right to use the land. According to them, the homes were demolished unlawfully even though court proceedings were still ongoing.

Another recent case involves a resident of a village in the same municipality. He accused members of the Kosovo Police of physically assaulting him during a search of his home conducted on suspicion of weapons possession, and said that his injuries had sent him to the hospital.

Why is the reduction happening now?

It remains unclear why KFOR chose this particular period to reduce its presence. The organization offered no explanation on the matter in its response to DW.

Zoran Saviq of the NGO Aktiv in North Mitrovica says the decision did not surprise him. He notes that similar announcements have been made before, just as residents of the north have long harbored distrust toward the Kosovo Police.

For years, reports by nongovernmental organizations operating in the north have highlighted citizens’ low level of trust in Kosovo’s security institutions. According to Saviq, when the latest developments in the municipality of Zubin Potok are also taken into account, the question arises as to what grounds international organizations have for concluding that security has improved significantly.

Saviq stresses that, from an objective standpoint, NATO statements and available statistics show some improvements, which are also reflected in police reports. But according to him, a different picture emerges when people on the street are asked how safe they feel and whether they trust the institutions, especially the police.

Nexhmedin Spahiu, a professor at the Faculty of Political Science in Pristina, considers this distrust understandable, given the events during and after the war. Nevertheless, he describes the work of the Kosovo Police in the north as “quite good” and, in some respects, “better than in other parts of Kosovo.”

Spahiu explains that, for this reason, the Kosovo Police enjoys a degree of legitimacy in enforcing law and order. He also emphasizes that, after Serbs withdrew from the police in the north at the request of their political representatives, gradual efforts were made to improve the ethnic composition of the police force.

In light of this, he believes that reopening the main bridge in Mitrovica “would not pose a security risk.”

According to Spahiu, keeping the bridge closed no longer makes sense following the incident in Banjska and the Kosovo authorities’ takeover of control in the north. He argues that the closure no longer serves as a security measure between the two sides because, in practice, there are no longer two sides, and the same institutions operate on both sides of the Ibar.

Debate over the timing

Local journalist Andrija Lazarević, founder of the Zubin Potok INFO media outlet, takes a different view. According to him, the timing is not appropriate either for opening the bridge or for reducing KFOR troops, particularly because “many allegations of violent police conduct toward Serb residents in recent years remain unresolved.”

Lazareviq says residents are frightened and perceive opening the bridge to traffic as “breaking the dam,” which would allow a greater influx of Albanians into the north. He notes that the demolition of buildings at Ujman/Gazivoda Lake is continuing, an issue that has still not been resolved legally, while home searches are conducted daily and people are questioned as part of war crimes investigations.

He adds that he does not wish to prejudge an investigation into such a sensitive issue, but believes that the chronological sequence of these developments makes it inevitable to ask whether an impression is being created of sustained pressure on one community.

Following KFOR’s announcement, the Serbian List immediately voiced its opposition and requested an urgent meeting with the mission commander. The meeting was held shortly afterward.

The Serbian List did not respond to DW’s question. As a result, the reason for requesting the meeting was not clarified, given that the Chief of the General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, Milan Mojsiloviq, had been informed about the process. It also remained unknown what steps the party intends to take, for example regarding the security of the Visoki Dečani Monastery.

Zoran Saviq of the NGO Aktiv believes that such matters “cannot happen unilaterally, without communication with official Belgrade.” For this reason, he views the process as “a clear implementation of the Franco-German plan, which President Vuçiq appears to have accepted.”

In conclusion, Saviq says that, whether people like it or not, the policies pursued by both Pristina and local Serb representatives have political legitimacy. According to him, that is precisely the essence of the entire issue.