A fierce political clash is unfolding in Tehran over how the war with the United States and Israel should end. On opposing sides are those calling for diplomacy and an agreement, and the radical faction insisting on continuing the resistance, viewing the regime’s survival as a success in itself.
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This dilemma is not new to Iran’s leadership. More than four decades ago, after difficult months in the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, thousands of Iranian soldiers launched a surprise offensive that changed the dynamics of the conflict.
However, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s supreme leader at the time, was not satisfied with consolidating the victory. His aim was to overthrow the Iraqi dictator and send a warning to future adversaries: any war against Iran would come at an extremely high cost.
The Iran-Iraq conflict thus became a defining moment in the construction of the modern Iranian state. Khomeini’s decision to continue the war turned it into an exhausting six-year confrontation that caused hundreds of thousands of deaths and ranked among the bloodiest conflicts in the modern history of the region.
Decades later, the same question has returned to the center of debate in Tehran: should Iran continue the war or move toward an agreement?
Two camps are clashing over the issue. On the pragmatist side are politicians and technocrats led by President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
This faction is seeking a final agreement with Washington. In its view, Iran’s economy has been severely damaged, its infrastructure has come under attack, while U.S. economic and naval pressure is placing an ever-greater strain on the situation.
Pezeshkian has said publicly that the war must end at some point and that the most suitable time for an agreement would be now, while Iran still believes it is in a strong position.
The pragmatists argue that an agreement with the United States could help ease the economic crisis, reduce international isolation and strengthen the survival of the Islamic Republic.
On the other side are the hard-line conservatives, who oppose any agreement that, in their view, would expose Iran and leave it vulnerable to Washington.
For the hardliners, the United States is not a reliable partner. They also point to past diplomatic experiences to argue that negotiations offer no guarantees.
As an example, they cite the 2015 nuclear agreement, which was signed during the Obama administration and later abandoned by Donald Trump. In their view, these developments show that concessions to Washington do not provide long-term protection.
This faction believes Iran can withstand the passage of time and economic pressure by continuing its resistance, in the hope that the United States will grow tired or that Trump’s position will weaken.
The clash has now spread into the government itself. Hardliners have accused government officials of exaggerating the severity of the economic crisis in order to pressure public opinion and encourage acceptance of an agreement with the United States.
Some of them have further escalated their rhetoric, claiming that the pragmatist camp is trying to manipulate the public and may even have plans for violent political change.
These accusations show that the debate over ending the war has now become an internal struggle over the direction the Islamic Republic will take.
Donald Trump’s positions are making the prospect of an agreement even more complicated. The U.S. president’s unpredictable strategy is strengthening the camp opposed to diplomacy.
According to an analysis by experts cited by CNN, Trump’s mixed messages—at times speaking of an agreement and at others threatening Iran—are reinforcing the hardliners’ arguments.
In Tehran, there is fear that negotiations may serve only to buy time while the United States prepares another military campaign. For this reason, reaching a compromise between Iran’s two camps is becoming even more difficult.
At the center of this confrontation is Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, who so far has not publicly taken a clear position for or against negotiations.
This silence may be calculated. Openly supporting one camp could damage his authority, especially at a time when he is trying to consolidate his legitimacy within the system.
Meanwhile, the hardliners are intensifying their campaign against an agreement with Washington, portraying diplomacy as a threat to Iran’s security and independence.
Consequently, the end of the war may be determined not only by talks between Washington and Tehran, but also by the political struggle unfolding inside Iran.
If the pragmatists manage to convince the leadership that an agreement is the best way to save the economy and the political system, the conflict could move closer to an end.
If the hardliners take control, Iran may choose a prolonged confrontation, calculating that time and economic pressure will weaken its opponent.
In this sense, the internal battle for peace may be just as decisive as the war itself.
