The Supreme Court has upheld V.Z.’s claim against the Kosovo Police as well-founded, declaring the Administrative Instruction on the Procedure for the Promotion of Police Officers unlawful and repealing it in its entirety.
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According to “Betimi për Drejtësi,” V.Z. had filed a lawsuit against the Kosovo Police seeking the partial repeal of the normative sublegal act, specifically Article 7, paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Administrative Instruction No. 01/2026 on the Procedure for the Promotion of Police Officers.
In her lawsuit, V.Z. had requested the partial repeal of the provisions of Article 7, paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Administrative Instruction (MIA) No. 01/2026 on the Procedure for the Promotion of Police Officers, dated May 26, 2026.
This Administrative Instruction had established a special promotion procedure through which police officers with at least 10 years of active service in the Kosovo Police could apply for two ranks simultaneously, without being subject to restrictions on the minimum period required in the previous rank. Consequently, officers who had not performed the duties and responsibilities of the rank of sergeant could apply directly for the rank of lieutenant in the same procedure as sergeants who had completed the previous stages of promotion and carried out supervisory responsibilities.
In addition to the plaintiff’s claim, the interested party V.S. had requested that the Instruction be repealed in its entirety, questioning the procedure followed in drafting the normative act.
In its response to the lawsuit, the Kosovo Police, as the defendant, stated that it fully disputed V.Z.’s claims. According to the police, these claims were supported neither by a systematic interpretation of the Law on Police nor by the principles of administrative justice or the administrative documentation on which the adoption of the Administrative Instruction had been based.
The defendant also argued that the Instruction had been issued on the basis of powers delegated under the Law on Police and within the responsibilities of the General Director for the administration and management of the Kosovo Police. According to this position, the act was intended to regulate the procedure for promoting police officers, career development and the efficient management of human resources.
In its judgment issued on July 28, 2026, the Supreme Court found V.Z.’s claim and the request filed by the interested party V.S. against the Kosovo Police to be well-founded. As a result, Administrative Instruction No. 01/2026 on the Procedure for the Promotion of Police Officers was declared unlawful and repealed in its entirety.
In its reasoning, the Supreme Court found that the contested act was contrary to Article 5 of Administrative Instruction No. 03/2013 on Standards for Drafting Normative Acts. The Court found that no problem had been identified and no need for action had been justified, since the promotion procedure was already regulated and covered by Administrative Instruction No. 01/2019. If the need arose, that act could have been supplemented or amended, without the need to issue a new Instruction, as had occurred in this case.
According to the Supreme Court, the contested Instruction contained a series of problems in the justification of the relevant needs and the definition of the identified issue. Ambiguities were also identified in the rules, their comprehensibility and accessibility, the opportunity for interested parties to express their views, and the lack of clear cross-references between provisions.
The Supreme Court’s ruling also refers to Article 55, paragraph 1, point 1.8 of the Law on Police, under which the General Director issues sublegal acts governing the procedure for promoting police personnel. However, the Court found that, through the contested Instruction, the General Director had intervened in the promotion system itself by circumventing the regular promotion process and adding a new category that allowed officers to obtain two ranks simultaneously.
The Supreme Court emphasized that substantive matters may be regulated only through legislative amendments following a comprehensive analysis, particularly since the existing system complies with practices in the region and EU countries. According to the Court, the actions of the General Director of the Police constituted an overstepping of authority and an exercise of discretion beyond legal limits, as the law does not grant the General Director such a right.
The judgment also found that the contested Instruction had reduced the weight given to performance evaluations, even though performance is a highly important criterion for every position, particularly within the Police. Performance had accounted for 10% under the previous 2019 Instruction, but its weight was reduced to 5% under the new act.
The Supreme Court also identified a discrepancy between the criterion of experience or time spent in a rank and performance evaluations, as regulated by Articles 6 and 7 of the contested Instruction. According to the Court, the requirement to spend two years in a rank was inconsistent with the evaluation of performance over the previous three years, while the objective of this arrangement remained unclear.
The ruling states that this form of promotion is entirely contrary to the principles of meritocracy and equality. It also creates an imbalance between ranks and demotivates those assigned as acting officers or awaiting promotion when they compete against colleagues holding lower ranks.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court declared the contested Administrative Instruction unlawful and repealed it in its entirety.
One of the reasons was the General Director of the Police’s lack of legal authority, as Article 55 primarily regulates the procedure itself rather than changes to the substantive conditions for promotion in contravention of the hierarchy and the legal system of ranks.
The Court found that the promotion system had been changed from the regular model, which complies with the Law and under which promotions are awarded one rank at a time, to a system that allows ranks to be skipped or two ranks to be obtained simultaneously.
Another reason cited was the violation of the hierarchy of legal acts, because a sublegal act, namely an Instruction, cannot amend or expand the law.
The Supreme Court also identified unequal treatment between categories of officers, namely those who had been promoted under the regular procedure and those who had not received a promotion for 10 years.
The Court also found a lack of proportionality, as the objective of compensating certain officers for the promotion procedure’s years-long stagnation could have been achieved through less restrictive measures. For this reason, the objective did not justify the means used.
Regarding the limits of discretion, the Court found that organizational needs cannot serve as unlimited authorization to create substantive rights.
The lack of a reasoned basis for issuing the sublegal act was also listed among the grounds for repeal.
The Supreme Court further found that the procedures and requirements for drafting sublegal acts had not been followed in accordance with Administrative Instruction No. 03/2013 on Standards for Drafting Normative Acts.
Interested parties had not been given an opportunity to present their positions regarding the act and its content.
The final problem cited was the lack of clarity, coherence, consistency and comprehensibility of the provisions within the sublegal act itself.
