Hoxha Analyzes the Political Turn in Kosovo: Vetëvendosje Strengthens, While LDK and PDK Deepen Their Decline

Hafir Hoxha has presented a critical assessment of political developments in Kosovo, focusing on the weakening of two parties that for years have held dominant weight in the country’s political and institutional life, the Democratic League of Kosovo and the Democratic Party of Kosovo.

In a Facebook post, he argues that both parties have sunk into pronounced organizational and ideological stagnation, remaining dependent on old structures and on a political legacy that, according to him, has not adapted to the new reality and the expectations of younger generations. Hoxha says that the lack of internal reform and the failure to include new cadres have directly affected the erosion of citizens’ trust, “Bota sot” reports.

On the other hand, he links the growth of the Vetëvendosje Movement to a more flexible approach and one closer to social developments, through a younger staff, more direct communication with citizens, and the ability to reflect the expectations of youth and the diaspora. According to his analysis, this way of operating has turned Vetëvendosje into the country’s main political force.

In the end, Hoxha stresses that the future of the traditional parties is closely tied to their willingness to undertake deep reforms, open up to meritocracy, and break away from old models built on political legacy or war narratives, which, according to him, no longer resonate with younger generations.

Full text

“Analysis of the decline of the LDK and PDK at their current level!”

The Democratic League of Kosovo, which once represented the bastion of pre-war pacifism and was one of the most powerful forces after the war, has now declined significantly, especially over the past 10 years.

According to him, this has historical reasons: after the loss of legendary leader Ibrahim Rugova, the structures grew old and acted narrowly, failing to regenerate with younger generations. They remained continuously supported by the ideology built as “Rugovist,” while new structures and young people do not have much knowledge of the content of this ideological political concept, which functioned in difficult conditions and circumstances, when we had no state, no state institutions either to work or to be accountable, but as a movement it did the maximum for the people of Kosovo as much as it knew and could, in illegal, semi-illegal and partly legal forms.

On the other hand, the PDK, as the first post-war party, within which were activists of the underground LPK and others, managed to preserve support, as it gathered veterans and war activists across the entire territory of Kosovo.

Later, on the same idea and a little afterwards, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo was created from military structures, remaining limited to the spirit of war. However, after the PDK included most of Kosovo’s territory, the Alliance was left with the Dukagjini region as its bastion, in fact the areas where they fought during 1998/99.

Meanwhile, Vetëvendosje, after 25 years of work as an opposition force against the three above-mentioned parties, has managed to build a new and fresh staff that responds to the times. According to him, they worked, listened and inspired the youth before they turned 18 and became involved in politics. They were created and shaped by observing the mistakes of governments, and today they are the main force.

VV, by listening to the aspirations of young people and the diaspora, who live and work in democratic and more developed countries, understands them and reflects them positively in their lives. VV listens to the wishes of the diaspora, which wants to see the state of Kosovo developed and functional like states in the West. It includes these aims in its political plan and campaign and manages to win elections convincingly, with a margin twice that of the second party behind it.

If the LDK, PDK and AAK aim to change their fate, then they must invest in youth and human resources, open their doors to new talent and build institutions on merit, not only on the glory of long political careers, on the values and merits of the war, or on traditional “Rugovist” ideology as a lengthy philosophy that is unattractive to today’s youth. Only in this way can they restore the trust and support of citizens.

Traditional populist rhetoric such as “I am a Rugovist” or “I liberated the country, where were you?!” can hardly convince an 18-, 20- or 25-year-old today to believe that they can contribute to the development of the state without necessarily being a Rugovist, a liberator, or their friend or family member.

For this reason, most young people are neither Rugovists nor liberators, because they did not live in those eras. In 30–40 years, perhaps not a single liberator or Rugovist will still be alive, while the state will need to be led by capable people, without these concepts, which should be known and respected, but should not remain a condition for being active in politics and state-building.