The Hague’s decision on former KLA leaders shakes Kosovo’s political scene – what are the next scenarios?

The sentencing of Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi by the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague has entered a new and highly delicate phase for the country, one that extends beyond the legal field, also touching the political, institutional and social spheres.

On 16 September 2026, the Trial Panel found the four former leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army guilty of war crimes and handed them prison sentences. This ruling has brought back into focus a process that for years has fueled political and public debate in Kosovo, and now, after the first-instance conclusion, it is expected to shape the stances of parties, institutions and various public figures.

But beyond the length of the sentences, the key question remains what political impact this judgment will have. Will relations between political forces be reconfigured? Will the political and institutional responsibility of those who dominated Kosovo’s political scene for years return to the center of discussion? And how will the political class behave in the face of the next stage of the judicial proceedings?

In Kosovo, the ruling has activated several layers of public debate simultaneously. On one side stands the question of individual criminal responsibility, which is the core of the judicial process, while on the other a much broader political and historical discussion is unfolding about the KLA war, the political legacy of its former leaders, and how Kosovo’s institutions should deal with the consequences of this decision.

Another important aspect is that the judgment does not necessarily close the legal debate. After the first-instance verdict, the focus will also shift to the further court proceedings and the arguments the defense will present in upcoming stages. This keeps the Hague issue still present in Kosovo’s political and public discourse.

Under these circumstances, political parties face another challenge: how to position themselves on the ruling without turning it into a mere partisan conflict, while having to address the concerns of the electorate, the families of the convicted, veterans, and that part of society that perceives the process from different viewpoints.

Political analyst Gani Qarri, in a statement to “Bota sot”, stresses that a clear distinction must be drawn between the individual responsibility of the convicted persons and the KLA war, arguing that a decision against individuals should not be taken as a judgment against the entire organization or the liberation war.

Qarri recalls that the Specialist Court was approved by 82 deputies from PDK, LDK, AAK, the former Nisma of Limaj and the so-called “Serb List”, and was incorporated into Kosovo’s Constitution through a special article, which makes its abolition impossible by the country’s legislature alone, without a prior declaration from the US and the EU that its mission has ended.

According to him, the current discussions on dismantling the Specialist Court must be seen in the context of recent political and institutional developments in Kosovo, where precisely representatives of PDK filed requests with the Constitutional Court to invalidate the constitution of the Assembly and the Government, questioning their legitimacy.

He believes that any initiative to abolish the Specialist Court must be viewed in light of the legitimacy and support it might have within Kosovo’s institutions, and unless the requests to the Constitutional Court are withdrawn beforehand, claims of dissolving the Court and annulling the sentences remain simply a political maneuver for short-term gain.

Qarri argues that changing or terminating the Specialist Court’s mission is not something that can be decided solely by Kosovo’s institutions, as the “Serb List”, as a co-voter for its establishment, will not give consent for its dissolution, thus shifting the address of decision-making from Prishtina to Belgrade.

Focusing on the content of the judgment, Qarri says that Thaçi and the others were not convicted for the war against Serbia, but on charges of murder and disappearance of Albanian political opponents and fellow fighters, such as the case of Behajdin Hallaqi. This makes it nearly impossible for the Appeals Court to overturn the indictment completely or eliminate the guilt, although there may be reductions in the prison years.

He underlines that it is positive that certain individuals have been found guilty of personal crimes and that these convictions do not represent an attack on the KLA or the war for freedom and national liberation from Serbian occupation. Individual criminal responsibility cannot tarnish the history of the Albanian people, nor change the historical truth of the Republic of Kosovo, he adds.

In this context, Qarri sees the judgment also as an opportunity to return institutional attention to cases of killings and disappearances that remain unresolved, especially the case of Behajdin Allaqi since 1998, re-actualizing the urgent need to investigate unresolved crimes before and after the war.

He concludes that after the conviction of Thaçi and the others, the stance of institutions and political parties remains to be seen, while the Hague judgment, instead of closing this long political chapter, has opened a new debate about the country’s future and the ultimate clarification of all unresolved killings.

Meanwhile, analyst Gani Mehmeti sees the latest development from another perspective. According to him, after the judgment Kosovo is facing a new political reality, which is particularly reflected in the relations among parties, where a closeness and interest in future cooperation are being observed, with the aim of overturning the ruling at the Appeals Court.

Mehmeti thinks that a unification of the party spectrum would be welcome, but stresses that such a thing should have been done two years ago, as the parties had not foreseen such a judgment and seemed to have forgotten their mission to the country and the people during the trial of the KLA leaders in The Hague.

He explains that unification would not affect the Hague verdict itself, but the parties would have done their job better if they acted jointly, without blaming each other. Citing an example from personal experience with a cousin in Turkey, Mehmeti illustrates how the parties should be united on matters concerning representation abroad, while they can have differences on internal issues.

According to him, Kosovo’s political parties, led by their chairmen, had forgotten that unity makes strength and they have realized this only now, seeing their years of hostile actions. Nevertheless, Mehmeti assesses that there is now a chance that the political scene may change after the Hague ruling, if the parties set aside grudges and form institutions to do everything possible for the acquittal of the convicted by the Appeals Court, treating them as innocent.

He notes that PDK is the most vocal against the Hague Court, but this is not enough to help the convicted, as these matters require diplomacy from parties and state institutions, not protests, insults or noise that bring no benefit to them or the state. Mehmeti appeals for legal experts from Kosovo to be gathered to identify errors in the judgment, in the hope that the Appeals Chamber will acquit the convicted.

Thus, after the Hague judgment, the debate in Kosovo appears to be shifting from the verdict’s pronouncement itself to what will follow: the legal battle at Appeal, the approach of institutions, the positioning of political parties, and how the country will confront unresolved issues from the war and post-war period.