Professor Kuçi warns: The Hague judgments risk being used to undermine the state of Kosovo

In an interview with “Bota sot,” researcher and professor Dr. Gurakuç Kuçi discussed the decision of the Specialist Chambers concerning former KLA leaders, focusing on the risks of a repeat of the 2004 unrest and on scenarios that, in his view, aim to weaken, fragment and dismantle the state of Kosovo.

He expressed concern that citizens’ reactions following the announcement of the sentences could be instrumentalized to fuel interethnic clashes, stressing that Kosovo must preserve its composure and social cohesion.

Referring to the events of March 2004, the professor said that the unrest was orchestrated by Serbia to manipulate public anger and create a new political reality in Kosovo. According to him, Serbia initiated and exploited the revolt to advance its project of cantonizing the territory.

He sees September 16, 2026, as a potential second opportunity for a “Second March,” aimed at undermining, dividing and abolishing the state of Kosovo, while simultaneously tarnishing the KLA’s war, the state itself and Albanians as elements pursuing aims against the Serbian community.

The professor stressed that developments following the judgment should also be analyzed through the prism of the risks to the country’s security and stability. He warned that citizens’ anger could be manipulated and redirected toward interethnic tensions.

According to Kuçi, plans to partition and dismantle the state appear to have been calculated with the expected popular revolt in mind. An immediate reaction, emotionally provoked and manipulated according to the model of the March 2004 unrest, would be the most fatal scenario for Kosovo.

He added that an interethnic incident would shift attention away from the Hague judgment and the issue of justice toward another debate concerning the security of the Serbian community and Orthodox heritage in Kosovo. The risk lay in exploiting the revolt to provoke clashes in Serb-majority areas or near Orthodox Church sites, resulting in casualties and an immediately internationalized crisis. Such a scenario would divert the debate from the injustice of The Hague to the question of whether Kosovo is capable of protecting Serbs and Orthodox heritage.

The political consequences of such a scenario would be severe for Kosovo. It was precisely this kind of consequence, following March 2004, that fueled plans for ethnic decentralization, autonomy, partition and, subsequently, the dismantling of the state.

Regarding developments before the announcement of the decision, Kuçi raised questions about statements by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and information circulating at political and diplomatic levels. He recalled that as early as September 3, thirteen days before the judgment, Vučić expressed concern about protests in Kosovo and warned of violence if Hashim Thaçi was not released. On September 12, Vučić revealed that Serbian services had initially reported that Thaçi would receive a sentence roughly covering the time he had spent in pretrial detention.

Later, referring to contacts in Paris with European and world leaders, he said he had received “other indications” of a severe sentence. Vučić’s meeting with Emmanuel Macron on September 9 is documented by the Presidency of Serbia. According to the professor, this raises the question of what information about a decision that had not yet been announced was circulating in political and diplomatic circles.

Regarding the origins of the process that led to Dick Marty’s report and the Specialist Chambers, Kuçi recalled that the April 15, 2008, motion was initiated by Russia’s Konstantin Kosachev. Among the signatories were Miloš Aligrudić of Serbia and Mikhail Margelov of Russia, along with parliamentarians from other countries. Serbia and Russia subsequently continued to promote the matter internationally; in April 2011, Serbia requested an investigative mechanism under the authority of the Security Council, and on June 23, Russia circulated, on behalf of Serbia, a draft resolution to establish that mechanism. Russia also supported Serbia’s request in subsequent discussions at the Security Council.

The professor also highlighted the institutional background of presiding judge Charles Smith. According to the official biography of the Specialist Chambers, he was an EULEX judge from 2010 to 2013, a member of Kosovo’s Supreme Court and later deputy head and head of the EULEX Judges’ Assembly. According to Kuçi, these elements create a convergence that warrants investigation: the political origins of the case, Serbia and Russia’s long-term interest, Vučić’s advance information, the history of the presiding judge and a context in which the West is seeking to keep Serbia as far away from the Russian orbit as possible.

Kuçi stressed that reactions to the judgment must remain within the bounds of political protest and institutional channels. If the anger remains a protest, we have a crisis of trust and justice, but if it turns into violence against Serbs or Orthodox churches, we have a security crisis that could be used to revive the argument that Kosovo cannot function as a multiethnic society and that another solution is needed. According to him, this model was seen in March 2004, and the question today is not only what The Hague decided, but what scenarios may have been calculated around that decision.

He added that if the plans have failed, the judgment could be changed on appeal, which is why legal support for the former KLA leaders is essential. Kuçi proposed that the Kosovo Bar Association consider supporting the defense in The Hague through a specialized team tasked with analyzing the judgment, identifying legal and factual errors, researching case law, reviewing new evidence and simulating appeal hearings.

According to him, amicus curiae status could also be sought, since Rule 67 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence allows an organization or individual to submit observations as amicus curiae, while procedural control remains with the defense team in The Hague.