Gjinovci: Kosovo has changed the reality in the north, dialogue with Serbia must enter a new phase

The expected opening of the Ibër Bridge and the EU’s agreement with NATO on this development are being interpreted as signs of a significant change on the ground and in how the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue should proceed. According to Rron Gjinovci, this is not just about a symbol, but proof that the political and institutional reality in northern Kosovo has undergone fundamental changes.

In a Facebook post, Gjinovci assessed that this transformation should also be reflected in the content of negotiations with Serbia, reports “Bota sot.”

He argues that Pristina should not return to negotiating issues that have already been resolved in practice, but should focus the dialogue on a final agreement, mutual recognition and full normalization of relations with Belgrade.

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A NEW REALITY, A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT “DIALOGUE”: HOW EVERYTHING IS CHANGING IN KOSOVO–SERBIA NEGOTIATIONS, ALONG WITH INTERNATIONAL STANCES

The opening of the Ibër Bridge, together with the agreement between the EU and NATO on its opening, represents neither a coincidence nor a momentary change. In essence, it is about a change in reality itself.

Earlier, when the opening of the bridge had been attempted, NATO had deployed carabinieri to prevent that action. Meanwhile, the Government of Kosovo built two other bridges next to it, on both sides of the existing bridge. As a result, the practical importance of the closed bridge faded almost entirely. It remained mainly a symbol, and it no longer made sense to assign military personnel to keep it closed, since new bridges were being built in different parts along the Ibër River.

This example shows how the nature of negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia will also change fundamentally.

In recent years, the talks have stalled, while the ground has taken a completely different direction. The dialogue has not been formally interrupted, but it has slowed and become politically blocked, first because of political developments in Kosovo and now also because of the elections in Serbia. At the same time, the reality in the north has changed fundamentally.

For more than a decade, Kosovo has sat at the negotiating table with Serbia from an unfavorable position. The argument repeatedly directed at Pristina was that it did not fully control part of its territory, that Serbia’s parallel structures operated in that area, that Kosovo’s laws were not fully implemented, and that some Serb citizens were not included in Kosovo’s institutional system.

For this reason, a considerable part of the dialogue has been focused on the north and its integration into Kosovo’s institutions.

Even after the formal integration of Serb structures, the situation was not clear. Police officers, judges, prosecutors and other officials were formally included in Kosovo’s institutions, but some of them continued to act under Serbia’s political influence and coordination. In this way, Kosovo achieved integration in formal terms, while Serbia retained much of the real control.

Today, according to Gjinovci, the situation is completely different.

Kosovo’s police, judiciary, prosecution and other institutions operate in the north as part of Kosovo’s state system. After the mass resignations of Serb police officers, judges and prosecutors, as well as the developments that followed, the attempt to challenge the state of Kosovo through barricades and alternative structures ended up further weakening Serbia’s institutional presence in that part of the country.

Under these circumstances, the question arises as to what can be the subject of negotiation between Kosovo and Serbia.

Previously there was a logic, albeit unfavorable for Kosovo, according to which it was necessary to negotiate over a territory where state authority was not fully exercised. But now that the reality on the ground has changed, Kosovo has no reason to discuss again securing something it has already achieved.

Of course, negotiations can and should include improving the lives of Kosovo Serbs, guaranteeing their rights, their integration and their relations with institutions. This is also in Kosovo’s interest, because they are its citizens and must live together with the rest of society.

However, this has never been the only or main interest of Serbia in the dialogue.

Belgrade has continuously sought the creation of a form of political autonomy for Kosovo Serbs or, at least, mechanisms that in the future would push Kosovo toward a federal model. The most extreme example of this approach is Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the internal political arrangement enables Republika Srpska to block fundamental decisions and, consequently, limit the functionality of the entire state.

Kosovo has no reason to accept such a model, nor to make new concessions to solve problems that, in practice, have already been overcome. This is the main change expected to characterize the upcoming negotiations. In any dialogue process, the party that controls the ground also has the strongest position at the table.

Today, Kosovo exercises sovereignty and institutional authority in the north at a level it had not reached at any other stage of the dialogue with Serbia. For this reason, when talks resume seriously, they are expected to have a completely different nature from what has been seen for more than a decade.

It no longer makes sense for Kosovo to negotiate endlessly with Serbia over how it is organized within its own territory. The focus must shift from Kosovo’s internal arrangement to relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

Any new compromise on Kosovo’s part, according to this assessment, should be linked only to reaching a final agreement, mutual recognition and full normalization of relations.

Once, Kosovo tried to secure at the negotiating table what it did not have on the ground. Today, to a large extent, it has on the ground what it previously sought through negotiations. This is exactly what is expected to completely change the character of the dialogue.

Just as the EU once tried to turn the Ibër Bridge into an issue for discussion with Serbia, while today it agrees that it should be opened and managed by the Kosovo Police without negotiations with Belgrade, the same approach can be extended to other topics, until the final agreement on normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo is reached.