Four Issues That Could Determine the Continuation of the Conflict After Six Months of War in Iran

Six months have passed since the start of the US and Israeli airstrikes against Iran, but the confrontation that has shaken energy markets and disrupted maritime transport around the world still has no clear end in sight. Although Iran’s military capabilities have been severely damaged, Tehran continues to wield influence over the Strait of Hormuz.

According to experts interviewed by Radio Free Europe, regardless of their political affiliation in Washington, the next phase of the conflict will depend on four key issues: Iran’s ability to withstand economic pressure, diplomacy’s ability to turn military superiority into a lasting agreement, the future of Hormuz, and Russia and China’s willingness to help rebuild Iran.

Economic offensive

Retired Vice Admiral Robert Harward, who served as a former deputy commander of the US Central Command, describes the current situation as a “stable state.” However, he says Tehran is facing a shrinking deadline.

“Time is their biggest problem,” Harward told Radio Free Europe. He warned that unrelenting economic pressure could gradually become an internal threat to the Iranian Government.

The mass protests held in December-January were driven by problems affecting citizens’ basic needs. They were brutally suppressed, while thousands of protesters were killed.

Washington is also describing the conflict through this lens. On August 24, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced what he called an “economic offensive,” with measures aimed at further isolating Iran. During the G20 finance ministers’ meetings in Asheville, North Carolina, on August 31 and September 1, Bessent is expected to apply pressure on this issue.

Harward believes the pressure could become an internal threat to Tehran if the authorities can no longer finance the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij militia and other state institutions. Citizens facing shortages of fuel and other essential goods could have the same effect.

According to him, the arrival of winter could significantly increase the weight of this pressure.

In this calculation, China occupies a decisive position.

Elaine Dezenski, head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, says economic ties between China and Iran are important, but do not constitute an alliance in the traditional sense.

She points out that around 80 percent of the oil Iran exports ends up in China. However, Iranian oil represents only around 12 to 13 percent of China’s crude oil imports.

“If China were to stop buying Iranian oil… that would have a major effect,” Dezenski said. So far, however, Beijing has not yielded to US pressure over its trade relations with Tehran.

The issue also has long-term financial consequences. Exporting Iranian oil in yuan, together with the use of payment channels outside the US dollar network, could help strengthen an alternative financial infrastructure.

“The way Iran is conducting these transactions and the way China is supporting these transactions is an effort to undermine the role of the US dollar in the global energy market,” Dezenski said.

Can diplomacy return?

Although the possibility of further military action has not been ruled out, officials have suggested that its effectiveness may have reached its limit. This means that few targets may remain to be struck.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in June that Iran’s defense industrial base had faced “massive destruction,” estimating the damage at 80 to 90 percent. President Donald Trump initially said that 90 percent of Iran’s missiles and their launch sites had been destroyed, before later revising the estimate to 82 percent. He has repeatedly said that the Iranian navy has been destroyed.

Nevertheless, the forces still available to Iran have shown that they are strong enough to impede the movement of ships through the Strait of Hormuz.

Bradley Bowman, director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, sees the key distinction as the gap between weakening military capabilities and achieving a long-term political outcome.

“America has repeatedly struggled in the Middle East to turn battlefield success into lasting and positive political outcomes,” Bowman told RFE/RL. “We often win on the battlefield and lose at the negotiating table.”

He emphasizes that lasting political change in Iran could come only through decisive action by the Iranians themselves. According to Bowman, Washington lacks the political will to send “thousands and thousands” of troops into Iran and bear the losses that such an operation would cause.

Bowman adds that the war has highlighted the level of US spending on weapons. It has also raised questions about the quantity of offensive and defensive munitions the United States has left for other possible conflicts.

The signals coming from Iran are mixed.

Some institutions, including the IRGC, do not appear interested in accelerating talks before the US midterm elections, which take place in November. At the same time, other influential members of the clerical authorities have recently and repeatedly spoken about economic problems and the need to revive diplomacy.

Hormuz, Iran’s main leverage

Gawdat Bahgat, a professor of national security affairs at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, believes the most important development of the past six months has been the transformation of the Strait of Hormuz into Iran’s main remaining negotiating tool.

“Even if an interim agreement is signed, it will be temporary, but in the future they will continue to threaten to close the strait,” he said.

Roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil, liquefied natural gas and other vital goods normally pass through this waterway. The consequences have also been felt in the US economy, as global markets have driven up gasoline prices.

At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is only about 39 kilometers wide. Both Iran and Oman claim the maximum 22.2 kilometers that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows as territorial waters. As a result, there are no international waters in this area.

UNCLOS was drafted to guarantee the right of transit passage for commercial vessels and to prevent them from being obstructed. Tehran, however, has never ratified the convention and maintains that it has no obligations arising from it. The US has also not ratified UNCLOS.

Bahgat believes the Gulf states could apply pressure for an agreement that would restore stability, even if it recognized Iran as having a certain role in the strait. For these countries, the main priority is the restoration of economic stability.

The more complicated question is whether Washington would accept any form of Iranian control or economic benefit from this maritime route.

For Bowman, the decisive factor will be how commercial ship captains and insurance companies assess the safety of navigation in the area.

For this reason, Iran does not need to block Hormuz entirely. Occasional missile or drone attacks could raise insurance premiums for ships and slow maritime transport. Meanwhile, strikes against infrastructure in the Persian Gulf states could increase pressure on countries cooperating with Washington.

“This effectively turns our Arab partners into instruments of pressure that Iran is using against Washington,” Bowman said.

Russian and Chinese aid to Iran

Another key question concerns the ability of Iran’s external allies to help it in the recovery process.

Bowman cites Chinese shipments of chemical materials, Russian targeting data and assistance with drones as indicators of increasing support. He says Moscow is considering sending Su-35 fighter jets to Iran, while Beijing could move from supplying dual-use materials to supplying weapons and ammunition.

The course of this support will be heavily influenced by the assessment Beijing and Moscow make of a possible US response.

“The main thing China fears is secondary sanctions from the US,” Bowman said.

Secretary Bessent’s announcement suggests that such measures could be taken. But new sanctions could also provoke a response from China, while it remains unclear to what extent Washington is willing to increase this type of pressure.

According to Bowman, Iran’s military recovery must be viewed within the context of the broader network supporting it.

A study led by Bowman identified 616 cases of security cooperation among China, Russia, Iran and North Korea during the period from January 2019 to December 2025. The cooperation included the development and transfer of weapons, military exercises, intelligence sharing and military diplomacy./RFE/RL