Has Trump Exposed Iran’s Weakness? The Conflict Enters a Decisive Phase as the Hormuz Leverage Fades

The idea that Iran has emerged victorious from its war with the United States is gaining increasing ground. The reasoning is based on the fact that the US and Israel bombed Iranian territory for several weeks, inflicted considerable damage and demanded significant concessions.

However, Tehran did not surrender. The Iranian government remains in power, its missile arsenal continues to pose a threat to the region, and the country still retains the ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Such a move would drive up energy costs for both the US and the rest of the world.

Donald Trump warned during the summer that keeping the strait closed could even trigger a global depression. But the analysis argues that declaring a winner may be premature, since wars are determined by the ability to exert influence and withstand pressure. The current picture of the conflict differs significantly from that of several months ago.

The six-month confrontation can be described in four acts. The first phase began on February 28 with a powerful air campaign and continued for around six weeks, during which military operations were conducted at high intensity.

The second phase began with the April 7 ceasefire. Negotiations then started and reached their peak on June 17, when Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a memorandum of understanding.

A few weeks later, the third act began. Iran renewed its threats against commercial vessels traveling through the Strait of Hormuz, prompting a new military escalation between the sides. During that period, calls grew for the US to withdraw and leave control of the strait to Tehran, but events took a different turn.

Since mid-July, the United States has reinstated its military blockade of Iranian ports, along with sanctions targeting Iran’s oil trade.

At the same time, US forces have worked to establish maritime corridors and guarantee the safety of commercial vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

According to the analysis, this approach has effectively hindered Iran’s oil exports. Meanwhile, global shipping has recovered and energy prices have remained relatively stable. It is reported that the volume of oil passing through Hormuz has returned to around two-thirds of the levels recorded before the war.

As a result, the economic burden is falling on Iran rather than the US. If Tehran can no longer use the strait as an instrument of pressure, its power at the negotiating table could suffer a significant decline.

Iran entered the conflict after spending years under sanctions and facing economic difficulties. The country’s financial situation has now deteriorated even further.

The International Monetary Fund forecasts that the Iranian economy will contract by more than 5 percent this year, while inflation could approach 70 percent.

The value of Iran’s currency has fallen sharply, while basic goods have become more expensive. Recently, an official from Iran’s Ministry of Labor estimated that more than one million jobs had been lost during the first three months of the war alone.

These indicators matter because Iran’s ability to continue the war is determined not only by the number and power of the missiles it possesses. Even before the conflict erupted, the regime was facing strong domestic pressure, fueled by political repression and the economic crisis.

One of Tehran’s options for escaping this position is further escalation. In the early stages, Iran’s strategy aimed to threaten shipping in Hormuz, drive up global energy prices and fuel costs in the US, and increase international economic pressure on Washington.

Iran has also attacked energy infrastructure in the Gulf countries and may choose to employ the same tactic again. At the same time, its Houthi allies in Yemen have threatened to disrupt commercial traffic in the Red Sea using Iranian drones and missiles.

However, the analysis emphasizes that returning to these methods has not so far brought Iran any advantage. For the first time, efforts to close the Strait of Hormuz using drones and mines are visibly failing.

The possibility of another escalation by Tehran cannot be ruled out, particularly if economic difficulties deepen. Nevertheless, even such a move may no longer be enough to reverse the course of events.

For a long time, Iranian leaders and a large number of Western analysts have defended the thesis that pressure cannot force Iran to change course.

From this perspective, Tehran would never agree to abandon its nuclear program, its control over the Strait of Hormuz or the armed allies it supports in the region.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently stated that sanctions and the blockade are doomed to fail. According to him, previous campaigns aimed at changing Iranian policy have met the same fate.

But the analysis raises another dilemma: is there a point beyond which pressure becomes unbearable?

At this stage, neither side can be declared the winner. Iran has survived the initial strikes and managed to keep the regime standing, but the US appears to have changed its approach, directing the confrontation toward economic pressure and control of maritime corridors.

This fourth phase appears different from the previous stages, which were characterized by shifting US objectives, contradictory statements and a persistent lack of strategic clarity.

According to the analysis, the US military now has a clearer mission: to enforce the blockade against Iran while ensuring the free passage of commercial vessels.

Washington’s political objective has also been clearly defined. Iran must abandon its claims over the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear enrichment program.

The conflict could last until the end of Trump’s presidency, and even beyond it. In various forms, the confrontation between the US and Iran has continued for nearly five decades.

Until a solution is reached, this situation could become the new normal. For the first time since the conflict began, such a reality could benefit Washington rather than Tehran.