Electing the president before the October 6 deadline: Can LVV and PDK reach an agreement? Ramadan Gjanaj speaks

The constitutional deadline for electing a new president is approaching, while meetings between the political parties, which have been discussed in recent days, have still not taken place. According to the latest ruling by the Constitutional Court, the 60-day period began on August 8, 2026, and ends on October 6, 2026.

The Assembly must complete the election of the president by that date. Otherwise, it will be dissolved and the country will hold new elections, for which November 8 or 15 may be considered as possible dates.

On Sunday, LVV leader Albin Kurti and PDK leader Bedri Hamza met. Initially, according to the parties, the issue of the president was not discussed at the meeting. However, Hamza later said that he and Kurti had also discussed the election of the president, but not potential candidates.

Before Monday’s session of the Assembly of Kosovo, Hamza told the media that at Sunday’s meeting with Prime Minister Kurti he had also discussed the draft law on amending and supplementing the law on the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague. He said that if the draft law is approved, PDK, as the largest opposition political entity in Kosovo, is ready to talk with LVV about other issues as well. He said that the names of presidential candidates had not been discussed.

Political scientist Ramadan Gjanaj believes that, although time is very limited, a political agreement remains possible. In a statement to Bota sot, he said the coming days would be decisive and that both the majority and the opposition must show a willingness to compromise if they want to avoid another institutional crisis.

According to Gjanaj, PDK’s new position on the election of the president is an important change in political relations. He links this development to the conviction of four former Kosovo Liberation Army leaders by the Specialist Chambers in The Hague, which, he says, has given Albin Kurti an additional opportunity. In its latest political statement, PDK raised, among other issues, the matter of defending the four convicts and reviewing the legal framework governing the Specialist Chambers.

Gjanaj recalls that, until now, LDK appeared to have the decisive role in the presidential process. However, he says its demands for the formation of a stable government had made an agreement with LVV on the president very difficult, almost impossible. He does not believe LDK would agree to secure votes for LVV—or merely the presence of its deputies on voting day—without a broader political agreement.

For this reason, the political scientist sees room for talks between LVV and PDK. He notes that PDK has not publicly conditioned possible support for the president on participation in the future government. This, he says, could help achieve an agreement without undermining the stability of the current governing majority. However, the defense of the four convicts in The Hague and the review of legislation on the Specialist Chambers appear to be important issues for PDK; it remains to be seen whether LVV is willing to compromise on them.

An agreement cannot be considered certain, Gjanaj stresses, given the limited time and the demands of each side. The election of the president requires broad parliamentary support, as well as the participation of deputies in the process, making political compromise essential. According to him, the approach of October 6 should push the parties toward dialogue, not confrontation. He warns that a new deadlock would become more likely if the sides maintained incompatible positions until the end. For now, both an agreement and a stalemate remain possible scenarios.

Regarding the president’s profile, Gjanaj says that a nonpartisan candidate may be more easily accepted by entities that do not want to appear to be supporting another party’s candidate. However, nonpartisan affiliation alone does not necessarily produce consensus. In his view, credibility, experience, integrity, respect for institutions and the candidate’s ability to represent all citizens, beyond party interests, are what matter. He adds that the candidate does not necessarily have to be completely outside politics and that the candidate’s profile alone cannot resolve the deadlock.

The political scientist recalls that the Constitution requires the votes of two-thirds of all deputies in the first two rounds, while at least 61 votes are needed in the third round—that is, a majority of all deputies. Their presence and a quorum are also decisive. According to Gjanaj, the political conditions for such participation have not yet been secured. Therefore, he sees a sustainable and workable compromise as the path to electing the president and believes that PDK’s new position should not be ignored if the aim is to avoid new elections.

If the president is not elected within 60 days of the start of the procedure, the Assembly will be dissolved, Gjanaj says, referring to Article 82 of the Constitution. Such a development would return Kosovo to an electoral cycle, with political, institutional and economic consequences, while prolonging uncertainty at a time when the institutions should be dealing with the country’s priorities.

He also draws attention to the legal difficulties that could arise from exceeding the deadlines and interpreting them. The Constitutional Court has set October 6 as the end of the 60-day period, while the Constitution stipulates that the acting president may not exercise the office for more than six months. Gjanaj says it cannot be stated with certainty that exceeding these deadlines would automatically interrupt institutional continuity, but neither can legal difficulties and differing interpretations of the constitutional situation be ruled out.

According to him, political actors could challenge before the Constitutional Court decisions taken during that period, including the dissolution of the Assembly, the calling of elections or the exercise of other presidential powers. Such challenges could prolong legal uncertainty, delay the electoral process and further postpone a political solution to the crisis.

For Gjanaj, October 6 is not merely a procedural date but a test of institutional responsibility. He calls on the parties to use the remaining time to reach an agreement, so that disagreement over the president does not, after the deadline, turn into a new political, legal and constitutional crisis that would obstruct the normal functioning, stability and continuity of Kosovo’s institutions.