September 9: A decisive day for Kosovo’s institutions, with three political scenarios on the table

Kosovo’s MPs are expected to convene on Wednesday, September 9, to continue the constitutive session, in another important moment for political developments in the country.

The session, which remained unfinished during the previous month, is scheduled to begin at 11:00 a.m. Completing the constitution of the Assembly would create the possibility of beginning the process of forming the country’s new institutions.

However, in addition to concluding parliamentary procedures, attention is also expected to focus on the next step: the election of the president of the Republic.

It is still unclear whether a possible agreement between LVV and LDK would produce the numbers needed to unblock the situation and fully operationalize the institutions.

The Democratic Party of Kosovo and the Democratic League of Kosovo are also expected to participate in the September 9 session, as they will be part of the process of constituting the Assembly.

Drenori: Three scenarios are possible for Wednesday’s session

Political analyst Xhavit Drenori has outlined three possibilities for how Wednesday’s session could unfold.

According to him, the first option is for LVV not to move forward with the constitution of the institutions if it does not secure an agreement on the president. The second scenario envisages continuing with the constitution of the Assembly and forming the government, giving LVV time to negotiate a solution. The third possibility involves reaching an agreement between the parties, which would pave the way for the election of the president.

Drenori believes that the first two alternatives are more likely to materialize, while an immediate agreement between the political entities remains less likely.

“Three scenarios may emerge during Wednesday’s session. The first concerns the possibility that the Vetëvendosje Movement will announce that it has not reached an agreement with any political entity. Since failure to elect the president would lead the country toward elections, LVV could seek to suspend the steps for constituting the institutions, including forming the government, and use the parliamentary space to find another solution.

Another possibility is that, even without an agreement with the other parties, the constitution of the Assembly would continue, followed by the formation of the government. This would give LVV the time and space to try to reach an agreement on electing the president during the next two months.

The third scenario would be reaching an agreement between the political entities, through which the procedure for electing the president could begin. I assess this possibility as less likely. For this reason, the first two scenarios appear more realistic for Wednesday’s session,” Drenori explained to Bota sot.

Makolli criticizes VV over the institutional vacuum

Political analyst Vesel Makolli described as paradoxical the situation in which an entity that has won three consecutive elections, two of them with more than 50% of the vote, has left the country without functioning institutions for nearly two years.

“Winning three consecutive elections, particularly the last two with more than 50% of the vote, should have translated into the creation of institutions. The fact that the country has been left in an institutional vacuum for nearly two years constitutes a political paradox that requires a much deeper assessment than an ordinary analysis.

This is also the responsibility for which Kosovo’s electorate gave its trust and, in the fullest sense, obligated the winning entity. It is not enough to attribute responsibility to the opposition, the system, circumstances or institutional blockades.

A leader who wins three times in a row and receives such substantial electoral support has an extraordinary responsibility to turn that mandate into functioning institutions. Political success is not measured only by the votes received on election day, but also by the ability to turn that trust into governance, stability, institutions and results,” Makolli told Bota sot.

According to Makolli, Avni Dehari, in his capacity as the convener of the constitutive session, has authority only to preside over that session. He considers the postponement of the meeting and the use of constitutional deadlines to be a political action in line with the interests of Dehari’s party.

“The person who called the Assembly meeting for September 9 is a deputy like all the others. Based on his age, the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure assign him only the task of calling and presiding over the constitutive meeting. Beyond this function, he has no special duties or powers.

Consequently, the postponement or delaying of the meeting and the use of all constitutional deadlines by Avni Dehari cannot be viewed solely as a procedural issue. This is a political action which, based on developments so far, appears to have been undertaken in accordance with the political decision and interests of his party.

The opposition has the right, normally and democratically, to oppose the government, demand new elections, refuse to vote for the government and use all the political and parliamentary means permitted by the Constitution and democracy,” he said.

Makolli stressed that primary responsibility for creating the institutions lies with the force that emerged victorious in the elections.

He assessed that extending the constitutional deadlines could be part of a political strategy aimed at shifting responsibility for the crisis and the possibility of holding new elections onto the opposition.

“Primary responsibility for forming the institutions falls on the entity that won the elections and sought the mandate to lead the country. This logic cannot be reversed by placing the main burden for the institutional vacuum on the opposition, when the election winner, with more than 50% of the vote, had the numbers and the mandate to create the institutions.

VV was not prepared from the outset to seek a political compromise and form the state institutions, because of the obligations arising from international agreements and the decisions that must be implemented.

In these circumstances, failure to respect the constitutional deadlines may be part of a calculated strategy. It could serve as bait for the opposition, so that after the constitution of the Assembly and the election of the government on September 9, it would turn to the Constitutional Court over the violation of the deadlines.

VV’s political goal would be to create a situation in which responsibility for prolonging the institutional crisis and for a new cycle of parliamentary elections would be attributed to the opposition. In other words, this is not merely a procedural deadlock, but a genuine political calculation,” he concluded.