Kurti becomes a campaign topic in Serbia, Islami: Opposition pressures Vučić with Kosovo and the Radoičić scandal

Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, has taken center stage in the political debate in Serbia, where the pre-election race is being given an international dimension. This is the assessment of security expert Avni Islami, who has focused on this phenomenon in one of his writings.

According to him, Serbian opposition forces are keeping Kosovo’s achievements in focus – especially those in the north of the country – in order to strike at President Aleksandar Vučić. Their words include the extension of Kosovo’s sovereignty, effective control over the territory, the neutralization of criminal and terrorist structures, the dismantling of espionage networks, as well as the securing of Lake Ujman and other strategically important assets. The opposition is constantly reminding Vučić of the statements he has made over the years.

Islami notes that the Serbian political scene is divided into two axes: on one side, the opposition speaks of the loss of control over Kosovo and of the government’s ties to crime, with the case of Milan Radoičić at the forefront, while on the other side, Vučić accuses students and political rivals of being in coordination with Kurti and of enjoying the support of Tirana and Pristina.

Meanwhile, according to the professor, in other countries of the region the name of Kosovo and of its prime minister is cited as a good example – for a model of governance, for results in tackling corruption, for transparency, for economic growth, and for commitment to the integration path. In Serbia, by contrast, Kosovo is mentioned only in a nationalist sense, with the opposite connotation.

Kosovo’s governing model, Islami emphasizes, is turning into a point of reference for the entire wider region, exerting positive influence even beyond its borders, in line with European and Euro-Atlantic values.

He sees the difference clearly: Serbia has not yet reached a level of democracy that would allow it to discuss models of governance. Meanwhile, terrorism suspect Milan Radoičić, together with his paramilitary formation, is acting as the main player in the electoral race in that country, where he leads the SNS alongside Vučić.

Kosovo’s response, according to the author, has been successful in destroying that paramilitary structure which, in addition to criminal activity, also controlled political and other spheres in Serbia’s interest – precisely those of the Serbian List.

Now, Islami observes, Radoičić is in Serbia and is expanding his power within the state there, in a reality where state apparatuses have been placed at the service of his person. His strong ties with Vučić make it difficult to distinguish where the state ends and where crime begins in that country.

Kosovo has dismantled and defeated this structure, and it is precisely this that the Serbian opposition exploits to expose the state-crime links between Vučić and Radoičić. Vučić, for his part, makes it known that the opposition relies on facts and references coming from Kosovo and from Prime Minister Kurti.

In Islami’s assessment, Kosovo has provided evidence that the Serbian government has used security institutions for narrow purposes – such as the BIA agency, placed at the service of the SNS and of electoral objectives (the case of Fehim Salihu) – and that the Serbian List in Kosovo has functioned as a satellite of that party (the cases of Fatmir Sheholli-Dimić). All of this and more, the opposition treats as evidence, while Vučić tries to pass it off as collaboration with Kurti.

According to him, Kosovo has also proven the grave insult that Vučić inflicted on KLA representatives in Kosovo.

Serbian failures in Kosovo – the events of Banjska and the episode of the Ibar and Lepenc canals – are read between the lines by the opposition in Belgrade, while Vučić continuously accuses them of coordination with Kosovo’s prime minister.

Islami also recalls the fact that for many years, hundreds of thousands of euros per day have been withdrawn from Serbia’s budget in the name of Kosovo, without any serious control mechanisms ever being brought to light.

In the end, he emphasizes that the media under Vučić’s control have consistently worked in favor of the Serbian List, acting as Belgrade’s spokespersons in Kosovo, strengthening its narratives and attacking Serbian voices that do not submit to Vučić’s politics.