Drizan Shala raises the alarm: Illegal cameras in northern Mitrovica may be serving Serbian intelligence

Security expert Drizan Shala has warned that the network of cameras installed illegally in northern Kosovo could constitute a system for collecting intelligence data in real time.

He says such devices could be used to monitor the movements of the Kosovo Police, KFOR and EULEX. In this way, actors seeking to challenge Kosovo’s institutions could gain an information advantage.

Shala praised the Kosovo Police’s intervention to dismantle the cameras, but called for the investigation not to stop at their removal. According to him, the organizers, financiers and individuals who administered the network must be identified, and any possible links to Serbian state structures must be investigated.

The expert stressed that clarifying these elements will determine whether this is an isolated case or a broader hybrid warfare operation directed against Kosovo.

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Serbia seeks electronic eyes in the north after losing its structures on the ground!

When Serbia loses the ability to operate through its own structures on the ground, it shifts its activities toward hybrid warfare instruments. This approach is not unfamiliar, but it represents the development of methods for gathering intelligence. Traditional surveillance networks are being replaced by technology that enables uninterrupted monitoring and an uninterrupted flow of information. From this perspective, every camera system installed without authorization in northern Kosovo must be analyzed.

If the devices are equipped with functioning SIM cards and have paid internet access in order to transmit 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, then they cannot be considered ordinary recording cameras. Such a system has the capacity to provide real-time intelligence and continuously monitor the area where the security institutions of the Republic of Kosovo and international partners operate.

The objective is not limited to observing events on the streets. Through this monitoring, a detailed operational picture could be created of the movements of the Kosovo Police, its tactical response methods, patrol schedules, the location of checkpoints and operating procedures. The activities of KFOR, EULEX and other international mechanisms that help guarantee peace and stability could also be tracked. The collected data could serve actors seeking to challenge the institutional authority of the Republic of Kosovo for analysis, planning and coordination.

For this reason, the removal of the cameras should not be viewed solely as a technical or administrative intervention. It may represent the dismantling of infrastructure established to gather intelligence. In modern conflicts, dominance over information carries the same weight as control of territory. Monitoring security forces creates an information advantage that could be used to evade police operations, warn criminal networks in advance or compile a complete picture of the state’s capabilities.

The Kosovo Police should be commended for dismantling any system of this kind; however, the matter does not end with the dismantling of the devices. Investigators must reach the people who organized, financed and managed the network. It must be clarified who paid for the SIM cards and internet traffic, where the data was sent and by whom it was analyzed. Given the way hybrid operations against the Republic of Kosovo have developed so far, one of the main lines of inquiry should be to examine every connection with Serbia’s state structures, including intelligence networks linked to Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA).

If the responsible authorities manage to prove such a connection, the case could no longer be treated as isolated criminal activity. It would constitute an organized intelligence-gathering operation supported by a state.

At this point, several issues of strategic importance arise. It must be established who installed the cameras and who was in charge of administering them. It must also be clarified whether, despite the dismantling of the so-called “Civil Defence” structures, human surveillance networks that are financed and coordinated continue to exist on the ground.

Another question is whether the operation was carried out through full inter-institutional coordination. It must also be determined what role KFOR’s intelligence mechanisms and EULEX’s monitoring structures played in detecting and preventing such infrastructure before it became consolidated. Above all, it must be investigated whether individuals or networks still operate within the Republic of Kosovo that cooperate with Serbia’s state structures, providing logistical, technical or operational assistance for activities of this nature.

Clarifying these questions is far more important than merely removing the cameras. The answers will show whether we are facing an isolated incident or a broader hybrid intelligence structure that continues to operate in northern Kosovo through technology, support networks and collaborators from within the country.

The threats facing Kosovo are no longer solely traditional in nature. Today’s challenge is linked to hybrid warfare, in which cameras, mobile networks, communication platforms and technological tools are used to obtain information and endanger national security. Every illegally installed device should be considered a potential threat to the constitutional order and to the ability of security institutions to operate without being monitored by hostile actors.

Hybrid warfare is not waged only with weapons. It is also conducted through information, technology and invisible networks aimed at challenging state sovereignty.