Bytyqi: Serbia may move away from nationalism and face pressure to recognize Kosovo

The result of Serbia’s October 25, 2025, election, in which the Students’ List won, could bring significant political changes and weaken nationalist influence, according to Professor Enver Bytyqi. In comments to the newspaper, he describes the vote as a rebuke to the politics inherited from the era of Slobodan Milošević and as a sign that Serbian citizens’ expectations are changing.

Bytyqi highlights the Socialist Party of Serbia’s failure to enter parliament as a significant development. The party is led by Ivica Dačić, a former spokesperson for Milošević. In Bytyqi’s view, the result shows that hard-line nationalism is losing ground.

“The victory of Serbia’s Students’ List in the October 25, 2025, election is remarkable. It brings an end to the rule of a political class tainted by Milošević’s policies and brings the country closer to the West,” Bytyqi says.

He expects the new political leadership to bring a different spirit to government and considers it better educated and more cultured than the politicians who have held power until now, including Aleksandar Vučić and Ivica Dačić.

“From Sunday, Serbia will be governed in the spirit of the student movement, by people with more education and culture than politicians such as Vučić and Dačić, who now belong to the past,” he says.

The professor describes the Socialist Party’s defeat and its departure from parliament as significant political achievements that reflect a shift in public opinion in Serbia.

“The victory was a positive development. But I consider it even more positive that Milošević’s party, led by his former spokesperson, Ivica Dačić, was turned away from the doors of the Serbian parliament. This is truly an indisputable success for the mood of Serbian public opinion. I see it as a rebuke to the ultranationalist politics of the Milošević era and his successor, Dačić,” Bytyqi says.

According to him, the election demonstrates a decline in the hard-line nationalism associated with Vojislav Šešelj’s politics and Milošević’s legacy. He notes that Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party received support from Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska, Kosovo and North Macedonia, but did not secure the same level of support within Serbia.

“I see a shift in public opinion in Serbia. It is not that the Students’ List has a diametrically opposed project or position to the SPS; rather, they were not aggressive in their campaign and adhere to democratic principles, under which the public will is expressed through referendums,” he says.

The new government and its approach to Kosovo

As for relations between Kosovo and Serbia, Bytyqi believes that a change of power in Belgrade could lead to a softer, more flexible stance toward Kosovo. However, he warns that international circumstances could influence the new government’s decisions.

“Since I see a softer approach toward Kosovo, I want to believe that Belgrade’s new government will be more flexible about the decisions it will have to make regarding Kosovo,” Bytyqi says.

If there are no major geopolitical changes, Serbia could move closer to the West while trying to preserve a special relationship with Russia, the professor says.

“Of course, we do not know what will happen with this government tomorrow, because international and geopolitical circumstances could also change. But if there are no new geopolitical developments, then it is reasonable to believe that Serbia is taking careful steps toward full alliances with the West,” he says.

Bytyqi says the new authorities may seek to maintain friendly and special ties with Moscow, but they will also face pressure to give up their claims to Kosovo.

“I am sure that along this path the new government will seek permission to have a particular, friendly relationship with Russia. But it will have to give up Kosovo,” Bytyqi says.

He argues that Serbia’s geographic position makes isolation difficult, as the country is surrounded by states that are members of the European Union and NATO.

“Geographically, Serbia is surrounded by EU and NATO member states. If NATO and the EU continue to exist—and, even better, grow stronger—Belgrade will be obliged to integrate into these two organizations,” the professor says.

Bytyqi cites Albania’s experience under Enver Hoxha’s regime as a warning against isolation.

“Enver Hoxha’s Albania tried to isolate itself from the Western world, and we know how that ended. It ended with the population guaranteed six days’ worth of bread and two million US dollars in the state treasury. Serbia, too, must have people wise enough not to follow the model of isolation,” he says.

The professor believes a new generation in politics could see Serbia’s future differently and gradually move away from nationalist taboos and myths.

“The new generation that has come to power will see the future from a different perspective, at least somewhat further removed from the false nationalist taboos and myths so diligently cultivated among the Serbian people by politicians,” Bytyqi says.

Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, the next challenge

According to Bytyqi, the change of power in Belgrade could create an opportunity for Kosovo-Serbia dialogue to resume and move forward more quickly. He says the issue has returned to American discourse and points to the US representative at the Security Council calling for dialogue.

“That is precisely why I believe approaches to dialogue with Kosovo will change. There is a strong possibility that dialogue will be pushed forward at a faster pace after Aleksandar Vučić’s fall,” Bytyqi says.

In his view, the US representative’s call may indicate that the United States anticipated political changes in Serbia and is once again focusing on negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia.

“The US representative insisted on this at the Security Council, which leads me to understand that America anticipated the change of power and is now returning to its call for dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia,” he says.

Bytyqi recalls that dialogue had disappeared from American discourse. He refers to the letter President Donald Trump sent to President Vjosa Osmani on February 17, 2026, in which, according to the professor, dialogue was not mentioned.

He expects Serbia’s new government to be interested in resuming negotiations in order to show the European Union and the United States that it represents a different kind of politics from the previous government.

“Serbia’s new government, too, will seek to renew the dialogue because it will want to send a message to the EU and the US that it is different from the previous government—that it is flexible, democratic and moderate,” Bytyqi says.

The professor links this approach to the spirit of the student movement, which, he says, has spread over the past two years from Novi Sad to Niš. In these circumstances, dialogue could become the next challenge for Kosovo’s government, led by Albin Kurti.

“That is, it is flexible, democratic and moderate. After all, these are the characteristics of the student movement that has been developing for two years, from Novi Sad to Niš. This means that dialogue could become the next challenge for Mr. Kurti’s government,” he says.

Bytyqi says the formation of institutions in Kosovo shortly before Serbia’s election was not accidental. In his view, international actors do not want political crises to continue in either country.

“International actors are not interested in a crisis in either Kosovo or Serbia. They will want a solution. Without a solution, neither Serbia nor Kosovo can take steps toward the EU. So there will be additional pressure,” the professor says.

A solution could take years

Bytyqi does not expect dialogue alone to resolve the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia quickly. He believes the process will take time and preparation, as neither government will readily accept a final agreement.

“Nevertheless, I do not expect the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia to be resolved through dialogue alone, nor do I expect it to be resolved so quickly. The process will take its time, because I see neither Serbia’s new government nor Kosovo’s government agreeing to a solution easily,” Bytyqi says.

First, he says, there will be a period of preparation, followed by an intensification of dialogue; substantive talks could take several years to begin.

“There will therefore be a period of preparation. Then there will be a warm-up period for dialogue. And it will take years before we reach genuine dialogue,” he says.

The professor places the potential resolution between the end of the current governments’ terms in both countries and the beginning of their next terms. He believes neither side will take politically risky decisions as elections approach.

“Nevertheless, I see a solution coming toward the end of the terms of both governments in both countries—perhaps at the beginning of the next terms, because neither side would take a risk as elections approach, in roughly four years,” Bytyqi says.

Russia and the possibility of recognizing Kosovo

Finally, Bytyqi discusses Russia’s influence on the Kosovo issue and raises the possibility that Moscow could recognize Kosovo before Serbia does.

According to him, this could happen if Russia reaches an agreement with the West on recognition of its sovereignty over Crimea and Donbas.

“Many people believe Russia is preventing Serbia from recognizing Kosovo. But there is another possibility: Russia could recognize Kosovo before Serbia does, and then Belgrade, with or without dialogue, would recognize it,” Bytyqi says.

The professor explains that he links this scenario to Moscow’s demand that the West recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea and Donbas.

“When I say Russia could recognize Kosovo, I have in mind its demands that the West recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea and Donbas. If that happens, an exchange involving Kosovo is certain,” Bytyqi concludes.