After nearly ten days of irregular drinking water supplies, residents of Dragash, in southern Kosovo, staged a protest this week.

Supply difficulties and water restrictions during the summer months have recurred for years in several parts of Kosovo.

Water expert Skender Bublaku believes the country has sufficient resources to ensure a stable supply, but the problem lies in how they are managed.

Speaking on Radio Free Europe’s “5 Questions” podcast, he linked water shortages to high losses in the system and low storage capacity.

According to Bublaku, Kosovo uses only about 15 percent of its surface water, while approximately 15 percent of it is stored.

He says more than 55 percent of the water is lost, while during the autumn, winter and spring, the vast majority of the water flows out of Kosovo’s territory without being stored.

Why does the situation worsen during the summer?

According to the expert, the difficulties are greater in municipalities supplied by water sources without storage systems.

He explains that in July, August and September, direct water sources without storage facilities cannot provide the minimum amount of water needed.

Among the areas dependent on river flows or groundwater, Bublaku lists Ferizaj, which is supplied directly from the river, as well as Peja, Kamenica and other places.

Supply disruptions are usually attributed to technical faults, turbidity at water sources or problems related to water quality.

Bublaku acknowledges that technical failures can occur in any system. However, according to him, when the same problems continue to recur over the years without being resolved, the responsibility lies with management.

Dams as an alternative for a long-term solution

To improve the situation sustainably, Bublaku says Kosovo must make long-term investments in water storage, including the construction of dams.

The Vetëvendosje Movement, the party that won the latest elections, has promised to build five water dams during the next government term.

Bublaku says he would be satisfied if even one dam were built, or at least if work on it were to begin.

However, he emphasizes that dam construction cannot be completed within a single government term.

What consequences could diverting the Ibar River have?

During the “5 Questions” podcast, the expert was also asked to comment on Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s statement that Serbia is considering the possibility of altering the course of the Ibar River.

According to Bublaku, warnings about diverting the Ibar are more a form of political pressure than a concrete project.

He says he does not consider this a specific, genuine problem or something that is expected to happen, but advises Kosovo to exercise great caution and monitor the situation.

If such a scenario were to materialize, Bublaku warns that Kosovo’s water infrastructure would suffer severe damage, as it covers almost all of central Kosovo./RFE

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Arben Fetoshi, director of the Institute for Hybrid War Studies “Octopus,” has responded to statements by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić about the Ibër River. According to him, the use of water as a means of pressure demonstrates that natural resources continue to be part of Serbia’s hybrid strategy against Kosovo.

“A statement with fascist elements that constitutes another direct threat to Kosovo. Vučić revealed the plan for the ‘protection of Serbs,’ using water as an instrument of pressure: We will change the course of the Ibër, and then let’s see what the Albanians will do” (RT Balkan, 09.08.2026). Fetoshi wrote on Facebook that linking this ‘plan’ to claims of the ‘mistreatment’ of Serbs should not be viewed merely as rhetoric aimed at a domestic audience. According to him, this represents an escalation of the hybrid strategy against Kosovo and indirectly confirms responsibility for the sabotage of the Ibër-Lepenc Canal in 2024.

Fetoshi assessed that, following the failure of the attack aimed at destabilizing the country because of its potential consequences for water supplies to the municipalities in the north, Mitrovica, Vushtrri, Pristina, Drenas, Fushë Kosovo and Obiliq, as well as for the energy supply of the power plants in Obiliq, Vučić is showing that Belgrade has not abandoned the use of natural resources against Kosovo.

He stressed that such an action is prohibited by international restrictions, including the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. He also said the threat would have consequences for Serb citizens in the north, while the United States treats Lake Gazivode/Ujmani as a regional security issue, based on the assessment by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Water Resource Opportunities at Lake Gazivode/Ujmani, 14.04.2021. In this context, according to Fetoshi, the combination of the presidential threat with claims of ‘mistreatment’ indicates the advancement of the ‘victimization’ narrative in support of pressure for the ‘Serbian World.’

According to Fetoshi, Vučić’s change in position—from the statement ‘the idea exists, but I am against it’ (Danas, 01.12.2024) to the assertion ‘we are gathering engineers to see how we can do it’ (RT Balkan, 09.08.2026)—shows the transformation of Serbia’s strategic communication. He links this development to statements by Minister Paunović, the ‘heroization’ of war criminals and the arrest of a Serb suspected of providing information related to mass graves.

The idea of diverting the Ibër, which ‘would leave Lake Gazivode without water,’ had circulated in Serbia earlier. Expert Ljubiša Mijačić stated that ‘Serbia has the technical capability to divert it’ and that this constitutes a ‘real threat’ (Kosovo Online, 22.11.2025). By contrast, Spanish geography professor Miguel Borja Bernabe-Crespo denied the danger, referring to the obligations arising from the international regime governing transboundary waters (REL, 05.12.2024).

Nevertheless, Fetoshi believes that the calculated impact of the threat, under conditions of Kosovo’s ‘dependence’ on this system, explains the retaliatory wording directed at Albanians and the attempt to portray the conflict on ethnic grounds. In this case, the ‘protection of Serbs’ serves as a premise for legitimizing the threat.

According to him, the ‘victimization’ strategy aims to portray Kosovo as ‘repressive’ and present the West as ‘co-responsible,’ preparing the ground for the advanced stage of ‘Serbia’s right to respond.’

Fetoshi stated that the radicalization of chauvinist discourse following Minister Paunović’s positions, her support from Dačić, and the ‘heroization’ of war criminals and those arrested in connection with the Reçak Massacre make the threat against the Ibër an extension of Vučić’s message at the commemorative ceremony for Operation Storm. At that ceremony, Vučić declared that ‘Serbia is strong enough to protect the Serbs’ (Insajder, 04.08.2026).

He warned that the normalization of language involving violence, ethnic cleansing and the ‘punishment’ of Albanians is intended not only to calculate the further ‘tolerance’ of Serbia in its ‘two chairs’ position and Vučić’s domestic political gain, but also to legitimize the ‘Serbian World’ as a camouflage for Milošević’s project. ‘This is Serbia’s hybrid strategy in its advanced form. Military intervention is not necessary as long as subversive goals can be achieved through water, energy, sabotage, espionage and disinformation. From this perspective, the threat against the Ibër is the strategic lever, while Lake Gazivode/Ujmani is a threat to national security,’ Fetoshi said.

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Albania expressed serious concern following a statement by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who spoke about the possibility of diverting the flow of the Iber River and involving Serbian specialists and institutions in assessing this scenario.

Albania’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ferit Hoxha, stressed in his response:

“The diversion of a river that is part of a transboundary river basin cannot be treated as an internal matter or a decision taken unilaterally, especially when its effects directly impact the land, ecosystem, water security, supply and livelihoods of the inhabitants of a neighboring country.”

He added that international water law establishes clear rules on this issue. The principles of equitable and reasonable use of waters crossing borders, the obligation to prevent, manage and reduce transboundary harm, as well as the need for cooperation, information exchange and consultations on measures with consequences beyond national territory, are now firmly established international norms. Hoxha recalled that Serbia has been a member of the UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes since 2010, thereby accepting its mechanisms for resolving disputes as well.

Emphasizing Albania’s expectations, Minister Hoxha stressed that Belgrade must fully respect its international commitments and the spirit of good-neighborly relations.

In a post on the “X” platform, Hoxha stated that “any project or intervention that could alter the flow, quantity or purity of waters connected to Kosovo must be addressed transparently, based on scientific data, with a full assessment of the transboundary impact and following consultations with the affected party.”

He warned that water resources must not be turned into a means of political pressure or punishment against another state or population. Albania, he added, firmly supports Kosovo’s right to security, sustainable development and the protection of its water reserves. “We are deeply convinced, and expect, that such matters will be resolved through dialogue, cooperation and European standards, not through threats or unilateral interventions and actions,” Hoxha concluded.

The post Albania Raises Its Voice Against Vučić’s Plan for the Iber River: Water Must Not Become a Political Weapon appeared first on Albeu.com.

Commentator Viktor Buzhala has commented on warnings that Serbia is considering diverting the course of the Ibër River, assessing that such a move would create a precedent that could place Serbia in even more unfavorable circumstances.

In a Facebook post, he compared water flows between Kosovo and Serbia. Buzhala claims that the volume of water flowing from Kosovo into Serbia is significantly greater than the amount entering Kosovo from Serbia through the Ibër.

According to his calculations, the Ibër brings an average of around 350 to 440 million cubic meters of water from Serbia into Kosovo each year.

On the other hand, he says that approximately 1.2 to 1.25 billion cubic meters of water flow from Kosovo’s territory into Serbia each year.

“The Ibër alone, after passing through Kosovo and taking in the Sitnica and other rivers and streams, carries around 950–970 million cubic meters of water to Serbia annually. The Binça Morava adds another approximately 280 million cubic meters per year,” Buzhala wrote.

He said that if Serbia establishes a precedent under which the state in the upper reaches of a river may alter or stop its flow to the state located downstream, it should bear in mind that it is itself in a “downstream” position for several waterways originating in Kosovo.

Buzhala emphasized that, in his view, Kosovo has other options for supplying water to the Kosovo Energy Corporation if potential problems arise with supplies from Ujman.

According to him, around 22 million cubic meters of water per year are needed to operate Kosovo A and Kosovo B. An alternative system with a capacity of one cubic meter per second, he added, could provide around 31.5 million cubic meters of water annually.

According to Buzhala, the Sitnica alone carries around 400 million cubic meters of water per year, so a small portion of that amount could be treated and used to meet KEK’s industrial needs.

“The water could be taken, treated and pumped into a reservoir near KEK or directly into the industrial system,” he wrote.

He also mentioned Batllava Lake as another option, noting that the lake was originally built in part to meet the needs of the thermal power plants. According to him, supplying Batllava with additional water through the Llap system could be considered.

According to Buzhala, these interventions would be far smaller in scale than completely replacing the Ibër system.

In conclusion, he warned that using water as a means of pressure could also have consequences for Serbia.

“Serbia should know that threatening to use water is a two-way game. If you cut off the water coming from your territory, there is a physical possibility that Kosovo could also retain the water originating in its territory,” Buzhala wrote.

According to him, if Belgrade intends to use water as an instrument of political pressure, it should carefully consider its geographical and hydrological position before establishing such a precedent.

The post Buzhala: Serbia Receives More Than 1.2 Billion m³ of Water Annually from Kosovo, Despite Threats Over the Ibër appeared first on Albeu.com.

Using a small excavator rented for a fee and their own labour, they have gone out into the field to repair the damaged pipeline. According to them, the damage occurred during work to install electricity poles. Residents say that, faced with a lack of institutional intervention, they have been forced to solve the problem themselves.

They say they built the village water supply system years ago through contributions from Morin families, and that even today they are covering the repair costs themselves, with help from their children living abroad. According to residents, the last investment in water supply was made in 2008, but the supply lasted only a few days. From building the water supply system to repairing the pipelines, they say they have paid twice to have water in their homes. As work continues in high temperatures, it remains unclear when the responsible institutions will intervene.

The post Morin Village in Kukës Left Without Water During Hot Days, Residents Repair Water Supply System Themselves appeared first on Albeu.com.

Hoxha claims that the suspected mechanism worked in such a way that the oil was registered in documents as an import for Kosovo, but in fact was unloaded in Albania and then traded on the black market. According to his claims, the tankers were later filled with water and entered Kosovo in order to cover up the traces.

He also stresses that at an early stage the company Exfis had been mentioned as well, but according to him this was done unfairly. Hoxha adds that it remains to be clarified by the official investigation which companies will turn out to have been involved.

Hoxha’s post:

The criminal scheme of money laundering through oil imports seems to be reaching an epilogue, as the Prosecutor’s Office and the Kosovo Police today carried out an operation in 40 locations across the country to uncover this scheme.

How did the scheme work?

Tons of oil loaded for import into Kosovo, transiting through Albania, were month after month appearing as oil entering the country for market needs.

Since Albania has higher VAT and excise tax on oil, one or several importing companies had found a formula for manipulation.

1. On paper, the oil appeared to be imported into Kosovo.

2. The oil was unloaded in Albania and distributed on the black oil market.

3. The tankers were filled with water and entered Kosovo in order to cover up the crime.

The scheme began to look suspicious when the stocks of oil companies could no longer justify the allegedly imported oil, because market demand was not that high.

This news began circulating in Kosovo several months ago. At first, it seems unfairly, Exfis was mentioned as a participant in this scheme. But when “professional” journalists got information about whose trucks were caught in the fraud, they started keeping quiet.

Today, seeing which portal is publishing and then removing news about this economic crime (figures in the millions), the chances are that one of the biggest petroleum companies is behind this scheme.

Let’s see. 😉

The post Dibran Hoxha Raises Suspicions of Fraud in Oil Imports: According to Him, This Is How the Scheme Is Suspected to Have Operated appeared first on Albeu.com.