Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić made an unannounced visit to the Presheva Valley several days ago, where he met with Serb citizens living in the area.

During his visit, Vučić assured one citizen that Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) would contact him or his son within 48 hours regarding a possible job.

The visit took place just one day after a delegation of Albanian politicians had visited Tirana. The meeting discussed opening an Albanian Consulate in Bujanoc as a reciprocal measure following the opening of the Serbian Consulate in Shkodra.

The timing and circumstances of the Serbian president’s visit have prompted reactions and questions about its political message, particularly with regard to the position of Albanians in the Presheva Valley.

Commentator Nehat Hyseni told “Bota sot” that Vučić’s promise could not be treated simply as an isolated case. According to him, it raises broader concerns about the functioning of security institutions and the way Albanians are treated in the region.

Hyseni said Aleksandar Vučić’s statement that a citizen or his son would be contacted by the BIA within 48 hours about a job opportunity required serious attention and analysis beyond the individual’s personal interest.

He stressed that no one’s right to seek employment and secure a dignified life in their own country was in question. On the contrary, he said, employment is a fundamental right, and the state has an obligation to provide equal opportunities for everyone. The problem, he said, lies in the fact that the head of state publicly and directly promised the intervention of a security agency to secure employment within 48 hours, giving the matter a clear political, institutional and distinctly anti-Albanian character.

According to Hyseni, the BIA operates neither as a private company nor as a municipal office where jobs can be promised during meetings with citizens; it is a state security institution. The agency itself, he recalled, states that working there requires specific professional skills and qualities, while recruitment is conducted through specific procedures. For this reason, he asked whether the main criterion should be meritocracy or personal ties to those in power and necessarily being of Serbian ethnicity, in an area where 95% of the population is Albanian.

Hyseni said the sensitivity of the issue was particularly heightened in the Presheva Valley, as Albanians have complained for decades about discrimination and insufficient representation in state institutions, especially in security structures, the administration and public institutions.

Under these circumstances, he said, the direct promise of employment at the BIA could be understood as a tool of political influence and a brazen signal to Albanians that, in Serbia and within this agency, there is room only for Serbs.

He described the situation in the Presheva Valley as paradoxical, with Albanians facing unemployment, poverty, a lack of investment and the continuous departure of young people. Hyseni said Albanians do not leave because they do not love Presheva, Bujanoc or Medvegjë, but because they see no economic or professional prospects. According to him, Serbia, as a discriminatory and fascist state, forces non-Serb citizens to choose between emigration and survival.

Hyseni asked where the state was when employment needed to be secured for young Albanians and what the institutional response was when a young Albanian applied for a job in the police, military, administration, judiciary, public enterprises or security institutions.

If a phone call from the president can expedite a citizen’s employment opportunity, then Albanians have the right to demand that the same state provide everyone with equal opportunities, regardless of ethnicity, he said.

He explained that Albanians are not seeking privileges, but equality; they do not want jobs to be handed to them as a political reward, but demand fair competition and meritocracy. Nor, he said, do they expect Belgrade to “save” them, but rather that the institutions of the Republic of Serbia refrain from discriminating against them.

Hyseni emphasized that the treatment of Albanians in the Presheva Valley was not only a matter of their rights, but was also important for Serbia’s own stability.

According to him, stability in the Presheva Valley cannot be based on political patronage, individual favors and direct clientelist relationships. A sustainable policy must be based on functioning institutions, proportional representation, economic development and equal opportunities for both Albanians and Serbs.

He said Vučić’s statement sent a troubling signal because it showed that the president could intervene personally to open an institutional door that should be accessible to ordinary citizens through standard procedures.

According to Hyseni, this creates the impression that the state serves only Serbs, who enjoy exceptional access to those in power, while Albanians continue to be ignored and discriminated against. He cited the non-recognition of diplomas obtained in Kosovo, the deletion of addresses and the ethnic cleansing of the Valley through administrative and police measures, stressing that the region’s Albanians should not accept this situation as normal.

Hyseni clarified that he did not oppose the employment of any Serb citizen. According to him, every young Serb who secures a job and remains in their hometown is one fewer person forced to leave. However, the same right must also be guaranteed to young Albanians. He called on the state to curb emigration and preserve the Albanian population through equal and non-discriminatory policies, rather than through ethnic selection or political patronage.

Speaking about a possible solution, Hyseni said the Presheva Valley did not need Belgrade’s political mercy, but economic development and institutional justice—two issues that, according to him, represent a fundamental distinction.

He stressed that a job could not serve as a reward for political loyalty, while employment in a security institution should not be offered as a personal favor. Such a position, he said, should be earned through knowledge, professionalism, integrity and a transparent process.

If Serbia aims to prove that it is a democratic and European state, the main test, according to Hyseni, is not found in statements made in Belgrade, but in the reality in Presheva, Bujanoc and Medvegjë. He reiterated that the Albanians of the Valley were not seeking privileged treatment, but an end to discrimination, describing this as a civic, democratic and European demand.

In conclusion, Hyseni also linked the issue to national dignity. As an Albanian from the Presheva Valley, he said no young Albanian should be forced to emigrate simply because the state had failed to provide equal conditions for them to work and live in their hometown.

He asked why, if a citizen could be found a job at the BIA within 48 hours, jobs and employment opportunities could not be created for thousands of young Albanians through an equal, transparent and merit-based system. According to him, this is precisely where a serious discussion about the position of Albanians in the Presheva Valley should begin.

Hyseni concluded by saying that Aleksandar Vučić’s unexpected visit was no coincidence, coming immediately after Albanian political leaders returned from Albania, where the opening of an Albanian Consulate in Bujanoc had been discussed as a reciprocal measure following the opening of the Serbian Consulate in Shkodra.

According to him, this consulate could do more harm than good, considering that more than 130,000 Albanians live in the Valley, while Shkodra and the surrounding area officially have 160 Serb and Montenegrin residents. For this reason, Hyseni also viewed Vučić’s visit as an insincere and ugly diplomatic message, he concluded for “Bota sot.”

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Security affairs expert Gurakuç Kuçi reacted following a statement by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić during his visit to the Preševo Valley. Vučić promised a citizen that, within 48 hours, he or his son would be contacted regarding the possibility of employment with Serbia’s Security Information Agency (BIA).

Kuçi interprets the statement as a development that goes beyond a job offer, viewing it as part of the way in which, according to him, the authorities in Belgrade seek to strengthen political and institutional control in the Preševo Valley.

The expert stresses that in autocratic regimes, intelligence services can be turned into tools for controlling citizens. According to him, the recruitment process in such structures can also be influenced by political aims and interests.

For Kuçi, the significance of Vučić’s statement is particularly linked to the fact that the promise concerns the BIA, one of Serbia’s main security institutions.

He believes that a persistent climate of interethnic tension is being consolidated in the Preševo Valley, in which Serbs are portrayed as a threatened community, while Belgrade presents itself as their protector.

“In this context, he needs as many people as possible within the security institutions who are directly linked to the regime and ready to implement its political objectives,” Kuçi wrote on X, KosovaPress reports.

According to the expert, the way Vučić conveyed the message resembles the model used by former Serbian president Slobodan Milošević in Kosovo Polje on April 24, 1987, when he addressed Serbs with the words: “No one should dare beat you.”

Kuçi sees the same approach in Vučić’s statement that what Albanians at the local level do not do for Serbs, “we will do for you from Belgrade.”

Such communication, he said, portrays Belgrade as the protector of Serbs against Albanians and, at the same time, turns local governance into an ethnic issue.

By contrast, Albanians in the Preševo Valley, Kuçi stresses, continue to face address deactivation, underrepresentation in institutions, and a lack of employment in state and security institutions.

He specifically points to Bujanovac, where, according to him, it has been reported that no young Albanian has been hired by the police for around ten years.

“While Serbs are promised employment, support and direct intervention from Belgrade, Albanians continue to face gradual administrative and institutional elimination,” Kuçi stated.

The security expert warns that this model could directly affect relations between communities in the Preševo Valley.

According to his analysis, the process begins with portraying Serbs as victims, continues with increasing hatred and distrust toward Albanians, and ends with the mobilisation of the central state as their protector.

Kuçi warns that such a policy could increase pressure on Albanians in the Preševo Valley and create circumstances in which administrative elimination could, in his view, shift into more direct forms of pressure and exclusion.

His reaction came after Serbian lawyer Čedomir Stojković published a video. Stojković has also expressed doubts about the use of the BIA for political purposes, interference in electoral processes and pressure on voters.

Stojković stated that Vučić’s words demonstrate the Serbian president’s direct influence over the intelligence service. He also called for increased international oversight of electoral processes in Serbia.

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The gradual transition from KFOR’s permanent presence on the Iber Bridge in Mitrovica has caused concern for Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić.

During an interview given on Friday to a Serbian media outlet, Vučić spoke about the bridge over the Iber River and revealed that regarding its opening, he had written to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.

“I believe Rutte wants to guarantee security for all people in the Balkans and, accordingly, I myself requested respect for the rights of Serbs and implementation of the Brussels agreements. Had the Association of Serb-majority municipalities been established, none of this would have happened. The Iber Bridge was part of the dialogue, and now they want to remove it because it bothers them that a Serb does not want to recognize the so-called Kosovo. It is unbelievable that someone would think that sovereign Serbia would give up a part of its territory; it was important that I also use my personal integrity to warn Rutte about what is happening,” Vučić declared.

The Serbian president described Rutte as an intelligent person, who, according to him, has more information than anyone else.

“He is smart enough that when everyone pushes him into conflict with Trump, he won’t enter into conflict. I believe he will act rationally now as well,” Vučić said.

Professor Sadri Ramabaja assesses that the statement of the Serbian president clearly reflects the political and spiritual state of Belgrade in the face of recent developments in northern Kosovo.

According to Ramabaja, Vučić’s reaction shows that the Iber Bridge has not been considered by Belgrade merely as an infrastructural work or an ordinary security issue. He sees it as a political element for preserving the status quo and as one of the symbols of contested sovereignty in the north.

“The Iber Bridge and the end of a strategic illusion! From Vučić’s statement to the failure of the project to partition Kosovo,” Ramabaja says.

“The bridge over the Iber River was part of the dialogue, now they want to remove it.”

“This statement by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić speaks more than many other statements about the spiritual and political state of Belgrade in the face of recent developments in northern Kosovo. In fact, it is clear evidence that the bridge over the Iber has not been seen by Belgrade simply as an infrastructure object or a technical security issue. It has been treated as a political asset of the status quo and, consequently, as one of the symbols of the contested space of sovereignty in the north,” Ramabaja tells “Bota Sot.”

He emphasizes that the gradual change of KFOR’s permanent presence should be analyzed as part of a broader reorganization of the political and strategic reality in northern Kosovo.

“Therefore, the warning about the gradual withdrawal of KFOR’s permanent presence from the bridge and the transfer of security responsibility to the Kosovo Police cannot be interpreted solely in operational terms. It should be seen in the context of a deeper transformation of the political and strategic reality in the north.

For about 27 years, the bridge over the Iber has been one of the most powerful symbols of Mitrovica’s division. On the physical level, it separated two parts of the city; on the political level, it embodied a much deeper dividing line: the boundary between an institutional order that the Republic of Kosovo aimed to extend throughout its territory and a parallel reality that Belgrade had nurtured, financed, and politically supported.

In this sense, the bridge was much more than a bridge. It was the symbol of a status quo. And the status quo, for Belgrade, was not neutrality. It was a strategic opportunity,” the professor emphasizes.

On August 10, the NATO mission in Kosovo, KFOR, announced that it had begun the gradual transition of its permanent presence on the Iber Bridge in Mitrovica. According to KFOR, this process is taking place due to the improvement of the security situation in Kosovo and is part of the gradual reduction of the mission’s presence.

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After more than a year and a half of protests against the government and corruption, Serbia is heading toward snap parliamentary elections.

President Aleksandar Vučić announced that the vote is expected to take place on October 18 or 25, 2026.

In an interview with state broadcaster RTS, Vučić said that one of these two dates would be election day, while the final decision is expected to be made in the coming days.

Under the normal timetable, parliamentary elections would have been held in 2027.

The protests, led primarily by students, have continued for months, with demands concerning institutional accountability, the fight against corruption, and the holding of snap elections.

The student movement gained strength after the collapse of a canopy at the railway station in Novi Sad in November 2024, in which 16 people lost their lives.

Will Vučić return as prime minister?

The announcement of the elections comes at a time when Aleksandar Vučić’s political future remains one of the main issues in Serbia.

At the end of June, the Serbian president said he would step down and that the country would move toward snap elections.

However, he has not yet specified when he will resign in order to clear the way for presidential elections.

Meanwhile, speculation has been circulating for weeks that Vučić could return to the post of prime minister if the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) wins the parliamentary elections.

Vučić held the post from 2014 to 2017, before being elected president.

Analysts believe that a return to the head of government would enable him to retain political influence even after leaving the presidency.

Protests have shaken the government

The political crisis in Serbia erupted after the tragedy in Novi Sad, which developed into a broad student movement against corruption and Vučić’s style of governance.

Pressure from the protesters has been one of the main factors pushing the authorities toward discussing snap elections. Now, with the two dates on the table, the political battle is expected to enter a new phase.

If the elections are held on October 18 or 25, they will represent an important test for the SNS and for the student movement that has challenged Vučić’s government for months.

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Arben Fetoshi, director of the Institute for Hybrid War Studies “Octopus,” has reacted on Facebook to a letter from Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić addressed to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. In the letter, Vučić asked KFOR not to allow the opening of the Ibër Bridge.

Fetoshi described the move as a desperate attempt by Belgrade to preserve the bridge as a political symbol of division and to portray as a threat a development that NATO considers an improvement in security.

“Aleksandar Vučić’s letter to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, in which he reportedly asked KFOR to stop the opening of the Ibër Bridge, is Serbia’s frustrated attempt to preserve its political meaning as a symbol of division and to frame as a threat precisely what NATO regards as an improvement in security,” Fetoshi wrote.

According to him, NATO’s decision, described as “concrete progress” in guaranteeing freedom of movement, significantly undermines the narrative of a “repressive Kosovo.” He added that this development makes irreversible the issue of stability, the rule of law, and the free movement of citizens, vehicles, goods, and ideas in the north.

Fetoshi believes that claims of “systematic attacks and ethnic cleansing” against Serbs in Kosovo have been dismantled and are increasingly losing their weight as an “argument” for the strategy of destabilization in the north.

“The ‘Albanian-Serb confrontation’ in the north exists only in the rhetoric of Vučić and his state and paramilitary structures,” he stressed. According to Fetoshi, Kosovo has built and put into operation two bridges over the Ibër River, enabling communication, development, and normalization.

He considered the claim that vehicle traffic over the main bridge would endanger security absurd and instrumental, saying that the argument serves to preserve the division in pursuit of hegemonic aims.

“Vučić also reportedly mentioned regional security. But before linking it to the freedom of vehicles to move across a bridge, he should remember that the criminal and illegal structures that blocked roads and attacked citizens and institutions in the north did not cross the bridge,” Fetoshi wrote.

He added that neither the KFOR attackers who wounded more than 90 soldiers crossed the bridge. According to him, the people who attacked journalists, citizens, and local and international institutions did not cross it either.

Fetoshi also stressed that the planners, organizers, and terrorist attackers in Banjska did not use the bridge even when they fled to seek shelter in Serbia. He also said that the sophisticated weaponry worth millions of euros seized in the north did not cross the bridge.

“The attackers of the Ibër-Lepenc Canal did not cross the bridge. The networks smuggling goods, drugs, and migrants that operated along the border did not pass through the bridge, and the systematic pressure on Kosovo Serbs from Belgrade and illegal structures does not pass through the bridge,” he declared.

For this reason, according to Fetoshi, the bridge is not Vučić’s real problem. The problem, he said, is the infrastructure of destabilization that over the years has been fueled by the symbolism of “division” on the Ibër.

“His strategy needs to project tensions, because tensions keep the narrative of ‘threatened Serbs’ alive. It needs intervention so that, together with his circle, he can benefit from millions of euros that he supposedly allocates to Kosovo Serbs, while using them for his own interests,” Fetoshi wrote.

According to him, this scheme also includes the role of Vučić’s “hero,” Milan Radoičić, as well as the structures that have operated in the north.

Fetoshi said that NATO does not need Vučić’s letters to understand the origin of the security threats in the north. “NATO knows who attacked its soldiers, and it also knows what happened in Banjska. It is fully aware of what weapons arsenal was seized and knows who used the tensions in the north as a political instrument,” he wrote.

“Therefore, with such letters, Vučić merely reveals the perfidious strategy of ‘victimhood as a warning,’ portraying normalization as a threat, freedom of movement as a danger, and the integration of the north as ‘terror against Serbs,’” Fetoshi concluded.

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Acting Minister of Internal Affairs Xhelal Sveçla has announced that the Kosovo Police Inspectorate (KPI) is investigating a complaint filed by Nenad Rashković, who claims that he was beaten by members of the Kosovo Police.

According to Sveçla, following a recommendation from the KPI, two police officers have been suspended from duty. He said that once the investigative process is completed, the public will be informed of the findings and possible measures.

“As soon as we were informed of this complaint, the Kosovo Police Inspectorate launched an investigation into the case. You already know that, based on the recommendation of this inspectorate, police superiors suspended two police officers. When the investigations are completed, our public will be informed of the findings and any measures against any individual,” Sveçla declared.

The acting minister also criticized Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, saying that he was attempting to use the Rashković case to divert attention from investigations into war crimes in Kosovo.

Sveçla described the Serbian president’s conduct as unacceptable and said that his statements were intended to minimize the actions of the Serbian state during the war in Kosovo.

“I also want to mention the absolutely unacceptable conduct of President Vučić, who is attempting to exploit one allegation to minimize the actions of the Serbian state during the last war in Kosovo, and to divert attention from the findings, which are horrific. In other words, we have discovered three mass graves, and we have discovered 71 long guns,” he said.

Instead of making public statements, according to Sveçla, Vučić should cooperate with the institutions and open Serbia’s archives concerning the crimes committed during the war.

The acting minister added that the institutions would conclude investigations into both matters. He called on the president of Serbia to help shed light on the fate of people who went missing during the war.

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Serbia is analyzing the possibility of diverting the course of the Ibar River within its territory, according to a statement by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. Authorities in Belgrade have begun work on the issue and have enlisted experts.

Speaking to a Serbian media outlet on Sunday, Vučić said that construction specialists, engineers and professionals from other fields had been called in. He delivered the warning in a threatening tone, stating that Serbia has several reasons to alter the course of the Ibar and that afterward they would see what the Albanians would do and how they would behave because, according to him, the Serbian people are being mistreated.

This is not the first time the Serbian president has put forward such an idea. In 2024, immediately after the attack on critical infrastructure at Ibër-Lepenc, of which Serbs are accused, Vučić said his country had a plan to divert the Ibar within Serbian territory.

Serbian commentator Zlatoje Martinov described the warning as a reckless statement detached from reality and an empty threat. According to him, diverting the river would be utterly absurd, as its technical implementation would be extremely complicated and would cost Serbia several billion euros.

Speaking to “Bota Sot,” Martinov questioned why Serbia would need to borrow such vast sums from foreign banks. He stressed that the country is barely managing to finance Vučić’s megalomaniacal “EXPO 2027” project, where construction is behind schedule, while the Serbian president is worried about whether all the buildings will be completed by next summer.

Martinov said that diverting the Ibar riverbed and “destroying Lake Gazivoda” would require not only billions of euros and many years of technical work, but also the approval of Europe and the rest of the world. According to him, Vučić does not have such approval, and no one can secure it because the intervention would amount to a form of crime against the people of Kosovo, as well as against the Serbs living in Kosovo, whom the Serbian president claims to support and for whom he swears his commitment.

For the commentator, Vučić’s idea sounds more ridiculous than frightening. He believes that misguided steps are often taken in moments of powerlessness and anger, while this threat against Kosovo would, in practice, be very difficult and even almost impossible to carry out. For this reason, Martinov described the plan as one of Aleksandar Vučić’s “daydreams.”

Any intervention in the course of the Ibar is of particular importance to Kosovo because the river is directly connected to the Gazivoda/Ujman water system and the Ibër-Lepenc canal.

Such an action would not simply be an ordinary diversion of the river’s course but would have direct consequences for Kosovo’s water and electricity supplies. The impact would particularly affect the two large power plants, Kosovo A and Kosovo B.

The European Union also responded to Vučić’s statements, calling for warnings about a possible diversion of the Ibar, as well as any action that does not help normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia, to be avoided.

On August 11, a European Commission spokesperson said that progress toward normalizing Kosovo-Serbia relations could be achieved only through dialogue.

In its response to Radio Free Europe, the European Commission stressed that both statements about possible changes to the river’s course and actions that do not support the goal of normalizing relations should be avoided.

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The possibility that Serbia could interfere with the flow of the Ibar River has renewed concerns about Kosovo’s security, water supply and stability. The debate was sparked by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who said that the authorities in Belgrade were considering altering the river’s course within Serbian territory.

Vučić linked this scenario to his claims about the way Kosovo’s authorities treat Serbs. In doing so, he shifted the issue of transboundary waters from the technical to the political sphere.

The statement has raised questions about whether Serbia could use control of or interference with the Ibar’s flow as an instrument of pressure against Kosovo. Such an action could affect the country’s water supply, energy production, agriculture, environment and security.

The sensitivity of the issue is linked to the strategic importance of the Ibar River and the Ujman–Ibar-Lepenc system to Kosovo. A change in the volume or flow of water could have consequences for several sectors vital to the functioning of the state, not only the water supply.

At the heart of the debate is the question of whether the Serbian president’s warning is merely political rhetoric and part of hybrid warfare, or whether Kosovo should treat it as a concrete national security threat and address it without delay in the international arena.

Attention has also focused on the response of Kosovo’s institutions and international partners, particularly the European Union, the United States, NATO and other international institutions, in the event of any attempt to turn water resources into a tool of political pressure.

Security expert Arben Dashevci, speaking to “Bota sot,” interpreted Vučić’s statement as propaganda and a continuation of Serbia’s hybrid warfare.

According to Dashevci, the idea of altering the Ibar’s course cannot be implemented because of the rules of international law. He stressed that conventions governing transboundary waters do not permit interventions of this nature.

He said Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić had stated that the Serbian authorities were analyzing a “possibility” that, in his view, was unfeasible. Dashevci emphasized that international water conventions prohibit such an action, despite Vučić presenting it as a possible alteration of the Ibar’s course within Serbian territory and linking it to the treatment of Serbs by the authorities in Pristina.

In the expert’s assessment, the Serbian president’s claims do not correspond with the actual situation in Kosovo. He believes the aim is to create pressure and divert attention from the domestic problems Serbia is facing.

Dashevci described the statement as pure propaganda serving Vučić’s domestic political needs and as an attempt to shift the focus away from the many problems he has with his own people in Serbia. According to him, this is part of hybrid warfare and marks the second time Vučić has made a propagandistic claim with no practical effect that is absolutely impossible to implement.

For this reason, Dashevci believes the possibility of Serbia actually using an alteration of the Ibar’s course as a means of pressure against Kosovo is extremely remote.

He said he did not consider this scenario serious and that, in terms of international law on transboundary waters, the risk was zero. According to Dashevci, there can be no consequences from an action that cannot be implemented, as the international convention strictly prohibits it and is applied uniformly worldwide.

Nevertheless, the expert urged Kosovo not to remain passive diplomatically, even though he considers the threat impossible to carry out.

According to him, the Kosovo authorities should immediately raise the issue at the international level and coordinate their response with their main allies.

Dashevci called on Kosovo to alert the international community by using its full diplomatic capacity. He said the issue should be raised without delay through a response coordinated with the EU, the United Kingdom, the US and other international institutions.

Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj, a retired Major General, took a different view. He argued that Vučić’s words should not be reduced to political rhetoric or a technical discussion, as the issue affects national security, human security and hybrid warfare.

Racaj told “Bota sot” that the Serbian president’s warning that he was considering the possibility of altering the Ibar’s course, linked to claims about the treatment of Serbs in Kosovo, should be taken very seriously. In his view, this is not merely a political statement or a hydrotechnical debate, but an issue that must be analyzed within the framework of national and human security, as well as hybrid warfare.

He emphasized that one principle is becoming increasingly clear in international relations: the 21st century is an era of competition and conflict over energy, while the 22nd century may be characterized by fierce competition for water and other vital resources. For this reason, according to Racaj, water is no longer merely a natural resource, but also a strategic one.

In Kosovo’s case, he considers the importance of the Ibar and, in particular, the Ujman–Ibar-Lepenc system to be far greater than it may appear. Racaj referred to a report by the US-based Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), published in 2021, which assessed Lake Gazivoda/Ujman as an important component of Kosovo’s water and energy security.

According to the report, the lake’s waters provide about one-third of Kosovo’s drinking water. They are also used to cool two coal-fired power plants, which at the time supplied about 95 percent of the country’s electricity production.

Racaj warned that deliberate interference by a state actor with the volume, quality or flow of water could trigger a chain of consequences for the drinking water supply, agriculture, industry, energy, public health and social stability. According to him, it is precisely this interdependence that makes the situation far more serious.

He also linked his concerns to previous events affecting Kosovo’s water infrastructure, singling out the attack on the Ibar-Lepenc canal in November 2024.

Racaj recalled that an explosion in northern Kosovo damaged the Ibar-Lepenc canal in November 2024. The attack disrupted the water supply and put the country’s energy system at risk. Security measures were strengthened after the incident, while KFOR took steps to protect critical infrastructure.

Responsibility for that attack remained the subject of accusations and investigations, while Belgrade denied any involvement. According to Racaj, this context makes Vučić’s latest statement even more troubling, as it removes water from the sphere of technical cooperation and places it in the realm of political and potentially security-related pressure.

From a technical perspective, Racaj referred to hydrotechnical engineer Mumin Morina, who has emphasized that a river’s course can technically be altered through hydrotechnical works. However, technical feasibility does not mean that a state has the right to act as it wishes, because international legal norms apply in such cases.

He explained that the UNECE Convention on transboundary waters is based on three main principles: preventing harm across borders, the equitable and reasonable use of waters, and cooperation among states that share the same water system.

UNECE also stipulates that interventions that could reduce or alter water flows into a downstream state must be handled in accordance with these obligations and through consultations between the parties. For Racaj, this means that water cannot be used as a political weapon or as a mechanism for punishing a population.

Regarding Kosovo’s response, Racaj called for immediate and coordinated diplomatic, security and strategic action. In his professional assessment, the threat should be addressed on three levels.

At the first, diplomatic level, Kosovo should immediately document the statement and officially submit it to the EU, the US, NATO, the United Nations, the OSCE and the relevant international institutions dealing with transboundary waters. Racaj stressed that a response should not be postponed until the threat turns into concrete action.

The second level concerns security. According to him, water infrastructure should be classified and protected as critical national infrastructure. This includes Ujman, the Ibar-Lepenc canal, water supply facilities and parts of the system linked to energy production.

Racaj added that the protection of these assets cannot be limited to physical security alone. It must also encompass the cyber, technological and information dimensions.

The third level is strategic, where Kosovo, according to him, should establish reserves and alternatives. A state is less vulnerable to blackmail when its supplies do not depend on a single source. For this reason, he called for the diversification of water sources, reservoirs, supply systems, emergency capacities and energy connections.

The retired Major General stressed that developments should also be analyzed through the lens of hybrid warfare, because vital resources and critical infrastructure can be used to exert pressure even without a direct military confrontation.

According to Racaj, modern conflicts do not necessarily begin with aircraft and tanks. They may begin with a political statement, a disinformation campaign, economic pressure, a cyberattack, infrastructure sabotage or the manipulation of a vital resource. In this sense, the use of water as an instrument of pressure would constitute a typical case of hybrid warfare against a state and society.

Nevertheless, he urged against creating panic, noting that a political statement is not the same as the technical implementation of a project. Precisely because of the potential scale of the consequences, Racaj said the state should be guided by the principle of prevention.

He proposed that Kosovo ask its international partners to establish a permanent mechanism for monitoring and cooperation regarding the Ibar’s transboundary waters. According to him, this mechanism should ensure transparency for every new hydrotechnical project that could affect the flow of water.

Concluding his comments to “Bota sot,” Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj said the message must be unequivocal: the Ibar cannot be used as a political instrument, and Ujman cannot be turned into a weapon of pressure against Kosovo.

The post Vučić’s Threat over the Ibar River Alarms Kosovo, Experts Divided on Level of Risk appeared first on Albeu.com.

Serbia is considering the possibility of changing the course of the Ibar River within its territory, an idea put forward by President Aleksandar Vučić.

According to him, the authorities in Belgrade have already engaged construction experts, engineers and other specialists to analyze this possibility.

Vučić made the statement to Serbian media on Sunday, accompanying it with a warning to Albanians regarding how they would react to such a decision.

“We have already called in experts who deal with this—the construction sector, engineers and everyone else. Since they are mistreating our people so much, let us see. We have various reasons for changing the course of the Ibar, and then we will see what the Albanians will do and how they will behave,” Vučić said.

This is not the first time the Serbian president has spoken about such a plan. He also mentioned the same idea in 2024, immediately after the attack on critical infrastructure at Ibër-Lepenc, for which Serbs have been accused.

At the time, Vučić said that Serbia had a plan to divert the Ibar River within its territory.

Serbian publicist Zlatoje Martinov described the latest statement as reckless and an empty threat, while calling the project an absurdity that would impose extraordinary costs on Serbia.

“This is one of a series of Vučić’s statements that have no connection with reality. It is another reckless statement and an empty threat. The idea of ‘changing the course of the Ibar River’ is pure absurdity, since such an infrastructure project is technically extremely complex and would cost Serbia several billion euros,” Martinov told “Bota sot.”

He added that Belgrade would be forced to take out large loans from foreign banks to finance such an undertaking at a time when Serbia is barely managing the costs of the “EXPO 2027” project. According to him, work on that project is being delayed, and Vučić is concerned about whether all the buildings will be completed by next summer.

Martinov also emphasized that implementing the plan would require the approval of Europe and the international community, which the Serbian president does not have.

“To relocate the Ibar riverbed and ‘destroy Gazivoda Lake,’ in addition to enormous sums of money and years of technical work, the approval of Europe and the world would also be needed. Vučić does not have this approval, and no one could ever obtain it, because such an action would constitute a kind of crime against the people of Kosovo and, of course, against the Serbs in Kosovo as well, whom Vučić swears by and supposedly supports,” the publicist asserted.

According to him, the Serbian president’s idea is more laughable than threatening, because putting it into practice would be extremely difficult, even almost impossible.

“In a state of helplessness and anger, people often make the wrong moves. Such a statement by Vučić, intended as a threat against Kosovo, is in fact more laughable than frightening, because in practice it would be difficult, even almost impossible, to carry out. Therefore, I would simply call it Aleksandar Vučić’s ‘daydreaming,’” Martinov added.

The course of the Ibar is of direct importance to Kosovo because it is connected to the Gazivoda/Ujman water system and the Ibër-Lepenc canal.

Such an intervention would not merely be a technical change to the river’s course. It would have direct consequences for Kosovo’s water and electricity supply, including the operation of the two major power plants, Kosovo A and Kosovo B.

The European Union has also reacted to Vučić’s statements. The EU said that both statements about a possible change to the course of the Ibar and any actions that do not contribute to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia should be avoided.

“Progress in normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia can be achieved only through dialogue,” a European Commission spokesperson said on August 11.

In a response to Radio Free Europe, the European Commission emphasized that “statements, including those about possible changes to the river’s course, and actions that do not support this objective should be avoided.”

The post Serbian Publicist: Vučić’s Plan to Divert the Ibar Is Impossible and Would Cost Serbia Billions appeared first on Albeu.com.

A new wave of concern has swept across Kosovo following Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s statement that Belgrade is considering the possibility of diverting the course of the Ibar River in the Serbian sector. The statement has brought the security of the water supply and the country’s overall stability into focus.

The Serbian head of state justified the initiative by referring to what he calls the unfair treatment of the Serbian community by Kosovo’s institutions, thus turning the issue of water resources into an entirely political matter.

These claims have sparked a broad debate over the level of risk posed by using control over the Ibar as leverage against Kosovo, as well as the potential effects on the water supply, energy production, the agricultural sector, the ecosystem and national security.

The strategic position of the Ibar River, and particularly the Ujman–Ibar-Lepenc system, makes this an extremely sensitive issue for Kosovo. Any action that affected the volume or direction of the water flow could have far-reaching consequences, impacting both the drinking water supply and other sectors vital to the state.

Against this backdrop, the question is whether Vučić’s words are merely a rhetorical exercise and an element of hybrid warfare, or whether the authorities in Pristina should view them as a concrete threat to national security and urgently raise the issue at the international level.

Also crucial will be the position taken by Kosovo’s institutions and allies such as the European Union, the United States, NATO and other global bodies in response to any attempt to turn water reserves into a weapon of pressure.

Dashevci: Propaganda statement, no practical risk

Speaking to the “Bota sot” news portal, security expert Arben Dashevci described Vučić’s claims as mere propaganda and part of Serbia’s hybrid arsenal.

According to him, changing the course of the Ibar is an impossible scenario from the standpoint of international law, since treaties governing transboundary rivers do not authorize interventions of this nature.

“Yes, the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, has stated that the Serbian authorities are considering the impossible ‘possibility’—because it is impossible, as international water conventions do not permit such a thing—and that, supposedly, according to him, he wants to change the course of the Ibar River within Serbian territory, linking such an action to the treatment of Serbs by the authorities in Pristina,” he said.

Dashevci added that the Serbian leader’s claims do not reflect the reality in Kosovo and that the entire maneuver is intended to generate pressure and divert attention from domestic turmoil in Serbia.

“Vučić’s statement is pure propaganda for his domestic political needs, aimed at shifting attention away from the many problems he has there with his own people in that country and, of course, it is a continuation of his hybrid warfare, because this is the second time he has repeated propaganda that has no practical effect and is absolutely impossible,” he stressed.

He believes the probability of the Ibar’s diversion being used as a tool of blackmail is almost zero, precisely because of the barriers imposed by international law.

“Therefore, I do not think it is serious at all. From the standpoint of international law governing transboundary waters, the risk of Serbia using a change in the Ibar’s course as a means of pressure against Kosovo is zero. There can be no consequence when something cannot be carried out because it is prohibited by an international convention that applies equally and strictly throughout the world,” he said.

Nevertheless, the expert emphasized that despite its technical and legal impossibility, Kosovo should be proactive diplomatically and immediately raise the concern with its strategic partners.

“Kosovo should alert the international community using all of its diplomatic capacity. I believe it should immediately raise the issue at the international level through a coordinated response with the EU, the United Kingdom and, certainly, the US, as well as other international institutions,” Dashevci concluded.

Racaj: Water as a strategic asset, statement demands an immediate response

In contrast to this position, Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj, a reserve Major General, believes Vučić’s statement cannot be treated as a simple rhetorical episode or a hydrotechnical debate, but as a challenge that affects national security, human security and the sphere of hybrid warfare.

“The statement by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić that Serbia is considering the possibility of changing the course of the Ibar River, linking this to claims about the treatment of Serbs in Kosovo, must be taken very seriously. This is not merely a political statement or a hydrotechnical debate. In my view, it should be analyzed as an issue of national security, human security and hybrid warfare.

There is a principle that is becoming increasingly clear in international relations: the 21st century is the century of competition and conflict over energy, while the 22nd century may be the century of fierce competition over water and other vital resources. For this reason, water can no longer be treated solely as a natural resource; it is also a strategic resource.

In Kosovo’s case, the importance of the Ibar, and particularly the Ujman–Ibar-Lepenc system, is far greater than it appears at first glance. A report by the American Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), published in 2021, considers Gazivoda/Ujman Lake an important component of Kosovo’s water and energy security. According to the report, the lake’s waters provide about one-third of Kosovo’s drinking water and are used to cool two coal-fired power plants, which at the time accounted for about 95 percent of Kosovo’s electricity production.

This makes the issue much more serious. If a state actor manages to deliberately influence the quantity, quality or flow of the water, it can trigger cascading consequences affecting drinking water, agriculture, industry, energy, public health and social stability,” Racaj said.

He linked this warning to previous events that affected the country’s water infrastructure, recalling the explosion that struck the Ibar-Lepenc canal in November 2024.

“Therefore, Vučić’s statement should also be viewed in the context of what happened in November 2024, when an explosion damaged the Ibar-Lepenc canal in northern Kosovo. The attack caused disruptions to the water supply and threatened the country’s energy system; following the incident, security measures were increased and KFOR took steps to protect critical infrastructure. Responsibility for the attack remained the subject of accusations and investigations, while Belgrade denied involvement.

In this sense, the Serbian president’s latest statement is concerning because it moves water from the sphere of technical cooperation into that of political and potentially security-related pressure.

From a technical standpoint, as hydrotechnical engineer Mumin Morina has also pointed out, interventions in a river’s course can technically be carried out through hydrotechnical works. But this does not mean that a state has the right to do so at will. This is precisely where international law comes into play.

The UNECE Convention on Transboundary Waters establishes three fundamental principles: the prevention of transboundary harm, the equitable and reasonable use of waters, and cooperation between states that share the same water system. UNECE also emphasizes that even interventions in watercourses that could reduce or alter flows to a downstream state must be addressed within the framework of these obligations and consultations between the parties.

Therefore, water cannot be used as a political weapon or as a means of punishing a population,” he added.

Regarding the steps Pristina should take, Racaj insisted on a swift and coordinated response on several fronts.

“In my professional view, the threat should be addressed at three levels.

First, the diplomatic level. Kosovo should immediately document the statement and formally submit it to the EU, the US, NATO, the United Nations, the OSCE and the relevant international institutions dealing with transboundary waters. There should be no waiting for a threat to become concrete action before responding.

Second, the security level. Water infrastructure should be treated as critical national infrastructure. This includes Ujman, the Ibar-Lepenc canal, water supply facilities and components linked to energy production. Protection should not only be physical, but also cyber, technological and informational.

Third, the strategic level. Kosovo should develop alternatives and reserves. A state is better protected from blackmail when it does not depend on a single source. Therefore, the diversification of water sources, reservoirs, supply systems, emergency capacities and energy links is required,” Racaj said, listing the measures.

He warned that the situation should also be analyzed through the prism of hybrid warfare, because essential resources and vital infrastructure can be turned into instruments of blackmail without the need for an open military conflict.

“We must also bear in mind the hybrid warfare dimension. Modern warfare does not necessarily begin with tanks and aircraft. It can begin with a political statement, a disinformation campaign, economic pressure, a cyberattack, infrastructure sabotage or the manipulation of a vital resource. In this sense, using water as an instrument of pressure would be a typical example of hybrid warfare against a state and society.

However, we must also make an important distinction: panic should not be created. A political statement is not the same as the technical implementation of a project. But precisely because the potential consequences are so significant, the state must act according to the principle of prevention.

Kosovo should ask its international partners to establish a permanent mechanism for monitoring and cooperation regarding the Ibar’s transboundary waters, with transparency concerning any new hydrotechnical project that could affect the water flow.

The message must be clear: the Ibar cannot be used as a political tool, and Ujman cannot be turned into a weapon of pressure against Kosovo,” Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj said in closing his interview with “Bota sot.”

The post Vučić Threatens to Divert the Ibar River, Experts Divided: Propaganda or a Real Threat to Kosovo? appeared first on Albeu.com.