KFOR’s decision to gradually withdraw its permanent presence from the Ibar Bridge in Mitrovica, together with the step-by-step inclusion of the Kosovo Police in KFOR’s security structure at Deçan Monastery, has sparked debate about the growing role of local institutions in ensuring security throughout the country.

KFOR and NATO have linked these two steps to the improved security situation in Kosovo. The developments are also being interpreted as an indication of greater confidence in the capabilities of local institutions, particularly the Kosovo Police. While Belgrade has reacted to the decision, a debate has emerged in Kosovo over whether it represents a political success for the current government or institutional progress benefiting the state.

Addressing these issues, Professor Enver Bytyçi gave a statement to “Bota sot,” describing the decisions concerning the Ibar Bridge and Deçan Monastery as evidence of improved security and NATO’s growing confidence in the Kosovo Police.

In his assessment, the significance of these developments is not limited to security. They also carry political weight because they show that Kosovo’s institutions have increased their capacity to maintain order and stability.

Bytyçi said that two developments had taken place in recent days: KFOR announced that responsibility for the Ibar Bridge is being transferred to the Kosovo Police, while the latter is also being given the right to ensure normality at Deçan Monastery. According to him, both decisions are based on the improved security situation. He claimed that the media and opposition in Kosovo had ignored and remained silent about these developments, which, according to him, were overshadowed by destructive and anarchic actions in the Kosovo Assembly.

The professor argued that the decisions did not come about by chance but are the result of an ongoing process of strengthening Kosovo’s institutions and increasing international confidence in them. For Bytyçi, the gradual transfer of certain duties from KFOR to the Kosovo Police demonstrates that local institutions can assume ever-greater responsibility for security.

He said that the Ibar Bridge and Deçan Monastery, as two sites of particular importance with the potential to cause insecurity in Kosovo, would one day come under the authority of the Kosovo Police. However, according to him, this required security and guarantees, which KFOR and NATO now assess as being in place in Kosovo.

Bytyçi attributed reaching this point to what he called Albin Kurti’s stubborn conduct, which the opposition has consistently portrayed as a “catastrophe” for Kosovo. According to him, current developments show that this “catastrophe” was not for Kosovo, but for Serbia.

Referring to Serbian President Aleksandër Vuçiq’s criticism of the decisions and the KFOR commander, the professor said Belgrade’s reaction shows that these measures directly affect Serbia’s political interests concerning Kosovo.

According to Bytyçi, Belgrade has been angered by these highly positive developments because it understands that it will never return to Kosovo and will not be able to take any part of its territory. He added that the message to Belgrade is that NATO stands with Kosovo and does not accept partners “with a hundred faces” such as Aleksandër Vuçiq.

In his interpretation, KFOR’s decisions clearly signal that Kosovo’s institutions are assuming an increasingly significant role in ensuring the country’s security. Bytyçi also believes that the strengthening of the state cannot be undone by political pressure from abroad.

The professor also considers these developments a political achievement for the Government of Kosovo. According to him, growing confidence in the Kosovo Police and the improved security situation legitimize the policies pursued by Prime Minister Albin Kurti.

He stated that stability and security in Kosovo are the result of Prime Minister Kurti’s courageous steps, taken even against the advice of allies. In Bytyçi’s assessment, this not only lends legitimacy to the actions and security policies of this government, but also increases its authority among the country’s citizens.

Speaking about the opposition’s stance, Bytyçi claimed that part of it seeks to downplay the significance of every positive result achieved by the current government. According to him, the latest security developments weaken the opposition’s political arguments against the executive.

He raised the question of why opposition figures appear dissatisfied with this development and answered by claiming that they had prepared a scenario to destabilize the country and mobilize citizens in protests against the Kurti Government and its policies. Bytyçi said that placing the Ibar Bridge and Deçan Monastery under the supervision of the Kosovo Police undermines their alibi, plans and scenario.

However, the professor stressed that this is about more than the success of a party or government. According to him, these steps are directly linked to the consolidation of the state of Kosovo and the strengthening of its institutions.

Bytyçi said that NATO’s two decisions are not accidental, but reflect the ability of Kosovo’s institutions to build the state and ensure peace and security both in Kosovo and across the region. According to him, peace and stability are not ensured by Edi Rama’s opportunistic statements to Aleksandër Vuçiq, nor by his accusations concerning Pristina’s “nationalism.”

He argued that the guarantee comes from an active policy in defense of Kosovo’s freedom, independence, statehood and sovereignty, describing this as the greatest lesson from these developments.

In conclusion, Bytyçi called for the increased responsibilities of the Kosovo Police to be viewed by political actors as institutional progress serving the state, regardless of which political force is in power. According to him, a responsible opposition should welcome every step that strengthens Kosovo’s security and sovereignty, even when credit is attributed to the opposing government.

Enver Bytyçi concluded his statement to “Bota sot” by describing the current conduct of Kosovo’s opposition as shameful and saying that it shows, in his view, a complete lack of respect for the successes of Albin Kurti’s government.

The post Bytyçi: Gradual Transfer of Responsibility for the Ibar Bridge and Deçan Monastery to Police Undermines Opposition’s Scenario Against Kurti appeared first on Albeu.com.

The possibility that Serbia could interfere with the flow of the Ibar River has renewed concerns about Kosovo’s security, water supply and stability. The debate was sparked by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who said that the authorities in Belgrade were considering altering the river’s course within Serbian territory.

Vučić linked this scenario to his claims about the way Kosovo’s authorities treat Serbs. In doing so, he shifted the issue of transboundary waters from the technical to the political sphere.

The statement has raised questions about whether Serbia could use control of or interference with the Ibar’s flow as an instrument of pressure against Kosovo. Such an action could affect the country’s water supply, energy production, agriculture, environment and security.

The sensitivity of the issue is linked to the strategic importance of the Ibar River and the Ujman–Ibar-Lepenc system to Kosovo. A change in the volume or flow of water could have consequences for several sectors vital to the functioning of the state, not only the water supply.

At the heart of the debate is the question of whether the Serbian president’s warning is merely political rhetoric and part of hybrid warfare, or whether Kosovo should treat it as a concrete national security threat and address it without delay in the international arena.

Attention has also focused on the response of Kosovo’s institutions and international partners, particularly the European Union, the United States, NATO and other international institutions, in the event of any attempt to turn water resources into a tool of political pressure.

Security expert Arben Dashevci, speaking to “Bota sot,” interpreted Vučić’s statement as propaganda and a continuation of Serbia’s hybrid warfare.

According to Dashevci, the idea of altering the Ibar’s course cannot be implemented because of the rules of international law. He stressed that conventions governing transboundary waters do not permit interventions of this nature.

He said Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić had stated that the Serbian authorities were analyzing a “possibility” that, in his view, was unfeasible. Dashevci emphasized that international water conventions prohibit such an action, despite Vučić presenting it as a possible alteration of the Ibar’s course within Serbian territory and linking it to the treatment of Serbs by the authorities in Pristina.

In the expert’s assessment, the Serbian president’s claims do not correspond with the actual situation in Kosovo. He believes the aim is to create pressure and divert attention from the domestic problems Serbia is facing.

Dashevci described the statement as pure propaganda serving Vučić’s domestic political needs and as an attempt to shift the focus away from the many problems he has with his own people in Serbia. According to him, this is part of hybrid warfare and marks the second time Vučić has made a propagandistic claim with no practical effect that is absolutely impossible to implement.

For this reason, Dashevci believes the possibility of Serbia actually using an alteration of the Ibar’s course as a means of pressure against Kosovo is extremely remote.

He said he did not consider this scenario serious and that, in terms of international law on transboundary waters, the risk was zero. According to Dashevci, there can be no consequences from an action that cannot be implemented, as the international convention strictly prohibits it and is applied uniformly worldwide.

Nevertheless, the expert urged Kosovo not to remain passive diplomatically, even though he considers the threat impossible to carry out.

According to him, the Kosovo authorities should immediately raise the issue at the international level and coordinate their response with their main allies.

Dashevci called on Kosovo to alert the international community by using its full diplomatic capacity. He said the issue should be raised without delay through a response coordinated with the EU, the United Kingdom, the US and other international institutions.

Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj, a retired Major General, took a different view. He argued that Vučić’s words should not be reduced to political rhetoric or a technical discussion, as the issue affects national security, human security and hybrid warfare.

Racaj told “Bota sot” that the Serbian president’s warning that he was considering the possibility of altering the Ibar’s course, linked to claims about the treatment of Serbs in Kosovo, should be taken very seriously. In his view, this is not merely a political statement or a hydrotechnical debate, but an issue that must be analyzed within the framework of national and human security, as well as hybrid warfare.

He emphasized that one principle is becoming increasingly clear in international relations: the 21st century is an era of competition and conflict over energy, while the 22nd century may be characterized by fierce competition for water and other vital resources. For this reason, according to Racaj, water is no longer merely a natural resource, but also a strategic one.

In Kosovo’s case, he considers the importance of the Ibar and, in particular, the Ujman–Ibar-Lepenc system to be far greater than it may appear. Racaj referred to a report by the US-based Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), published in 2021, which assessed Lake Gazivoda/Ujman as an important component of Kosovo’s water and energy security.

According to the report, the lake’s waters provide about one-third of Kosovo’s drinking water. They are also used to cool two coal-fired power plants, which at the time supplied about 95 percent of the country’s electricity production.

Racaj warned that deliberate interference by a state actor with the volume, quality or flow of water could trigger a chain of consequences for the drinking water supply, agriculture, industry, energy, public health and social stability. According to him, it is precisely this interdependence that makes the situation far more serious.

He also linked his concerns to previous events affecting Kosovo’s water infrastructure, singling out the attack on the Ibar-Lepenc canal in November 2024.

Racaj recalled that an explosion in northern Kosovo damaged the Ibar-Lepenc canal in November 2024. The attack disrupted the water supply and put the country’s energy system at risk. Security measures were strengthened after the incident, while KFOR took steps to protect critical infrastructure.

Responsibility for that attack remained the subject of accusations and investigations, while Belgrade denied any involvement. According to Racaj, this context makes Vučić’s latest statement even more troubling, as it removes water from the sphere of technical cooperation and places it in the realm of political and potentially security-related pressure.

From a technical perspective, Racaj referred to hydrotechnical engineer Mumin Morina, who has emphasized that a river’s course can technically be altered through hydrotechnical works. However, technical feasibility does not mean that a state has the right to act as it wishes, because international legal norms apply in such cases.

He explained that the UNECE Convention on transboundary waters is based on three main principles: preventing harm across borders, the equitable and reasonable use of waters, and cooperation among states that share the same water system.

UNECE also stipulates that interventions that could reduce or alter water flows into a downstream state must be handled in accordance with these obligations and through consultations between the parties. For Racaj, this means that water cannot be used as a political weapon or as a mechanism for punishing a population.

Regarding Kosovo’s response, Racaj called for immediate and coordinated diplomatic, security and strategic action. In his professional assessment, the threat should be addressed on three levels.

At the first, diplomatic level, Kosovo should immediately document the statement and officially submit it to the EU, the US, NATO, the United Nations, the OSCE and the relevant international institutions dealing with transboundary waters. Racaj stressed that a response should not be postponed until the threat turns into concrete action.

The second level concerns security. According to him, water infrastructure should be classified and protected as critical national infrastructure. This includes Ujman, the Ibar-Lepenc canal, water supply facilities and parts of the system linked to energy production.

Racaj added that the protection of these assets cannot be limited to physical security alone. It must also encompass the cyber, technological and information dimensions.

The third level is strategic, where Kosovo, according to him, should establish reserves and alternatives. A state is less vulnerable to blackmail when its supplies do not depend on a single source. For this reason, he called for the diversification of water sources, reservoirs, supply systems, emergency capacities and energy connections.

The retired Major General stressed that developments should also be analyzed through the lens of hybrid warfare, because vital resources and critical infrastructure can be used to exert pressure even without a direct military confrontation.

According to Racaj, modern conflicts do not necessarily begin with aircraft and tanks. They may begin with a political statement, a disinformation campaign, economic pressure, a cyberattack, infrastructure sabotage or the manipulation of a vital resource. In this sense, the use of water as an instrument of pressure would constitute a typical case of hybrid warfare against a state and society.

Nevertheless, he urged against creating panic, noting that a political statement is not the same as the technical implementation of a project. Precisely because of the potential scale of the consequences, Racaj said the state should be guided by the principle of prevention.

He proposed that Kosovo ask its international partners to establish a permanent mechanism for monitoring and cooperation regarding the Ibar’s transboundary waters. According to him, this mechanism should ensure transparency for every new hydrotechnical project that could affect the flow of water.

Concluding his comments to “Bota sot,” Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj said the message must be unequivocal: the Ibar cannot be used as a political instrument, and Ujman cannot be turned into a weapon of pressure against Kosovo.

The post Vučić’s Threat over the Ibar River Alarms Kosovo, Experts Divided on Level of Risk appeared first on Albeu.com.

A new wave of concern has swept across Kosovo following Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s statement that Belgrade is considering the possibility of diverting the course of the Ibar River in the Serbian sector. The statement has brought the security of the water supply and the country’s overall stability into focus.

The Serbian head of state justified the initiative by referring to what he calls the unfair treatment of the Serbian community by Kosovo’s institutions, thus turning the issue of water resources into an entirely political matter.

These claims have sparked a broad debate over the level of risk posed by using control over the Ibar as leverage against Kosovo, as well as the potential effects on the water supply, energy production, the agricultural sector, the ecosystem and national security.

The strategic position of the Ibar River, and particularly the Ujman–Ibar-Lepenc system, makes this an extremely sensitive issue for Kosovo. Any action that affected the volume or direction of the water flow could have far-reaching consequences, impacting both the drinking water supply and other sectors vital to the state.

Against this backdrop, the question is whether Vučić’s words are merely a rhetorical exercise and an element of hybrid warfare, or whether the authorities in Pristina should view them as a concrete threat to national security and urgently raise the issue at the international level.

Also crucial will be the position taken by Kosovo’s institutions and allies such as the European Union, the United States, NATO and other global bodies in response to any attempt to turn water reserves into a weapon of pressure.

Dashevci: Propaganda statement, no practical risk

Speaking to the “Bota sot” news portal, security expert Arben Dashevci described Vučić’s claims as mere propaganda and part of Serbia’s hybrid arsenal.

According to him, changing the course of the Ibar is an impossible scenario from the standpoint of international law, since treaties governing transboundary rivers do not authorize interventions of this nature.

“Yes, the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, has stated that the Serbian authorities are considering the impossible ‘possibility’—because it is impossible, as international water conventions do not permit such a thing—and that, supposedly, according to him, he wants to change the course of the Ibar River within Serbian territory, linking such an action to the treatment of Serbs by the authorities in Pristina,” he said.

Dashevci added that the Serbian leader’s claims do not reflect the reality in Kosovo and that the entire maneuver is intended to generate pressure and divert attention from domestic turmoil in Serbia.

“Vučić’s statement is pure propaganda for his domestic political needs, aimed at shifting attention away from the many problems he has there with his own people in that country and, of course, it is a continuation of his hybrid warfare, because this is the second time he has repeated propaganda that has no practical effect and is absolutely impossible,” he stressed.

He believes the probability of the Ibar’s diversion being used as a tool of blackmail is almost zero, precisely because of the barriers imposed by international law.

“Therefore, I do not think it is serious at all. From the standpoint of international law governing transboundary waters, the risk of Serbia using a change in the Ibar’s course as a means of pressure against Kosovo is zero. There can be no consequence when something cannot be carried out because it is prohibited by an international convention that applies equally and strictly throughout the world,” he said.

Nevertheless, the expert emphasized that despite its technical and legal impossibility, Kosovo should be proactive diplomatically and immediately raise the concern with its strategic partners.

“Kosovo should alert the international community using all of its diplomatic capacity. I believe it should immediately raise the issue at the international level through a coordinated response with the EU, the United Kingdom and, certainly, the US, as well as other international institutions,” Dashevci concluded.

Racaj: Water as a strategic asset, statement demands an immediate response

In contrast to this position, Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj, a reserve Major General, believes Vučić’s statement cannot be treated as a simple rhetorical episode or a hydrotechnical debate, but as a challenge that affects national security, human security and the sphere of hybrid warfare.

“The statement by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić that Serbia is considering the possibility of changing the course of the Ibar River, linking this to claims about the treatment of Serbs in Kosovo, must be taken very seriously. This is not merely a political statement or a hydrotechnical debate. In my view, it should be analyzed as an issue of national security, human security and hybrid warfare.

There is a principle that is becoming increasingly clear in international relations: the 21st century is the century of competition and conflict over energy, while the 22nd century may be the century of fierce competition over water and other vital resources. For this reason, water can no longer be treated solely as a natural resource; it is also a strategic resource.

In Kosovo’s case, the importance of the Ibar, and particularly the Ujman–Ibar-Lepenc system, is far greater than it appears at first glance. A report by the American Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), published in 2021, considers Gazivoda/Ujman Lake an important component of Kosovo’s water and energy security. According to the report, the lake’s waters provide about one-third of Kosovo’s drinking water and are used to cool two coal-fired power plants, which at the time accounted for about 95 percent of Kosovo’s electricity production.

This makes the issue much more serious. If a state actor manages to deliberately influence the quantity, quality or flow of the water, it can trigger cascading consequences affecting drinking water, agriculture, industry, energy, public health and social stability,” Racaj said.

He linked this warning to previous events that affected the country’s water infrastructure, recalling the explosion that struck the Ibar-Lepenc canal in November 2024.

“Therefore, Vučić’s statement should also be viewed in the context of what happened in November 2024, when an explosion damaged the Ibar-Lepenc canal in northern Kosovo. The attack caused disruptions to the water supply and threatened the country’s energy system; following the incident, security measures were increased and KFOR took steps to protect critical infrastructure. Responsibility for the attack remained the subject of accusations and investigations, while Belgrade denied involvement.

In this sense, the Serbian president’s latest statement is concerning because it moves water from the sphere of technical cooperation into that of political and potentially security-related pressure.

From a technical standpoint, as hydrotechnical engineer Mumin Morina has also pointed out, interventions in a river’s course can technically be carried out through hydrotechnical works. But this does not mean that a state has the right to do so at will. This is precisely where international law comes into play.

The UNECE Convention on Transboundary Waters establishes three fundamental principles: the prevention of transboundary harm, the equitable and reasonable use of waters, and cooperation between states that share the same water system. UNECE also emphasizes that even interventions in watercourses that could reduce or alter flows to a downstream state must be addressed within the framework of these obligations and consultations between the parties.

Therefore, water cannot be used as a political weapon or as a means of punishing a population,” he added.

Regarding the steps Pristina should take, Racaj insisted on a swift and coordinated response on several fronts.

“In my professional view, the threat should be addressed at three levels.

First, the diplomatic level. Kosovo should immediately document the statement and formally submit it to the EU, the US, NATO, the United Nations, the OSCE and the relevant international institutions dealing with transboundary waters. There should be no waiting for a threat to become concrete action before responding.

Second, the security level. Water infrastructure should be treated as critical national infrastructure. This includes Ujman, the Ibar-Lepenc canal, water supply facilities and components linked to energy production. Protection should not only be physical, but also cyber, technological and informational.

Third, the strategic level. Kosovo should develop alternatives and reserves. A state is better protected from blackmail when it does not depend on a single source. Therefore, the diversification of water sources, reservoirs, supply systems, emergency capacities and energy links is required,” Racaj said, listing the measures.

He warned that the situation should also be analyzed through the prism of hybrid warfare, because essential resources and vital infrastructure can be turned into instruments of blackmail without the need for an open military conflict.

“We must also bear in mind the hybrid warfare dimension. Modern warfare does not necessarily begin with tanks and aircraft. It can begin with a political statement, a disinformation campaign, economic pressure, a cyberattack, infrastructure sabotage or the manipulation of a vital resource. In this sense, using water as an instrument of pressure would be a typical example of hybrid warfare against a state and society.

However, we must also make an important distinction: panic should not be created. A political statement is not the same as the technical implementation of a project. But precisely because the potential consequences are so significant, the state must act according to the principle of prevention.

Kosovo should ask its international partners to establish a permanent mechanism for monitoring and cooperation regarding the Ibar’s transboundary waters, with transparency concerning any new hydrotechnical project that could affect the water flow.

The message must be clear: the Ibar cannot be used as a political tool, and Ujman cannot be turned into a weapon of pressure against Kosovo,” Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj said in closing his interview with “Bota sot.”

The post Vučić Threatens to Divert the Ibar River, Experts Divided: Propaganda or a Real Threat to Kosovo? appeared first on Albeu.com.

A statement by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has revived concerns about Kosovo’s water and energy security. He announced that Serbian authorities are considering the possibility of changing the course of the Ibër River within Serbian territory.

Vučić justified a possible move with his claims about how Serbs are treated by Kosovo’s institutions, turning the issue of cross-border waters into a direct instrument of political debate.

The statement has sparked discussions over whether Serbia could exploit its control over, or intervene in, the course of the Ibër as a means of putting pressure on Kosovo, as well as over the consequences such a situation would have for drinking water, energy, agriculture, the environment and national security.

The sensitivity of this issue is linked to the strategic importance of the Ibër River and, particularly, the Ujman–Ibër-Lepenc system. A change in the volume or flow of water could have consequences in several vital areas of Kosovo’s state functioning.

In the face of this situation, the question remains open as to whether the Serbian president’s statement is merely part of political rhetoric and hybrid warfare, or whether Kosovo should immediately treat it as a concrete threat to national security and raise it in the international arena.

The response of Kosovo’s institutions and its partners, including the European Union, the United States, NATO and other international organizations, is also expected to be equally important in the face of any attempt to turn water resources into a tool of political pressure.

Security expert Arben Dashevci described Vučić’s statement as propaganda and another element of Serbia’s hybrid warfare.

According to Dashevci, changing the course of the Ibër cannot be carried out legally, as international conventions on cross-border waters do not allow such an intervention.

“The President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, has spoken about considering the ‘possibility’ of changing the course of the Ibër River on Serbian territory, linking this claim to the treatment of Serbs by the authorities in Pristina. But this possibility is impossible because international conventions on water do not allow it,” he said.

The expert assessed that the Serbian president’s claims do not correspond to the reality in Kosovo and that their aim is to create political pressure while diverting attention from Serbia’s domestic problems.

“Vučić’s statement is pure propaganda for his domestic political needs. It aims to divert attention from the many problems he has with his own people in that country and is a continuation of his hybrid warfare. This is the second time such propaganda without practical effect and absolutely impossible to implement has been mentioned,” Dashevci said.

He stressed that using a change in the course of the Ibër as an instrument of pressure against Kosovo is practically impossible because of the restrictions imposed by international law.

“I do not consider this threat serious at all. Under international law on cross-border waters, the risk that Serbia could use a change in the course of the Ibër as a means of pressure against Kosovo is zero. There can be no consequences from an action that an international convention strictly prohibits, equally for the entire world,” he said.

Although he considers the implementation of such a scenario impossible, Dashevci called on Kosovo to respond actively through diplomacy.

He said the issue should be raised without delay at the international level and discussed in cooperation with Kosovo’s main allies.

“Kosovo must alert the international community using all its diplomatic capacity. The issue must immediately be raised at the international level through a coordinated response with the EU, the United Kingdom and, above all, the US, as well as with other international institutions,” Dashevci concluded.

Another assessment was provided by Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj, a retired Major General, who believes the statement should not be viewed merely as political rhetoric or as a technical discussion about water.

Racaj described the issue as directly linked to national security, human security and hybrid warfare.

“The statement by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić that Serbia is considering changing the course of the Ibër River and that he links this to claims about the treatment of Serbs in Kosovo must be taken very seriously. This is not merely a political statement or a hydrotechnical debate. It must be analyzed as an issue of national security, human security and hybrid warfare.

“One principle is becoming increasingly evident in international relations: the 21st century is the century of competition and the struggle for energy, while the 22nd century could become the century of fierce clashes over water and other vital resources. For this reason, water should no longer be viewed only as a natural asset, but also as a strategic resource.

“In Kosovo’s case, the importance of the Ibër and, in particular, the Ujman–Ibër-Lepenc system is far greater than it may appear. A report by the American Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), published in 2021, assesses Lake Gazivoda/Ujman as an important part of Kosovo’s water and energy security. According to the report, water from the lake provides around one-third of Kosovo’s drinking water and is used to cool two coal-fired power plants, which at the time produced around 95 percent of Kosovo’s electricity.

“This significantly increases the seriousness of the situation. If a state manages to deliberately influence the quantity, quality or flow of water, the consequences could spread through drinking water, agriculture, industry, energy, public health and social stability,” Racaj told Bota sot.

His concerns are also linked to previous events affecting Kosovo’s water infrastructure, particularly the attack on the Ibër-Lepenc canal in November 2024.

“Vučić’s statement should be viewed in light of what happened in November 2024, when an explosion damaged the Ibër-Lepenc canal in northern Kosovo. As a result, the water supply was interrupted and the country’s energy system was placed at risk. Following the incident, security measures were increased, while KFOR took measures to protect critical infrastructure. Responsibility for the attack remained the subject of accusations and investigations, while Belgrade denied involvement.

“This is precisely why the Serbian president’s latest statement is concerning: it removes water from the sphere of technical cooperation and places it within the framework of political and potentially security-related pressure.

“From a technical perspective, as hydrotechnical engineer Mumin Morina has also argued, the course of a river can be changed through hydrotechnical works. But technical capability does not give a state the right to undertake such action at its own discretion. This is precisely where international law applies.

“The UNECE Convention on cross-border waters is based on three main principles: preventing transboundary harm, the equitable and reasonable use of water, and cooperation between states that share the same water system. UNECE emphasizes that any intervention in the flow that could reduce or alter water discharge in the downstream state must be addressed within these obligations and through consultations between the parties.

“Consequently, water cannot be turned into a political weapon or used as a means of punishing a population,” Racaj said.

According to him, Kosovo’s response must be swift and coordinated and must simultaneously include diplomatic and security measures, as well as strategic planning.

“In my professional assessment, this threat must be addressed on three levels.

“The first is the diplomatic level. Kosovo must immediately document the statement and officially send it to the EU, the US, NATO, the United Nations, the OSCE and the relevant international institutions dealing with cross-border waters. We must not wait for the threat to turn into action before responding.

“The second level is security. Water infrastructure must be considered critical national infrastructure. This includes Ujman, the Ibër-Lepenc canal, water-supply facilities and the parts of the system connected to energy production. Their security must be physical, cyber, technological and informational.

“The third level is the strategic one. Kosovo must create alternatives and reserves, because a state is less exposed to blackmail when it does not depend on a single source. This requires diversifying water sources, reservoirs, supply networks, emergency capacities and energy connections,” Racaj said.

Prof. Dr. Racaj also placed the situation within the framework of hybrid warfare, in which vital resources and critical infrastructure can be used to exert pressure without necessarily being accompanied by a direct military confrontation.

“We must consider the dimension of hybrid warfare. Modern conflict does not necessarily begin with tanks and aircraft. It can take the form of a political statement, a disinformation campaign, economic pressure, a cyberattack, infrastructure sabotage or the manipulation of a vital resource. In this sense, using water as an instrument of pressure would constitute a typical example of hybrid warfare against a state and society.

“Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between two things: a political statement is not the same as the technical implementation of a project. Panic must not be caused, but given the scale of the potential consequences, the state must be guided by the principle of prevention.

“Kosovo should ask its international partners to establish a permanent monitoring and cooperation mechanism for the Ibër’s cross-border waters. This mechanism should guarantee transparency regarding any new hydrotechnical project that could affect the flow of water.

“The message must be unequivocal: the Ibër cannot be used as a political instrument, and Ujman cannot be turned into a tool of pressure against Kosovo,” Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj told Bota sot.

The post Vučić threatens to change the course of the Ibër, experts divided over the risk to Kosovo appeared first on Albeu.com.

Although this step formally closes the electoral process, the main challenge that lies ahead is the creation of a parliamentary majority and the constitution of the institutions in line with constitutional and legal deadlines.

Commentator Lis Bukuroca spoke to “Bota sot” about what is expected to happen in the coming days.

According to him, as the successor in office to the president, Haxhiu is obliged to call the constitutive session within the constitutional deadline of 30 days, although he believes this could be done within a week if there were political will.

“The certification of the results by the CEC makes it possible to constitute the Assembly, where the acting president must call the constitutive session within the deadline set by the Constitution. The constitutional deadline for holding the constitutive session is 30 days from the day the results are certified. If there is political will, it can be done even within a week, but I do not think there will be.”

Bukuroca further stressed that, as soon as the Assembly is constituted, the next phase is the selection of the new president.

“The next step is the election of the president. The Constitution stipulates that the president must be elected within 60 days from the day the Assembly is constituted. In parallel, the prime minister-designate (from the ranks of LVV, as the winning party) must secure a majority for the Government.”

He also commented on the contacts and talks among political parties, as well as the consequences that the lack of an agreement on the election of the president could bring.

According to the commentator, if political consensus is not reached, the country could once again face new elections.

“LVV has won 53 of the 120 seats, therefore not a self-governing majority, so it needs allies. Now the political parties have begun official talks on a possible agreement regarding the president.

If the agreement is not reached within the 60-day deadline for the president, the consequences are clearly foreseen: if the president is not elected within this deadline, the Assembly is automatically dissolved and the country goes to new elections, which would be the fourth parliamentary elections since the beginning of 2025, a scenario that can be avoided if the parties act in time and responsibly toward the state,” Lis Bukuroca concluded for “Bota sot”.

The post After the certification of the results, the showdown for the new institutions begins: commentator outlines the possible political scenario appeared first on Albeu.com.

However, it remains unclear whether political parties will find common ground within the legal deadlines, or whether the country could slide into an institutional deadlock.

Political analyst Zejnulla Jakupi spoke to “Bota sot” about what is expected to happen after the certification of the election results.

He initially explained that the constitutional phase for establishing the institutions has now begun and listed the main procedures that follow.

“After the certification of the results by the Central Election Commission (CEC), the constitutional phase for creating Kosovo’s new institutions begins. The certification of the results clears the way for the President to take steps toward constituting the Assembly and then forming the Government.

The main steps are: calling the constitutive session of the Assembly – the President must convene the first meeting of the Assembly within 30 days of the certification of the results. At this session, deputies take the oath and the speaker and deputy speakers of the Assembly are elected.

The mandate to form the Government will be given after the constitution of the Assembly, while the president mandates the candidate for prime minister, usually from the party or coalition that has won the most seats and has the ability to secure a parliamentary majority. The candidate must present the government cabinet and program for a vote in the Assembly,” he said.

Further on, Jakupi also spoke about the scenario in which there is no political agreement and the necessary votes to form the Government are not secured.

“At least 61 votes from 120 deputies are needed to approve the Government. What happens if there is no political agreement?

The law and the Constitution provide for procedures, but not always short deadlines that force a political solution. In practice, if the Assembly fails to constitute itself (for example, if the speaker is not elected), the process can remain blocked until the parties reach a compromise; if the candidate for prime minister does not secure a majority, other constitutional procedures for mandating may be followed, according to the interpretation of the Constitution and the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo; if no majority can be created, one of the final solutions may be the calling of new elections, according to constitutional procedures.”

The analyst also stressed that the establishment of the institutions is directly linked to securing a parliamentary majority and that the law, in itself, does not necessarily unblock the process.

In this context, he underlined the need for a broader political agreement, recalling that 81 votes are needed to elect the president.

“So, the process is not automatically unblocked by law in the absence of a political agreement. Constitutional mechanisms provide procedural steps, but the formation of institutions ultimately depends on securing a parliamentary majority and, in cases of disagreement, also on interpretations by the Constitutional Court.

An agreement must nevertheless be reached – a consensus – so that the president can be elected by the parliamentary majority with 81 votes, by choosing a non-political candidate,” Zejnulla Jakupi concluded for “Bota sot”.

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