The failure of talks between the Vetëvendosje Movement and the Democratic League of Kosovo has sparked a debate that has so far focused mainly on the political clash. Lumir Abdixhiku claims that LVV’s proposal was intended to reduce the LDK to a force with a “decorative” role, while Albin Kurti insists that the offer reflected the balance created by the election result.

However, beyond the political statements, a simple calculation can show what the numbers actually say.

The parliamentary ratio is 53 to 18.

VV has 53 MPs, while the LDK has 18.

If these two parties were to join forces in a coalition, their majority would total:

53 + 18 = 71 MPs.

In such a coalition, the respective strength of the partners would be calculated as follows:

VV: 53 / 71 = 74.65%

LDK: 18 / 71 = 25.35%

In other words, VV would hold approximately three-quarters of the parliamentary weight of the majority, while the LDK would account for about one-quarter.

This ratio provides the basis for assessing whether the proposal was proportional.

How many ministries would the LDK receive?

Using a cabinet of 20 ministries as a model and mechanically allocating the posts according to the 53-to-18 ratio, the calculation produces the following result:

VV: 20 × 74.65% = 14.93 ministries

LDK: 20 × 25.35% = 5.07 ministries

Thus, an allocation based solely on mathematics would give VV about 15 ministries and the LDK approximately five.

At first glance, these figures appear to reinforce Abdixhiku’s position. If the LDK is offered only three ministries, even though its proportional weight works out to approximately five, then the offer does not appear to be entirely proportional.

However, the equation cannot be settled through this simple calculation alone.

The three ministries that cannot be divided as “spoils” between VV and the LDK

Under Kosovo’s Constitution, a government with more than 12 ministers must include at least three ministers representing non-majority communities.

For this reason, these three positions cannot automatically be included in the allocation between VV and the LDK.

If the three posts reserved for communities are deducted from the total of 20 ministries, the two partners are left with:

20 – 3 = 17 ministries.

Allocating these 17 ministries according to the 53:18 balance of power produces the following figures:

VV: 17 × 74.65% = 12.69

LDK: 17 × 25.35% = 4.31

Thus, a realistic allocation based on proportionality would translate approximately into:

VV – 13 ministries

LDK – 4 ministries

Communities – 3 ministries

From this perspective, Kurti’s proposal that the LDK receive four ministries takes on a different meaning.

Mathematically, four ministries correspond almost exactly to the LDK’s proportional share of the ministries that could realistically be divided between the two parties.

How much weight does the deputy prime minister’s post carry?

In the version presented by Kurti, the proposal was not limited to four ministries. One of the options also envisaged the LDK receiving the post of deputy prime minister.

This position cannot be assessed merely as an additional number. Politically, it carries greater importance than an ordinary ministry because it gives the smaller partner a direct presence at the highest level of executive power.

Consequently, the formula:

4 ministries + deputy prime minister

can hardly be described mathematically as a “decorative” role for a party representing 25.35 percent of the coalition’s MPs.

In numerical terms, this package is quite close to a proportional allocation.

Why, then, does the LDK view the offer as insufficient?

The reason is that coalition agreements are not determined by arithmetic alone.

The LDK has a long history on the political scene and claims the status of one of Kosovo’s main political pillars. From Abdixhiku’s perspective, participation in a cabinet in which VV would clearly dominate could create the perception that the LDK was becoming an appendage of Kurti.

For this reason, the LDK’s position cannot be interpreted merely as a demand for more ministries.

At its core, it is a demand for the party to wield political influence within the cabinet.

Four secondary ministries do not necessarily have the same political value as four portfolios such as Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance or Internal Affairs.

Accordingly, the decisive issue is not only how many ministries were proposed for the LDK.

It is equally important to know which ministries were offered.

The presidency transforms the entire calculation

It is precisely at this stage that the most consequential political factor emerges.

According to Kurti, two options were on the table. The first would give the LDK four ministries and the deputy prime minister’s post, while VV would put forward its own presidential candidate. The second envisaged seeking a consensus candidate for president, while the LDK would receive three ministries and the deputy prime minister’s post.

If this account is taken as the starting point, the comparison cannot simply be made between three and five ministries.

The office of president carries far greater institutional weight than a ministerial post.

If VV was prepared to withdraw its candidate for the presidency and accept a jointly agreed name, logically this compromise would have to be reflected in another part of the agreement.

For this reason, the proposal:

3 ministries + deputy prime minister + consensus president

must be assessed as a whole rather than by focusing solely on the number three.

Which side has the stronger case?

If the analysis is strictly limited to mathematics, the LDK is right in one respect: 18 of the coalition’s 71 MPs give it a weight of about 25 percent, and the allocation of all 20 ministries would result in approximately five ministerial posts.

However, this calculation remains incomplete because it overlooks the constitutional requirement for community representation.

Once the three ministries belonging to the communities are excluded from the calculation, the LDK’s proportional share falls to about 4.3 ministries.

This means that the package:

4 ministries + deputy prime minister

is, mathematically, very close to the actual power the LDK would have in a VV–LDK coalition.

On the other hand, the formula:

3 ministries + deputy prime minister

remains below the proportional level produced by the figures. Nevertheless, the difference could have a political explanation if the agreement also included VV’s compromise regarding the presidency.

The fundamental disagreement does not appear to be about the numbers

Ultimately, the clash between Kurti and Abdixhiku appears to be far more a political matter than a mathematical debate.

With a total of 71 MPs, VV and the LDK would form one of the strongest parliamentary majorities in recent years. Such a configuration would significantly reduce the possibility of recurring crises in the Assembly and provide the government with a considerable degree of stability.

But the potential strength of this coalition also creates the main dilemma for the LDK.

The party must weigh whether it would benefit from joining a government in which it would hold about one-quarter of the coalition’s weight, or whether it should remain in opposition to protect its identity and pursue growth in future elections.

From Kurti’s perspective, four ministries together with the deputy prime minister’s post can be presented as a proportional offer.

For Abdixhiku, the same proposal may be politically insufficient if the LDK would have no real influence over the government’s course.

Thus, the figures lend greater support to Kurti’s argument, while political logic makes Abdixhiku’s decision to reject the offer understandable.

However, if the discussion is limited to the claim that an LDK with 18 MPs should have received far more than four ministries, that position does not find strong support in the numbers.

In a cabinet with 20 ministries, once the seats reserved for communities under the Constitution are guaranteed, allocating four ministries to the LDK is almost entirely consistent with mathematical proportionality.

This may also be the fundamental difference between an argument that sounds persuasive in political rhetoric and the conclusion that emerges when the calculations are done with a calculator.

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