Halil Geci reacted harshly after former Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani spoke about Albin Kurti’s offer for a political agreement with the LDK.

Geci rejected Osmani’s claim that Vetëvendosje’s proposal was intended to humiliate the LDK. He blamed her for weakening the party, as well as for the ongoing political clashes with Kurti and other LDK figures.

In a Facebook post carried by “Bota sot,” Geci leveled strong criticism at Osmani and Abdixhiku. According to him, the LDK had no genuine willingness to accept Kurti’s offer.

Geci’s full response:

“Vjosa Osmani, tell us: who has humiliated the LDK more than you?!

Vjosa Osmani has reportedly said that Albin Kurti and the Vetëvendosje Movement sought to humiliate the LDK through the proposal for a political agreement.

Now that no one is asking Rrushe where her maternal uncles come from, she is looking for a hair in the butter. Today, she is even troubled by the fact that Kurti calls Abdixhiku a ‘friend,’ although, according to Rrushe, just two weeks ago he compared him to ‘tribal leaders.’

Nevertheless, the question remains perfectly clear:

Is there anyone who has humiliated the LDK more than you?

No one—yesterday, today or tomorrow—can humiliate a party to which you once belonged more than you have humiliated it.

You became involved in every battle against Kurti and Gërvalla. You tried to bring them down and humiliate them, and you spared no words against them. After you left the LDK, you were also followed by people who previously did not know you as I did. You garnered more than 300,000 votes and convinced yourself that they belonged to you personally.

There was not an office, television studio or political podium, either at home or abroad, where you did not speak against Kurti and Gërvalla. Your only aim was for your political curls to stand out above all other politicians.

You parted ways with Kurti through betrayal and returned to the LDK through betrayal as well, thinking that the 300,000 voters would once again line up behind you. But politics does not work that way.

You have moved from one side to the other, clashing with the people who once trusted you.

You betrayed former President Sejdiu and Isa Mustafa. You trampled over those who once opened the path for you in politics, and then believed you could do the same to Albin Kurti.

But this time, you failed.

When you appeared before the people today, you came across as lightweight and shallow, like the mountain bird known as the ‘vremç.’

The vremç has a small body and a big mouth, while keeping its mind on the treetops. But when caught in a violent storm, it often ends up dead beneath the oak tree.

The same happens in politics: when the storm strikes you, a big mouth alone does not ensure your survival.

The maneuvers of the two ‘aunties.’

Rrushe and Lumja, the two ‘aunties,’ as Rugovist voters call them, have fought and continue to fight for the chair. They are using tricks to avoid relinquishing control of the LDK and to hold on to that position. Rugovists must understand this clearly.

Kurti, like everyone involved in politics, knows that your and Lumir’s strategy was to leave the blame with VV. That way, you could tell your voters: ‘We wanted to, but VV refused.’

You intended to take part in meetings without any genuine desire to form a coalition. In this way, you two ‘aunties’ would continue to remain at the head of the party while trying to bring the LDK’s factions closer together so as not to lose control over it.

It appears that Rrushe and Lumja, the two ‘aunties,’ share the same objective: not to hand the party leadership over to anyone else, despite successive defeats!

For those who know you, it does not matter much which of you emerges victorious. The main issue is how you will persuade others to follow you.

You in particular, Auntie Rrushe, have played a major role in weakening the LDK and turning it into an entity that is now struggling to preserve the influence it once enjoyed.

But you, who ruined it and led it to defeat, cannot restore the LDK’s former influence.

Regardless of what offer Kurti may have presented to you, you did not plan to enter a coalition. I had told everyone this before, and that is exactly what happened.

The PDK was more forthright and stated unequivocally:

‘We will not enter a coalition with VV, period.’

You, meanwhile, created the impression that you were holding negotiations, even though the political decision had essentially been made earlier.

For this reason, do not now describe as ‘humiliation’ a proposal that you never actually intended to accept.

Before accusing others of humiliating the LDK, you should ask yourself this question:

Who humiliated the LDK and brought it to this state?

We will speak and be heard.

Time will prove it!”

The post Geci Challenges Osmani Over Kurti’s Offer: Who Humiliated and Weakened the LDK? appeared first on Albeu.com.

Mesmerizing images of flamingos have emerged from the Karavasta lagoons in Divjakë. The birds have become the symbol of the “Flamingo Revolution” and of protests by Albanians demanding the departure of Edi Rama.

As they grace the lagoon landscape with their presence, flamingos have become one of the most prominent symbols of the protests, embodying peace, resistance and the call for change.

The post VIDEO/ Flamingos Offer Mesmerizing Views in the Karavasta Lagoons in Divjakë appeared first on Albeu.com.

The failure of talks between the Vetëvendosje Movement and the Democratic League of Kosovo has sparked a debate that has so far focused mainly on the political clash. Lumir Abdixhiku claims that LVV’s proposal was intended to reduce the LDK to a force with a “decorative” role, while Albin Kurti insists that the offer reflected the balance created by the election result.

However, beyond the political statements, a simple calculation can show what the numbers actually say.

The parliamentary ratio is 53 to 18.

VV has 53 MPs, while the LDK has 18.

If these two parties were to join forces in a coalition, their majority would total:

53 + 18 = 71 MPs.

In such a coalition, the respective strength of the partners would be calculated as follows:

VV: 53 / 71 = 74.65%

LDK: 18 / 71 = 25.35%

In other words, VV would hold approximately three-quarters of the parliamentary weight of the majority, while the LDK would account for about one-quarter.

This ratio provides the basis for assessing whether the proposal was proportional.

How many ministries would the LDK receive?

Using a cabinet of 20 ministries as a model and mechanically allocating the posts according to the 53-to-18 ratio, the calculation produces the following result:

VV: 20 × 74.65% = 14.93 ministries

LDK: 20 × 25.35% = 5.07 ministries

Thus, an allocation based solely on mathematics would give VV about 15 ministries and the LDK approximately five.

At first glance, these figures appear to reinforce Abdixhiku’s position. If the LDK is offered only three ministries, even though its proportional weight works out to approximately five, then the offer does not appear to be entirely proportional.

However, the equation cannot be settled through this simple calculation alone.

The three ministries that cannot be divided as “spoils” between VV and the LDK

Under Kosovo’s Constitution, a government with more than 12 ministers must include at least three ministers representing non-majority communities.

For this reason, these three positions cannot automatically be included in the allocation between VV and the LDK.

If the three posts reserved for communities are deducted from the total of 20 ministries, the two partners are left with:

20 – 3 = 17 ministries.

Allocating these 17 ministries according to the 53:18 balance of power produces the following figures:

VV: 17 × 74.65% = 12.69

LDK: 17 × 25.35% = 4.31

Thus, a realistic allocation based on proportionality would translate approximately into:

VV – 13 ministries

LDK – 4 ministries

Communities – 3 ministries

From this perspective, Kurti’s proposal that the LDK receive four ministries takes on a different meaning.

Mathematically, four ministries correspond almost exactly to the LDK’s proportional share of the ministries that could realistically be divided between the two parties.

How much weight does the deputy prime minister’s post carry?

In the version presented by Kurti, the proposal was not limited to four ministries. One of the options also envisaged the LDK receiving the post of deputy prime minister.

This position cannot be assessed merely as an additional number. Politically, it carries greater importance than an ordinary ministry because it gives the smaller partner a direct presence at the highest level of executive power.

Consequently, the formula:

4 ministries + deputy prime minister

can hardly be described mathematically as a “decorative” role for a party representing 25.35 percent of the coalition’s MPs.

In numerical terms, this package is quite close to a proportional allocation.

Why, then, does the LDK view the offer as insufficient?

The reason is that coalition agreements are not determined by arithmetic alone.

The LDK has a long history on the political scene and claims the status of one of Kosovo’s main political pillars. From Abdixhiku’s perspective, participation in a cabinet in which VV would clearly dominate could create the perception that the LDK was becoming an appendage of Kurti.

For this reason, the LDK’s position cannot be interpreted merely as a demand for more ministries.

At its core, it is a demand for the party to wield political influence within the cabinet.

Four secondary ministries do not necessarily have the same political value as four portfolios such as Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance or Internal Affairs.

Accordingly, the decisive issue is not only how many ministries were proposed for the LDK.

It is equally important to know which ministries were offered.

The presidency transforms the entire calculation

It is precisely at this stage that the most consequential political factor emerges.

According to Kurti, two options were on the table. The first would give the LDK four ministries and the deputy prime minister’s post, while VV would put forward its own presidential candidate. The second envisaged seeking a consensus candidate for president, while the LDK would receive three ministries and the deputy prime minister’s post.

If this account is taken as the starting point, the comparison cannot simply be made between three and five ministries.

The office of president carries far greater institutional weight than a ministerial post.

If VV was prepared to withdraw its candidate for the presidency and accept a jointly agreed name, logically this compromise would have to be reflected in another part of the agreement.

For this reason, the proposal:

3 ministries + deputy prime minister + consensus president

must be assessed as a whole rather than by focusing solely on the number three.

Which side has the stronger case?

If the analysis is strictly limited to mathematics, the LDK is right in one respect: 18 of the coalition’s 71 MPs give it a weight of about 25 percent, and the allocation of all 20 ministries would result in approximately five ministerial posts.

However, this calculation remains incomplete because it overlooks the constitutional requirement for community representation.

Once the three ministries belonging to the communities are excluded from the calculation, the LDK’s proportional share falls to about 4.3 ministries.

This means that the package:

4 ministries + deputy prime minister

is, mathematically, very close to the actual power the LDK would have in a VV–LDK coalition.

On the other hand, the formula:

3 ministries + deputy prime minister

remains below the proportional level produced by the figures. Nevertheless, the difference could have a political explanation if the agreement also included VV’s compromise regarding the presidency.

The fundamental disagreement does not appear to be about the numbers

Ultimately, the clash between Kurti and Abdixhiku appears to be far more a political matter than a mathematical debate.

With a total of 71 MPs, VV and the LDK would form one of the strongest parliamentary majorities in recent years. Such a configuration would significantly reduce the possibility of recurring crises in the Assembly and provide the government with a considerable degree of stability.

But the potential strength of this coalition also creates the main dilemma for the LDK.

The party must weigh whether it would benefit from joining a government in which it would hold about one-quarter of the coalition’s weight, or whether it should remain in opposition to protect its identity and pursue growth in future elections.

From Kurti’s perspective, four ministries together with the deputy prime minister’s post can be presented as a proportional offer.

For Abdixhiku, the same proposal may be politically insufficient if the LDK would have no real influence over the government’s course.

Thus, the figures lend greater support to Kurti’s argument, while political logic makes Abdixhiku’s decision to reject the offer understandable.

However, if the discussion is limited to the claim that an LDK with 18 MPs should have received far more than four ministries, that position does not find strong support in the numbers.

In a cabinet with 20 ministries, once the seats reserved for communities under the Constitution are guaranteed, allocating four ministries to the LDK is almost entirely consistent with mathematical proportionality.

This may also be the fundamental difference between an argument that sounds persuasive in political rhetoric and the conclusion that emerges when the calculations are done with a calculator.

The post Kurti’s Offer to the LDK Under the Numerical Microscope: What Does the 53-to-18 Ratio Mean? appeared first on Albeu.com.