Just one day before the verdict is due to be announced for Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi, public tensions have risen sharply amid protests, warnings of destabilization, calls to “burn” Kosovo and encouragement for the population to take up arms.

But what real weight could these developments carry in the decision-making of the judicial panel in The Hague?

From a legal perspective, the answer is unequivocal: they should have no influence whatsoever on the determination of guilt or innocence.

The verdict must be based exclusively on the materials admitted during the trial: testimony, documentary evidence, the individual responsibility of each defendant, and the final submissions of the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office and the defense.

A gathering organized by an individual, a statement by a former member of the Kosovo Liberation Army or a threat issued by someone entirely outside the judicial process cannot be turned into incriminating evidence against the defendants. That would only be possible if a direct and documented connection to them were established, something that has not emerged from the publicly available information so far.

The verdict has most likely already been finalized

One practical aspect should be kept in mind: a judgment of this volume and complexity is not drafted in the final moments before it is announced.

The document involves the assessment of a broad range of evidence, thousands of pages of documents and complex legal arguments. Consequently, its essential contents must have been finalized and approved by the Trial Panel well before the protests and heated rhetoric of recent days erupted.

Legally, the judges cannot change their finding on guilt based on warnings of protests or threatening statements made outside the courtroom.

Doing otherwise would seriously undermine the principles of a fair trial and individual criminal responsibility.

Peaceful protests are a legitimate right, not a pressure mechanism

The gatherings held in Pristina and the one announced outside the premises of the Specialist Chambers may have a political and media impact, but they have no evidentiary force in court.

Expressing dissatisfaction through peaceful gatherings is a fundamental democratic right. These demonstrations may reflect the deep extent of part of the public’s outrage toward the Specialist Chambers and the recognition of how delicate any effort remains to detach the Kosovo Liberation Army’s war from the context of the aggression and repression of the Serbian regime.

Nevertheless, neither the number of protesters nor the intensity of the public reaction can replace a detailed examination of the evidence. Therefore, these protests provide no basis for acquitting the accused, but neither do they provide grounds for convicting them.

Threats may undermine the public cause

A different situation arises with statements about “burning” the country, escalating the situation or calls to take up arms.

These statements, too, do not become evidence against Thaçi, Veseli, Selimi and Krasniqi. But they can seriously damage the public narrative in favor of an impartial process.

The Specialist Chambers has partly based the continuation of their detention on the risk of obstructing justice and influencing witnesses. In the past, Hysni Gucati and Nasim Haradinaj were convicted precisely for actions aimed at intimidating witnesses and obstructing the administration of justice.

In this environment, threatening statements provide arguments for supporters of the Specialist Chambers to claim that pressure and intimidation remain real problems.

These developments may influence security plans, the way the hearing is organized and, perhaps, future decisions concerning detention. But they cannot legally change the answer to the fundamental question: whether the alleged crimes have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Could these developments affect the sentence?

In theory, the length of the sentence should not be increased because of the conduct of third parties. To worsen a defendant’s legal position, his or her personal involvement must be proven.

The court cannot penalize a person for statements made by his or her supporters. Recent events are more likely to be reflected in the reasoning for keeping them in detention after the verdict is issued than in the content of the verdict itself.

If the court concludes that there is a high risk of unrest after the verdict is announced, obstruction of the appeals process or interference with it, it may be more cautious about releasing them. Here too, however, the arguments must be clearly defined and closely connected to each of the accused.

How might the Trial Panel decide?

Without access to all the confidential evidence and testimony heard behind closed doors, no outside observer can accurately predict the verdict that will be announced.

Nevertheless, given the extraordinary length of the proceedings, the high number of witnesses, the complex nature of the indictment and the substantial differences in the alleged roles of each of the four defendants, the most likely scenario remains a mixed verdict.

This means the court may reject some elements of the prosecution’s case while accepting others. At the same time, the verdict will not necessarily be the same for Thaçi, Veseli, Selimi and Krasniqi.

The prosecution has requested a sentence of 45 years in prison for all four, while the defense has sought full acquittal. These represent the two extremes of the case. The court may reach an intermediate conclusion: acquittals on some charges and convictions on others, or different outcomes for each defendant.

Based on this assessment, a uniform sentence of 45 years for all four appears less likely than a judgment that individualizes criminal responsibility. At the same time, the full acquittal of all four remains possible, but it is not the most certain outcome.

The most realistic projection is that the Trial Panel will substantially narrow the prosecution’s allegations, but may find responsibility for certain specific counts or incidents. After this decision, an appeal by the party left dissatisfied is almost certain.

The verdict is not judging the Kosovo Liberation Army

Whatever the outcome, tomorrow’s decision should be understood as a determination of the personal criminal responsibility of four individuals, not as a verdict on the character of the Kosovo Liberation Army’s war of liberation.

That war was fought against a brutal Serbian apparatus of repression, and the overwhelming majority of the victims and those forcibly displaced were Albanians. No judgment against individuals can overturn this historical truth.

That is precisely why calls for fire and unrest are so damaging. They do not help the defendants, they have no power to change the court’s decision and they may shift the focus of the debate from concrete evidence to concerns about public order.

On Wednesday, the Specialist Chambers will communicate through the official verdict. Peaceful protest remains a democratic right; threats of violence, by contrast, serve only to damage Kosovo and the legitimacy of the demand for a fair trial.

Editorial note: This text is an analysis based on knowledge of judicial procedure, publicly available information and the latest developments. It does not convey inside information from the Court, nor does it offer definitive predictions about the outcome.

Sources: Kosovo Specialist Chambers; Reuters, on the verdict and the prosecution’s request; AP, regarding the protests and the case of the four defendants; United States Embassy, notice concerning the demonstrations

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Just 24 hours before the verdict is announced against Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi, the public atmosphere has been heightened by protests, warnings of unrest, statements about “setting Kosovo ablaze” and calls for citizens to arm themselves.

But how much could these developments affect the judges’ decision in The Hague?

The legal answer is: they should have no bearing whatsoever on determining the defendants’ guilt or innocence.

The verdict must be based solely on the evidence admitted during the trial, the testimony, the documents, the individual responsibility of each defendant, and the final arguments of the prosecution and the defense.

A citizen’s protest, a former fighter’s statement or a threat by someone outside the proceedings cannot be used as evidence against the defendants unless there is a concrete and proven link between them. So far, there is no public information indicating that the four defendants ordered or coordinated the latest statements.

The verdict has most likely been finalized

A practical fact must also be kept in mind: a verdict of this magnitude is not written overnight.

It includes an assessment of thousands of documents, testimonies and legal arguments. For this reason, the essential part of the decision must have been completed and approved by the trial panel well before the protests and statements of recent days.

Judges cannot legally change a finding of guilt simply because protests have been announced outside the courtroom or threatening language has been used.

If they did so, they would seriously undermine the principles of a fair trial and individual responsibility.

Peaceful protests are a right, not legal pressure

The protests in Pristina and the one announced outside the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague may have political and media impact, but they have no evidentiary weight.

Peaceful gatherings are a democratic right. They may show how deep dissatisfaction with the Specialist Chambers runs and how sensitive every attempt remains in Kosovo to portraying the KLA’s war outside the context of Serbian aggression and repression.

Neither the number of protesters nor the strength of public reactions can replace an analysis of the evidence.

Therefore, protests cannot secure the defendants’ acquittal, but neither can they be used as a reason to convict them.

Threats could damage the public cause

The situation is different when it comes to statements about “setting Kosovo ablaze,” escalation, or calls for people to arm themselves.

These statements are not evidence against Thaçi, Veseli, Selimi or Krasniqi either. Nevertheless, they could seriously damage the public cause of a fair trial.

The Specialist Chambers has repeatedly justified pretrial detention by citing the risk of influencing witnesses and obstructing the proceedings. In the past, Hysni Gucati and Nasim Haradinaj were convicted of offenses related to obstructing the administration of justice and intimidating witnesses.

In this climate, threatening statements give supporters of the Court an opportunity to argue that pressure and intimidation remain a problem.

They could affect security measures, the way the hearing is organized and, potentially, future assessments regarding pretrial detention. But they cannot legally change the answer to the question of whether the alleged crimes have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Could they affect the length of the sentences?

In principle, the severity of the sentences should not increase because of the conduct of third parties.

To worsen a defendant’s position, his or her personal responsibility must be proven. A court cannot punish someone for statements made by his or her supporters.

Recent developments could have a greater impact on decisions about extending pretrial detention after the verdict than on the verdict itself. If the court assesses that there is a risk of unrest, obstruction or interference with the appeals process after the verdict is announced, it may take a more cautious approach to the question of release.

Here too, however, concrete and individualized reasons must exist.

How might the court rule?

Without access to all the confidential materials and closed-session testimony, no one outside the trial panel can predict the verdict with certainty.

Nevertheless, given the length of the proceedings, the large number of witnesses, the complexity of the indictment and the differences in the alleged roles of the four defendants, the most likely scenario appears to be a mixed verdict.

This means that the court could reject some parts of the prosecution’s theory while accepting others. The decision also does not necessarily have to be identical for Thaçi, Veseli, Selimi and Krasniqi.

The prosecution has requested 45 years in prison for each of them, while the defense has sought their full acquittal. These are the two extremes of the proceedings. The court could end up somewhere in between: acquitting them on some charges and convicting them on others, or reaching different outcomes for each defendant.

In my assessment, an identical 45-year sentence for all four appears less likely than a verdict that individualizes responsibility. At the same time, the full acquittal of all four on every count remains possible, but cannot be considered the most certain outcome.

The most realistic prediction is that the court will limit or reject a broad part of the prosecution’s allegations, but may find responsibility for some specific counts or events. After that, an appeal by the dissatisfied party will almost certainly follow.

The verdict is not a judgment on the KLA

Regardless of the outcome, the verdict should be treated as a decision on the individual responsibility of four people, not as a ruling on the character of the Kosovo Liberation Army’s war.

The KLA’s war was waged against the repression of Serbian forces, while the overwhelming majority of the victims and those expelled were Albanians. No decision concerning individuals can change this historical reality.

For precisely this reason, statements about fire, weapons and unrest are dangerous. They do not help the defendants, they do not change the verdict and they may shift attention from the evidence to fears about security.

Tomorrow, the court will speak through its verdict. Peaceful protest remains a democratic right; threats of violence, by contrast, only damage Kosovo and the argument for justice.

Editorial note: This is an analytical assessment based on the judicial proceedings, publicly available information and recent developments. It does not present inside information from the Court, nor is it a certain prediction of the outcome.

Sources: Kosovo Specialist Chambers; Reuters – the verdict and the prosecution’s request; AP – the protests and proceedings against the four defendants; U.S. Embassy – notice concerning the demonstrations

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