President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic has announced that he will send a letter to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, asking him not to allow the opening of the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica.

Vucic said the letter would be sent this evening and expressed hope that the NATO chief would consider his request.

The Serbian president reiterated that Serbia would continue to oppose the opening of the bridge, declaring that he would “fight as much as he can” over the issue.

Meanwhile, KFOR earlier began a gradual process to change its presence at the main bridge over the Ibar.

According to reports, this development is linked to the improvement in the security situation and the gradual adjustment of NATO’s mission in Kosovo.

Islami: Vucic is trying to move the bridge issue from the local to the international level

Avni Islami, a professor of security sciences, told “Bota sot” that Aleksandar Vucic has intensified his rhetoric against plans to open the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica.

According to him, the Serbian president is expected to send Mark Rutte an official letter requesting that the bridge not be opened to traffic.

“Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, a former propaganda minister during the time of Milosevic, has toughened his position toward plans to open the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica.

He has announced that he will send NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte an official letter with the clear request that the bridge’s opening to traffic be prevented,” Islami said.

He assesses that this approach aims to increase international pressure on Kosovo and directly involve KFOR in decision-making concerning the Ibar Bridge.

Islami believes that Belgrade is trying to create the impression that opening the bridge could endanger the security of Serbs in Kosovo. In this way, according to him, Vucic’s narrative as the “protector” of this community is also reinforced.

“This move clearly demonstrates Vucic’s strategy of shifting the issue from the local level to the highest international and diplomatic arena.

By addressing the NATO chief directly, Belgrade aims to strip Kosovo of its decision-making authority and place NATO and KFOR face-to-face with direct responsibility for maintaining the status quo.

The warning that an official letter will be sent represents a new political escalation and is accompanied by a dangerous security equation. Through this rhetoric, Vucic is pursuing three main objectives: pressuring KFOR and directly implicating NATO troops in blocking the sovereign decisions of Kosovo’s institutions.

At the same time, the aim is to construct a narrative in which the opening of the bridge is portrayed as a threat to the security and stability of the Serbian community, using fear as a tool of pressure. The third objective is to strengthen the image of the “protector” through domestic propaganda claiming that Belgrade remains the sole guarantor of the security and existence of Serbs in Kosovo,” Islami concluded to “Bota sot.”

Shala: The bridge is not merely a road, but a symbol of Mitrovica’s division

Security expert Drizan Shala said in a conversation with “Bota sot” that Vucic’s opposition to the opening of the bridge cannot be explained solely by security arguments, as it also contains political and strategic elements.

According to Shala, the bridge represents the division of Mitrovica, while its opening would weaken this reality and narrow Belgrade’s sphere of influence in northern Kosovo.

“Aleksandar Vucic’s statement that he will address Mark Rutte with a request that the main bridge over the Ibar in Mitrovica not be opened should be analyzed beyond the symbolic importance of the bridge itself.

The first reason Vucic opposes the opening is linked to the fact that the Ibar Bridge is not simply an infrastructure facility. For more than two decades, it has become a symbol of Mitrovica’s physical, political and psychological division.

Opening it would have consequences far broader than allowing vehicles to pass, because it would weaken the bridge’s role as a dividing line.

For Belgrade, preserving this division is politically important. A divided Mitrovica can more easily be presented as evidence of a reality that has not yet been consolidated and as an argument for Serbia’s continued intervention in the affairs of northern Kosovo.

Therefore, opposition to the opening should not be viewed solely as concern for the security of the Serbian community. It has a clear political and strategic background,” Shala said.

He considers Belgrade’s request for NATO involvement in the bridge issue an attempt to intervene in an area that falls under the jurisdiction of Kosovo’s institutions.

Shala emphasizes that Serbia has the right to express security concerns, but it cannot transfer to NATO the authority to decide whether infrastructure in Kosovo should be opened or not.

“If the purpose of the request is for an external authority to stop a decision concerning the operation of territory and infrastructure located under the jurisdiction of Kosovo’s institutions, then we are dealing with interference.

Serbia’s concerns about the security of Serbs in Kosovo can be expressed, and NATO/KFOR should treat them seriously. Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between raising a security concern and requesting that the fate of infrastructure in Kosovo be determined.

In this case, Belgrade is attempting to shift decision-making from Kosovo’s institutions to NATO. This is the issue that must be carefully examined,” he said.

According to Shala, NATO should seriously assess Vucic’s request, but it should not be turned into a political veto over Kosovo’s institutions.

He adds that, in the absence of concrete security threats, the bridge should not continue to remain a symbol of political division.

“NATO should neither disregard the request nor treat it as a political order.

The most professional approach would be to hear it and analyze it from a security perspective, while any attempt to use KFOR as an instrument of Belgrade’s political decision-making should be rejected.

KFOR is responsible for security and stability, but this does not mean that it should assume the powers of Kosovo’s institutions.

The European position has also been that the bridge should be opened, but in coordination with security partners. For this reason, the main question should not be whether Vucic wants the bridge opened, but whether there is a concrete and verifiable threat that would justify keeping it closed.

If there is a concrete threat, it should be addressed with concrete security measures. If no such threat exists, then the security argument cannot be used to preserve a political division.

Belgrade opposes the opening in an area where Kosovo’s institutions have responsibility because the bridge carries symbolic weight far greater than its physical function.

Its opening would convey the message that northern Mitrovica should not be treated as a separate political zone isolated from the rest of Kosovo. This message directly contradicts Belgrade’s political narrative.

From a security perspective, reducing the issue to an Albanian-Serb confrontation must be avoided. The main problem is whether public infrastructure can be kept closed indefinitely simply because it has become a symbol of a political conflict.

The message from the perspective of national security must be clear: Kosovo’s institutions should have primary responsibility for public order and the functioning of infrastructure in Kosovo’s territory. KFOR should guarantee security within its mandate, while political issues should be addressed through political dialogue.

A model must not be allowed to emerge in which every decision by Kosovo’s institutions in the north is blocked through the political pressure Belgrade exerts on NATO. Such a practice would create a dangerous precedent.

Ultimately, the Ibar Bridge is not merely a matter of concrete, asphalt and traffic. It is a test to determine who establishes normality in northern Kosovo. If security can be guaranteed, free movement should be the objective. If threats exist, they must be neutralized, but security must not be used as a pretext for preserving political division.

For this reason, Vucic’s request should be treated with diplomatic seriousness, but it must not be allowed to turn into a political veto over Kosovo’s institutions,” Drizan Shala concluded to “Bota sot.”

The post Vucic asks Rutte to block the opening of the Ibar Bridge; experts: Belgrade aims to internationalize the issue appeared first on Albeu.com.

The European Commission has reiterated the need for proper coordination and meaningful consultations between the affected municipalities and Kosovo’s central institutions before the Ibar Bridge is opened. The main bridge over the Ibar River connects South Mitrovica, where Albanians make up the majority, with North Mitrovica, which is inhabited mainly by Serbs.

European Commission spokesperson Anita Hipper told a press conference on August 18 that the European Union’s position on the issue remains clear.

According to her, the Kosovo Police must ensure the safety of all communities by acting in accordance with democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law, so that every citizen feels protected.

Hipper recalled that the bridge is currently open to pedestrians, while vehicle traffic is still not permitted. She said steps had been taken on the issue, but the EU continues to expect effective coordination and meaningful consultations, which she said need to improve.

The European Commission’s position was made public after KFOR announced on August 10 that it had begun the “gradual transition” of its permanent presence on the bridge.

The NATO peacekeeping mission linked the decision to an improvement in the security situation, emphasizing that the process would proceed in stages and depend on conditions on the ground. However, KFOR will continue to maintain a visible presence in South Mitrovica, North Mitrovica and northern Kosovo in general.

Security expert Fidair Berisha told “Bota sot” that opening the bridge to vehicles is of strategic importance to Kosovo, even though it is happening late and without any particular reason for the delay. He summed up the situation with the phrase “better late than never.”

Berisha believes no provocation is expected from the Albanian side, as the main objective is to guarantee freedom of movement and uphold the rule of law. At the same time, he expects that various destabilizing scenarios could emerge from the Serbian side.

According to him, Serbia may try to obstruct the process or close the bridge through provocations and diplomatic channels. Berisha says political structures in Belgrade know that the Kosovo Police and other security institutions have the situation under control and will not allow actions that undermine security in Kosovo.

Among the possible scenarios, the expert mentions staged interethnic provocations, roadblocks in the north using heavy vehicles, disinformation campaigns and staged incidents in which Serbian citizens could be portrayed as being endangered by Albanians or the security authorities.

Berisha believes the Kosovo Police have sufficient personnel and logistical capacity to guarantee public order and keep the situation under control, regardless of the nature of any provocations. He also considers tactical coordination with KFOR and EULEX important in order to avoid misunderstandings and send a clear message of unity.

Regarding a coordination plan before the opening, the expert proposes fixed monitoring points on both sides of the bridge, a direct line of communication between the two Mitrovica municipalities and the establishment of a joint operational center that would operate in real time.

He believes that, in the long term, opening the bridge could help reduce tensions and facilitate the integration of the north. However, Berisha identifies a deliberate attack on vehicles as the most dangerous scenario, as it could subsequently be used by Serbian structures and Serbia to seek the reinstatement of blockades through the international community.

The expert adds that Kosovo’s security institutions are prepared and capable of responding professionally. For this reason, he believes that any scenario will be detected in time and successfully managed.

Analyst Eduard Gashi says the EU’s demand for coordination should not become an obstacle to Kosovo exercising its sovereignty. According to him, the main question is no longer whether the bridge should be opened, but how it should be opened and what political message the decision will convey.

Gashi interprets the European Commission’s call for “effective coordination and meaningful consultations” not as a veto on opening the bridge, but as a demand for a politically and institutionally controlled process. He emphasizes that this demand should not be used as a formula for indefinite delay.

According to the analyst, Kosovo has the right to exercise its sovereignty, but a serious state should not demonstrate that sovereignty by surprising its allies. He notes that the EU has emphasized that the bridge should serve all communities and that the Kosovo Police must guarantee security for everyone.

Gashi recalls that only a few days earlier, the EU had confirmed that the conditions it had previously deemed necessary for opening the bridge had been met. At the same time, KFOR had begun the gradual withdrawal of its permanent presence from the bridge, linking the development to improved security.

He emphasizes that coordination is not permission and consultation does not constitute a veto. According to him, Kosovo’s institutions cannot make their sovereignty conditional on the approval of a municipality or a Serbian political party. Nevertheless, in a sensitive area such as North Mitrovica, listening to residents and local authorities is part of good governance.

Gashi considers it unacceptable for the Serbian List or Belgrade to have the power to grant or withhold consent for the bridge’s opening, as this would create a right of veto over the functioning of the Republic of Kosovo’s authority and infrastructure.

The analyst recalls that the bridge issue is not new. As part of the EU-mediated dialogue, Kosovo and Serbia agreed in 2015 that the bridge and the surrounding area would be revitalized, with the aim of opening it to all traffic no later than June 2016. According to Gashi, it is now 2026 and, ten years later, its opening is still being discussed.

He believes this situation demonstrates the weakness of European policy in the Balkans, as technical issues that are not resolved in time turn into political problems, then into security issues, and require even greater diplomatic engagement.

Gashi emphasizes that cooperation with the US, NATO and the EU should not be viewed as an infringement of sovereignty, but as a way to increase Kosovo’s strength. He underlines that a small state that is not yet a member of the UN, NATO or the EU multiplies its influence through alliances, and that Kosovo did not achieve its current position alone.

According to him, even if Kosovo has the legal right to open the bridge, state decision-making must take into account the consequences that the manner of implementation could bring. The question, he emphasizes, is not only whether an action is permitted, but also what is gained, what is put at risk and who will stand by Kosovo the day after the decision.

A unilateral opening contrary to the position of key international partners could provide Kosovo with immediate domestic benefits, but at the same time could cost it diplomatic capital in Brussels and other decision-making centers.

The analyst considers the concerns of the Serbian community in the north important and says Serbian citizens must feel safe if the bridge is opened. However, he distinguishes between listening to that community and granting it a political veto over the operation of the Republic of Kosovo’s roads, bridges and institutions.

Gashi says a Serbian resident of North Mitrovica should feel just as safe crossing the bridge as an Albanian resident from the south. According to him, guaranteeing that safety is Kosovo’s responsibility, but no community should decide which parts of the Republic’s infrastructure or institutions may function.

He calls on the EU to provide greater clarity about what “meaningful consultations” entail. If further consultations are needed, he says Brussels should specify with whom they will be held, what they will include and the deadline by which they must be completed, so that they do not turn into an endless process.

Gashi believes the ultimate goal should be for the Ibar Bridge to no longer be treated as a political issue, but simply to serve as a link between the two parts of the city. For this reason, he proposes immediate consultations, concrete security guarantees, coordination with KFOR and the EU, and a clear deadline for the opening.

“Kosovo should open the Ibar Bridge, but it should not burn political bridges with its allies in the process,” the analyst concludes, describing this approach as statecraft rather than weakness.

The main bridge over the Ibar was blocked after the 1999 war and over the years became one of the main flashpoints of ethnic tension.

Kosovo and Serbia agreed to open it as part of the EU-mediated dialogue. The implementation plan, agreed in 2016, stipulated that the bridge would open to traffic in January 2017.

Work to revitalize the bridge, in which around 1.5 million euros was invested, was completed in 2018. Despite this, it was never opened to vehicles.

In 2024, initiatives by the Kosovo government to open the bridge were opposed by local Serbs. At the time, the international community demanded that any action be taken in coordination.

The post EU Calls for Coordination Before Opening the Ibar Bridge, Experts Warn of Risks and Demand a Clear Plan appeared first on Albeu.com.

Following KFOR’s decision to begin a gradual transition away from its permanent military presence on the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica, the European Union has confirmed that the necessary criteria for opening it have been met. This development is considered significant for northern Kosovo and for efforts aimed at normalizing life in Mitrovica.

For years, the Ibar Bridge has represented one of the most visible symbols of the city’s division into two parts. For this reason, any change in its status carries political, social and security implications. However, it remains unclear whether the EU’s position means its opening is now only a matter of time and what effect the transition in KFOR’s presence could have on stability in the area.

Professor Nijazi Halili, speaking to “Bota Sot,” described the European Union’s confirmation as an important step, but warned that it should not automatically be interpreted as a sign that the bridge will open soon.

According to Halili, the Ibar Bridge has long been more than simply a piece of infrastructure, as it has become a symbol of the political and social division in Mitrovica. For this reason, he believes the decision on opening it should be made carefully and in full coordination with international and security mechanisms.

Commenting on the gradual change to KFOR’s permanent presence at the site, the professor said the process should not be viewed as a withdrawal from its responsibilities for maintaining security. He described it as a planned and coordinated transition.

Halili emphasized that stability in the north remains essential, and therefore any change on the ground should be implemented cautiously to avoid creating new tensions.

According to the professor, opening the bridge under safe conditions and through coordination could have a significant impact on ensuring freedom of movement and restoring normal life for Mitrovica’s residents.

However, he stressed that merely removing the physical barriers on the bridge would not be enough to overcome the long-standing divisions between the communities. According to him, this step should be accompanied by other measures that help build mutual trust.

Concluding his remarks to “Bota Sot,” Nijazi Halili said the goal should be to transform the bridge from a dividing line into a place that brings citizens closer together. He added that normalization in Mitrovica cannot be achieved solely by opening the bridge, but also requires security, dialogue, freedom of movement and the political will to overcome divisions.

The post Ibar Bridge Heading Toward Reopening After Two Decades of Division? Professor Urges Caution appeared first on Albeu.com.

The European Union’s (EU) position regarding the main bridge over the Ibar River is clear, European Commission (EC) spokesperson Anita Hipper said during a press conference on August 18.

On Tuesday, the EC said that before the bridge linking Albanian-majority South Mitrovica with Serb-majority North Mitrovica is opened, it expects “effective coordination and meaningful consultations between the affected municipalities and Kosovo’s central institutions.”

Hipper also called on the Kosovo Police to ensure the safety of all communities. “What we are also asking is for the Kosovo Police to guarantee the safety of all communities, in line with democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law, so that everyone feels safe,” she said.

Referring to the current situation, the EC spokesperson noted that pedestrians are allowed to cross the bridge, while vehicle traffic has not yet been permitted.

“We have made our assessment, steps have been taken in this direction, and our position remains that we still expect effective coordination and meaningful consultations, which need to be improved,” Hipper said.

The statement follows an August 10 announcement by KFOR, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, that it had begun the “gradual transition” of its permanent presence on the bridge.

According to KFOR, the decision was made because of the improved security situation. The process will proceed step by step and will depend on conditions, while the mission will continue to maintain a visible presence in South Mitrovica, North Mitrovica and northern Kosovo in general.

After the 1999 war, the main bridge over the Ibar was blocked and, over the years, became a flashpoint for ethnic tensions.

Its opening was agreed between Kosovo and Serbia as part of the EU-mediated dialogue. The implementation plan, agreed by the parties in 2016, stipulated that the bridge would open to traffic in January 2017.

About 1.5 million euros was invested in work to revitalize the bridge, which was completed in 2018. Despite this, it was never opened to vehicle traffic.

Initiatives by the Kosovo government to open the bridge during 2024 were opposed by local Serbs. At the same time, the international community called for any step to be taken in coordination. / REL

The post European Commission Calls for Coordination and Consultations on Opening Ibar Bridge appeared first on Albeu.com.

Security expert Nuredin Ibishi has described Brussels’ confirmation that the conditions have been met for opening the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica as an extraordinary development.

Speaking on the program “Ditari,” Ibishi said the bridge’s opening could have a direct impact on the process of integrating northern Kosovo.

He emphasized that the creation of a suitable security environment was made possible by the work of the Kosovo Police, other security institutions and the restraint shown by communities in northern and southern Mitrovica.

“First and foremost, the Kosovo Police, intelligence services and all other Kosovo services have contributed to creating favorable conditions and a suitable security environment. Naturally, the communities living in the north and south have also shown restraint and self-control, avoiding incidents,” Ibishi said.

According to him, KFOR, EULEX and the European Union also played an important role in overcoming the situation.

“Fortunately, KFOR, EULEX and the European Union finally gave the green light for this situation to be overcome. Overall, I believe this is an extraordinary achievement that will also have an impact on the integration of the north,” he said.

Regarding the timeframe for opening the bridge, Ibishi said the process was not expected to take long. However, he explained that responsibilities would be transferred to the Kosovo Police gradually.

“I do not think it will take long. Following this initiative, what has been announced by KFOR, EULEX and the Kosovo Police will be implemented, with responsibilities gradually transferred to the Kosovo Police. This does not concern only the bridges, but also other sites in Kosovo, including the Deçan Monastery. Therefore, I do not believe it will take much time, but it will be a gradual process,” Ibishi said.

Referring to the Serbian List’s reaction following Brussels’ decision, he ruled out the possibility of the situation in the north escalating.

According to Ibishi, the reaction represents a final attempt to resist the integration process.

“The Serbian List merely conveys the demands of Vučić and Belgrade, but it no longer has the extremist power it once had on the ground to organize a blockade or obstruct freedom of movement, including by taking measures with serious consequences,” he said.

Ibishi said the Serbian List’s position was aimed at halting the integration of the north.

“This is merely a final and destructive attempt to obstruct the integration of the north instead of supporting it. Their reaction should be condemned,” Ibishi concluded.

The European Union has announced that the criteria for opening the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica have been met. The announcement came after KFOR began gradually withdrawing its permanent presence from the bridge.

On Monday, former Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani welcomed the confirmation, describing the opening of the bridge as a historic step.

The process began early last week, when NATO’s mission in Kosovo announced that it had started the gradual transition of its permanent troop presence on the main bridge.

KFOR explained that the transition was being carried out based on security conditions and in coordination with Kosovo’s institutions, EULEX and other international actors.

The Kosovo Police were also seen on the bridge that same day.

Following the announcement, the European Union said it had been informed by NATO and reiterated its unchanged position: the bridge should be opened after the work, assessments and consultations with security partners have been completed.

The bridge over the Ibar River has for years been considered one of Kosovo’s most sensitive areas.

It separates southern Mitrovica, which is inhabited mainly by Albanians, from the northern part of the city, which has a Serb majority.

Persistent tensions have led KFOR to maintain a presence on the bridge for many years.

The post Ibishi: Opening of the Ibar Bridge After Brussels’ Confirmation an Extraordinary Success appeared first on Albeu.com.

Kadri Kastrati, a former commander of the KSF, said that the necessary security conditions now exist for the opening of the Ibar Bridge, while responsibility for its management could be entrusted to the Kosovo Police.

He referred to the position of the European Union, stressing that the statement clearly shows that the criteria have been met both politically and in terms of security.

According to Kastrati, KFOR and EULEX have also reached the same conclusion regarding the fulfillment of the conditions. For this reason, he said the bridge should no longer remain a dividing point and that the Kosovo Police is capable of administering it.

The former KSF commander praised the police’s engagement in the north, stating that its professional work and dedication had produced extraordinary results. As he put it, extremist and terrorist elements that Serbia had installed there over a long period of time have been eliminated to a certain extent.

Kastrati emphasized that the Kosovo Police had already proven that it is not an institution concerned with only one community, but provides protection for all communities living in the country.

Regarding the police presence at the bridge, he said that the deployment of special units was not necessary. According to him, stationing a vehicle or a police patrol would be sufficient to monitor the movement of people.

He also addressed a message to the citizens of Kosovo, calling for the crossing of the bridge to be carried out in accordance with European norms. Kastrati stressed that crossing with flags, horns or vehicles does not constitute patriotism, while recalling that the territory beyond the Ibar is part of Kosovo.

Kastrati also reacted to former President Vjosa Osmani’s statement on the opening of the Ibar Bridge, rejecting the description of the event as a “historic act.”

He expressed regret that the former president had described the opening in this way, saying that, in his view, it was a normal action: the opening of a bridge over the Ibar River. Kastrati reiterated that the bridge should no longer be used as a dividing line and that its management could be left to the Kosovo Police.

The post Kadri Kastrati: The Bridge over the Ibar Should Not Remain a Symbol of Division; Management Could Be Entrusted to the Kosovo Police appeared first on Albeu.com.

On an ordinary day in August, Italian Carabinieri dismantled their tents on the northern side of the bridge over the Ibar River. For the first time in many years, the KFOR checkpoint was temporarily removed altogether.

The move signaled the start of a gradual reduction in KFOR’s permanent troop presence. The NATO-led international military mission has been in Kosovo since the end of the war in 1999, with the aim of preventing conflict.

The “improved security situation in Kosovo” was cited as the reason, while it was stressed that troops could return to the area if future developments make it necessary. KFOR told DW that, once the process is complete, it will maintain a robust presence in North Mitrovica and throughout northern Kosovo, continuing to help provide a safe environment for all communities.

However, KFOR did not say whether the Kosovo Police would assume responsibility for security on the bridge between South and North Mitrovica. For decades, this location has been a flashpoint for tensions and interethnic clashes.

Meanwhile, Interior Minister Xhelal Sveçla said that the transfer of responsibilities from KFOR to the police had already begun and that the process should lead to the reopening of the main bridge to traffic.

Regarding the Visoki Dečani Monastery, KFOR’s response was more direct: the Kosovo Police will gradually be integrated into the security structures protecting the monastery.

What happened before this decision?

The announcements came after several incidents in northern Kosovo that caused concern among local Serbs and the European Union.

Over the course of one month, the public enterprise “Ibër-Lepenci,” acting on a decision by Kosovo’s Ministry of Environment, demolished 17 holiday homes belonging to local Serbs near Ujman/Gazivoda Lake, in the municipality of Zubin Potok. Kosovo authorities said the buildings had been constructed without permits on land administered by the company and had therefore requested that the “usurped property be vacated.”

Many of the owners say they have documents proving their right to use the land. According to them, the homes were demolished unlawfully even though court proceedings were still ongoing.

Another recent case involves a resident of a village in the same municipality. He accused members of the Kosovo Police of physically assaulting him during a search of his home conducted on suspicion of weapons possession, and said that his injuries had sent him to the hospital.

Why is the reduction happening now?

It remains unclear why KFOR chose this particular period to reduce its presence. The organization offered no explanation on the matter in its response to DW.

Zoran Saviq of the NGO Aktiv in North Mitrovica says the decision did not surprise him. He notes that similar announcements have been made before, just as residents of the north have long harbored distrust toward the Kosovo Police.

For years, reports by nongovernmental organizations operating in the north have highlighted citizens’ low level of trust in Kosovo’s security institutions. According to Saviq, when the latest developments in the municipality of Zubin Potok are also taken into account, the question arises as to what grounds international organizations have for concluding that security has improved significantly.

Saviq stresses that, from an objective standpoint, NATO statements and available statistics show some improvements, which are also reflected in police reports. But according to him, a different picture emerges when people on the street are asked how safe they feel and whether they trust the institutions, especially the police.

Nexhmedin Spahiu, a professor at the Faculty of Political Science in Pristina, considers this distrust understandable, given the events during and after the war. Nevertheless, he describes the work of the Kosovo Police in the north as “quite good” and, in some respects, “better than in other parts of Kosovo.”

Spahiu explains that, for this reason, the Kosovo Police enjoys a degree of legitimacy in enforcing law and order. He also emphasizes that, after Serbs withdrew from the police in the north at the request of their political representatives, gradual efforts were made to improve the ethnic composition of the police force.

In light of this, he believes that reopening the main bridge in Mitrovica “would not pose a security risk.”

According to Spahiu, keeping the bridge closed no longer makes sense following the incident in Banjska and the Kosovo authorities’ takeover of control in the north. He argues that the closure no longer serves as a security measure between the two sides because, in practice, there are no longer two sides, and the same institutions operate on both sides of the Ibar.

Debate over the timing

Local journalist Andrija Lazarević, founder of the Zubin Potok INFO media outlet, takes a different view. According to him, the timing is not appropriate either for opening the bridge or for reducing KFOR troops, particularly because “many allegations of violent police conduct toward Serb residents in recent years remain unresolved.”

Lazareviq says residents are frightened and perceive opening the bridge to traffic as “breaking the dam,” which would allow a greater influx of Albanians into the north. He notes that the demolition of buildings at Ujman/Gazivoda Lake is continuing, an issue that has still not been resolved legally, while home searches are conducted daily and people are questioned as part of war crimes investigations.

He adds that he does not wish to prejudge an investigation into such a sensitive issue, but believes that the chronological sequence of these developments makes it inevitable to ask whether an impression is being created of sustained pressure on one community.

Following KFOR’s announcement, the Serbian List immediately voiced its opposition and requested an urgent meeting with the mission commander. The meeting was held shortly afterward.

The Serbian List did not respond to DW’s question. As a result, the reason for requesting the meeting was not clarified, given that the Chief of the General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, Milan Mojsiloviq, had been informed about the process. It also remained unknown what steps the party intends to take, for example regarding the security of the Visoki Dečani Monastery.

Zoran Saviq of the NGO Aktiv believes that such matters “cannot happen unilaterally, without communication with official Belgrade.” For this reason, he views the process as “a clear implementation of the Franco-German plan, which President Vuçiq appears to have accepted.”

In conclusion, Saviq says that, whether people like it or not, the policies pursued by both Pristina and local Serb representatives have political legitimacy. According to him, that is precisely the essence of the entire issue.

The post DW/ Can KFOR’s Presence in Northern Kosovo Be Reduced? appeared first on Albeu.com.

Serbia is analyzing the possibility of diverting the course of the Ibar River within its territory, according to a statement by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. Authorities in Belgrade have begun work on the issue and have enlisted experts.

Speaking to a Serbian media outlet on Sunday, Vučić said that construction specialists, engineers and professionals from other fields had been called in. He delivered the warning in a threatening tone, stating that Serbia has several reasons to alter the course of the Ibar and that afterward they would see what the Albanians would do and how they would behave because, according to him, the Serbian people are being mistreated.

This is not the first time the Serbian president has put forward such an idea. In 2024, immediately after the attack on critical infrastructure at Ibër-Lepenc, of which Serbs are accused, Vučić said his country had a plan to divert the Ibar within Serbian territory.

Serbian commentator Zlatoje Martinov described the warning as a reckless statement detached from reality and an empty threat. According to him, diverting the river would be utterly absurd, as its technical implementation would be extremely complicated and would cost Serbia several billion euros.

Speaking to “Bota Sot,” Martinov questioned why Serbia would need to borrow such vast sums from foreign banks. He stressed that the country is barely managing to finance Vučić’s megalomaniacal “EXPO 2027” project, where construction is behind schedule, while the Serbian president is worried about whether all the buildings will be completed by next summer.

Martinov said that diverting the Ibar riverbed and “destroying Lake Gazivoda” would require not only billions of euros and many years of technical work, but also the approval of Europe and the rest of the world. According to him, Vučić does not have such approval, and no one can secure it because the intervention would amount to a form of crime against the people of Kosovo, as well as against the Serbs living in Kosovo, whom the Serbian president claims to support and for whom he swears his commitment.

For the commentator, Vučić’s idea sounds more ridiculous than frightening. He believes that misguided steps are often taken in moments of powerlessness and anger, while this threat against Kosovo would, in practice, be very difficult and even almost impossible to carry out. For this reason, Martinov described the plan as one of Aleksandar Vučić’s “daydreams.”

Any intervention in the course of the Ibar is of particular importance to Kosovo because the river is directly connected to the Gazivoda/Ujman water system and the Ibër-Lepenc canal.

Such an action would not simply be an ordinary diversion of the river’s course but would have direct consequences for Kosovo’s water and electricity supplies. The impact would particularly affect the two large power plants, Kosovo A and Kosovo B.

The European Union also responded to Vučić’s statements, calling for warnings about a possible diversion of the Ibar, as well as any action that does not help normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia, to be avoided.

On August 11, a European Commission spokesperson said that progress toward normalizing Kosovo-Serbia relations could be achieved only through dialogue.

In its response to Radio Free Europe, the European Commission stressed that both statements about possible changes to the river’s course and actions that do not support the goal of normalizing relations should be avoided.

The post Serbian Commentator Dismisses Vučić’s Plan for the Ibar: Technically Almost Impossible, a “Daydream appeared first on Albeu.com.

Serbia is considering the possibility of changing the course of the Ibar River within its territory, an idea put forward by President Aleksandar Vučić.

According to him, the authorities in Belgrade have already engaged construction experts, engineers and other specialists to analyze this possibility.

Vučić made the statement to Serbian media on Sunday, accompanying it with a warning to Albanians regarding how they would react to such a decision.

“We have already called in experts who deal with this—the construction sector, engineers and everyone else. Since they are mistreating our people so much, let us see. We have various reasons for changing the course of the Ibar, and then we will see what the Albanians will do and how they will behave,” Vučić said.

This is not the first time the Serbian president has spoken about such a plan. He also mentioned the same idea in 2024, immediately after the attack on critical infrastructure at Ibër-Lepenc, for which Serbs have been accused.

At the time, Vučić said that Serbia had a plan to divert the Ibar River within its territory.

Serbian publicist Zlatoje Martinov described the latest statement as reckless and an empty threat, while calling the project an absurdity that would impose extraordinary costs on Serbia.

“This is one of a series of Vučić’s statements that have no connection with reality. It is another reckless statement and an empty threat. The idea of ‘changing the course of the Ibar River’ is pure absurdity, since such an infrastructure project is technically extremely complex and would cost Serbia several billion euros,” Martinov told “Bota sot.”

He added that Belgrade would be forced to take out large loans from foreign banks to finance such an undertaking at a time when Serbia is barely managing the costs of the “EXPO 2027” project. According to him, work on that project is being delayed, and Vučić is concerned about whether all the buildings will be completed by next summer.

Martinov also emphasized that implementing the plan would require the approval of Europe and the international community, which the Serbian president does not have.

“To relocate the Ibar riverbed and ‘destroy Gazivoda Lake,’ in addition to enormous sums of money and years of technical work, the approval of Europe and the world would also be needed. Vučić does not have this approval, and no one could ever obtain it, because such an action would constitute a kind of crime against the people of Kosovo and, of course, against the Serbs in Kosovo as well, whom Vučić swears by and supposedly supports,” the publicist asserted.

According to him, the Serbian president’s idea is more laughable than threatening, because putting it into practice would be extremely difficult, even almost impossible.

“In a state of helplessness and anger, people often make the wrong moves. Such a statement by Vučić, intended as a threat against Kosovo, is in fact more laughable than frightening, because in practice it would be difficult, even almost impossible, to carry out. Therefore, I would simply call it Aleksandar Vučić’s ‘daydreaming,’” Martinov added.

The course of the Ibar is of direct importance to Kosovo because it is connected to the Gazivoda/Ujman water system and the Ibër-Lepenc canal.

Such an intervention would not merely be a technical change to the river’s course. It would have direct consequences for Kosovo’s water and electricity supply, including the operation of the two major power plants, Kosovo A and Kosovo B.

The European Union has also reacted to Vučić’s statements. The EU said that both statements about a possible change to the course of the Ibar and any actions that do not contribute to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia should be avoided.

“Progress in normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia can be achieved only through dialogue,” a European Commission spokesperson said on August 11.

In a response to Radio Free Europe, the European Commission emphasized that “statements, including those about possible changes to the river’s course, and actions that do not support this objective should be avoided.”

The post Serbian Publicist: Vučić’s Plan to Divert the Ibar Is Impossible and Would Cost Serbia Billions appeared first on Albeu.com.

The Albanian Ambassadors Council (AAC) has expressed deep concern over Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s recent statement that the Serbian authorities are considering diverting the course of the Ibar River and have engaged experts on the matter.

According to the AAC, water resources and issues related to energy security and citizens’ well-being must not be turned into instruments of political pressure against the Republic of Kosovo.

The Council considers the Ibar River and the Ujman/Gazivoda system vital to Kosovo’s water supply, energy production, economic development and the lives of its citizens, regardless of their ethnicity.

Any unilateral action that would alter the river’s natural course and could have significant cross-border consequences must be examined with the utmost responsibility and in full compliance with international law, the AAC emphasized.

The Council recalled that international rules governing transboundary waters are based on the equitable and reasonable use of shared resources, the prevention of significant harm to other parties, cooperation between states and the exchange of information.

This framework also includes the obligation to provide prior notification and consultation on measures that may cause significant cross-border impacts, as well as the protection of ecosystems and the sustainable use of water resources.

These principles are enshrined, among other instruments, in the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. They are also reflected in the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, which forms part of the international framework for the peaceful and sustainable management of shared water resources.

A project aimed at altering the course of a transboundary river that could seriously affect the water supply, energy, environment and economic life of another territory cannot be regarded as a purely domestic matter. It requires transparency, a comprehensive assessment of cross-border impacts, notification, consultations and cooperation with the affected parties, in accordance with the relevant norms and principles of international law.

The AAC considers the use of water or other vital resources as instruments of political pressure unacceptable. According to the Council, such an approach runs counter to the spirit of regional cooperation, good-neighborly relations and the principles that should guide the European future of the Western Balkans.

The Council called on President Vučić and the institutions of the Republic of Serbia to abandon any unilateral idea or action that could harm the water, energy, economic and environmental security of the Republic of Kosovo and its citizens.

At the same time, the AAC called on the European Union, the United States of America, the OSCE and other international partners to take Vučić’s statement seriously and demand transparency and official clarification from the Belgrade authorities as to whether there is any concrete project to alter the course of the Ibar River.

The Albanian Ambassadors Council stressed that water is a vital resource and should serve to unite, not divide, peoples. According to the Council, long-term peace and stability in the region cannot be built through threats or the use of natural resources as instruments of pressure, but through dialogue, cooperation, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the implementation of international law.

The post AAC Opposes Any Use of the Ibar as a Means of Pressure Against Kosovo appeared first on Albeu.com.