In the first court session held at the Basic Court in Pristina, Fatmir Sheholli, accused of espionage, pleaded not guilty to all charges brought by the Special Prosecution.

His defense lawyer, Mentor Neziri, announced that his client and the legal team have decided to withdraw the request to challenge the indictment, aiming to proceed directly to the judicial review phase. According to Neziri, the decision was made considering the time spent in detention and the volume of evidence to be examined during the process.

Prosecutor Bekim Kodraliu presented the main submissions of the indictment, emphasizing that the defendant is suspected of having acted continuously and with direct intent as a collaborator of Serbia’s Intelligence Service (BIA). According to him, Sheholli followed the instructions of a senior official of this service, Bojan Dimic, who headed the Department against Terrorism and International Organized Crime.

The indictment describes that for a period up to October 9, 2025, Sheholli collected and transmitted through electronic communication channels sensitive information related to political life, the security situation, and the functioning of Kosovo’s state institutions.

A central point of the investigation is an action plan that, according to the prosecution, was prepared by the BIA to damage the country’s interests and to manipulate the local elections of October 12, 2025. The indictment describes that on September 26, 2025, Sheholli traveled accompanied by a relative in a vehicle toward North Mitrovica. There, in a parking lot near the Technical School, close to the “Sindikata” café, he allegedly received from an unidentified individual audio recordings and transcripts of conversations of senior officials in the Ministry for Communities and Return.

The prosecution claims that these materials were intended to discredit those officials and that Sheholli was rewarded with 5,000 euros for this action. Further, following directives, the same materials along with 1,000 euros were delivered to a journalist, whom he instructed on how and when to make them public, just hours before election day.

Continuing with the claims, Kodraliu stressed that these actions have seriously damaged state interests, incited social division, and enabled direct interference by a foreign agency in a Kosovo electoral process. Details of the 80-page dossier include a wide range of evidence, such as phone interceptions extracted from the defendant’s device, video recordings from security cameras, seized documents, numerous testimonies, and a financial report.

In addition to the espionage charge, Sheholli is also charged with the criminal offense of blackmail. According to the claims, he possessed compromising video recordings of a Kosovar businessman and demanded a sum of over 13,000 euros from him in exchange for not publishing them.

The investigative file also mentions documents found on Sheholli’s phone, such as the one coded “Top Secret 2,” which describes a plan to portray Kosovo as a radicalized state, and the “Leptiri” file, an old plan by the Serbian secret service to compromise the current prime minister, Albin Kurti, during the time he was in Serbian prisons.

When asked by the court about guilt, Sheholli responded briefly that he does not feel guilty. Today’s session marked the first procedural step of this judicial process, which is expected to involve numerous witnesses and evidence in the coming stages.

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At the first court hearing, held on September 7, 2026, Fatmir Sheholli denied all the charges brought against him by Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office. He clearly told the panel of judges at the Basic Court in Pristina that he considered himself completely innocent of both the criminal offense of espionage and that of blackmail.

Special Prosecutor Bekim Kodraliu argued in court that the defendant had carried out a genuine plan aimed at harming Kosovo’s state interests and manipulating the electoral process held on October 12, 2025. Acting Minister for Communities and Return Nenad Rashiq was also present at the hearing as the injured party.

According to an 80-page indictment, Sheholli is suspected of having been recruited by Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) and of reporting directly to Bojan Dimiq, who heads the Directorate for Combating Terrorism and International Organized Crime. The prosecution claims that, during an unspecified period up until his arrest on October 9, 2025, he systematically collected and passed on data about the country’s political developments, security situation and institutional functioning.

The indictment details that the Serbian intelligence service had entrusted Sheholli with 5,000 euros and audio materials intended to influence local elections within Kosovo’s Serb community. The materials, which contained intercepted conversations and transcripts of senior officials from the ministry headed by Rashiq, were intended for distribution in the media to discredit Kosovo’s institutions. According to the prosecution, Sheholli handed the recordings to journalist Milaim Zeka, along with 1,000 euros, instructing him on when and how to publish them on the program “Pa Rrotlla,” on the pretext that the documentation had come from the German Development Agency (GIZ).

Another central element of the case file is a photograph found on the defendant’s phone, nicknamed “Top Secret 2.” According to the prosecutor, the document describes a strategy to create the perception of a radicalized and extremist Kosovo by collecting funds from an Islamic embassy in Belgrade to build mosques in prominent locations. The ultimate goal, the indictment states, was to generate insecurity, encourage young people to leave and gradually return the country to Serbian jurisdiction, thereby changing Western allies’ stance toward Kosovo.

A document titled “Leptiri” was also found on Sheholli’s mobile device. The prosecution describes it as a 2001 plan drafted by the structures of Serbia’s State Security Directorate (RDB). The plan envisaged compromising and recruiting the current prime minister, Albin Kurti, during the period when he was serving a sentence in Serbian prisons, using an operational source nicknamed “Leptiri” to obtain compromising material.

In addition to the espionage charge, Sheholli also faces the criminal offense of blackmail. The prosecution claims that he possessed video recordings of a local businessman and used them as leverage to demand a sum exceeding 13,000 euros. Investigators have secured photographs and other material evidence, including intercepts obtained through special investigative measures.

Fatmir Sheholli, who has been held in pretrial detention since October 2025, has a professional background that includes working as a journalist, serving as an adviser to the Municipality of Graçanica and the Ministry of Return, and heading a nongovernmental organization. Today’s hearing marked the first procedural step, as the court is expected to examine the parties’ claims. He is presumed innocent until a final verdict is issued.

The case adds to a series of espionage investigations conducted by Kosovo authorities in recent years. In June last year, Aleksandar Vllajiq was sentenced to five years in prison after pleading guilty as a member of the BIA, while Bedri Shabani and Muharrem Qerimi are standing trial on similar charges. Most recently, in August this year, Fehim Sali was arrested on suspicion of espionage on behalf of Serbia, with the prosecution alleging that he had collected information about individuals linked to the Wahhabi sect.

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The initial hearing against Fatmir Sheholli has begun at the Basic Court in Pristina. He is facing charges of “Espionage” and “Blackmail,” while acting minister Nenad Rashiq is also present in the courtroom as the injured party.

The hearing was scheduled for 9:30 a.m. and represents one of the first steps in the legal process, during which procedural issues and the parties’ positions on the indictment filed by the Special Prosecution of the Republic of Kosovo are expected to be examined.

According to the prosecution’s allegations, Sheholli acted as a person recruited by Serbia’s Security and Intelligence Agency, BIA, carrying out the orders and tasks of Bojan Dimiq, whom the indictment identifies as director of BIA’s Directorate for Combating Terrorism and International Organized Crime. According to the indictment, his activities extended from an unspecified date until October 9, 2025.

The prosecution alleges that during this period Sheholli collected and forwarded data and documents concerning political activities, the security situation and the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions.

The case is also linked to allegations of cooperation with BIA, while the investigative file includes materials and communications that the prosecution considers evidence.

According to the indictment, BIA gave Sheholli 5,000 euros and audio materials, with the aim of influencing local elections among Kosovo’s Serb community.

The prosecution says that, several days before last year’s local elections, he received materials containing audio conversations and transcripts of several senior officials from the Ministry for Communities and Return, an institution headed by Nenad Rashiq.

The alleged plan was to publish these materials in Kosovo’s media in order to damage the reputation of Kosovo’s officials and institutions and influence the electoral process.

The indictment states that Sheholli handed the materials to journalist and analyst Milaim Zeka, along with 1,000 euros, and also instructed him on when and how to publish them on the program “Pa Rrotlla.”

According to the prosecution, Sheholli told Zeka that the materials had been obtained from the German Development Agency, GIZ.

Another important part of the indictment concerns a photograph found on Sheholli’s phone bearing the inscription “Top Secret 2.” The prosecution alleges that it was an action plan aimed at creating the impression that Kosovo is a radicalized and extremist state.

According to the prosecution, the document envisaged collecting funds from Islamic embassies in Belgrade and using them to build mosques in prominent locations. According to the prosecution, the purpose described in the document was to create insecurity and drive some young people away from Kosovo.

The prosecution further alleges that the plan aimed to change Western powers’ stance toward Kosovo and create circumstances for the country to return under Serbia’s jurisdiction.

Among the materials mentioned in the indictment is also a document titled “Leptiri,” found on Sheholli’s phone.

The prosecution alleges that the document was drafted by Serbia’s State Security structure, RDB, in 2001, and described a plan to compromise and recruit acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti during the period when he was serving a sentence in Serbian prisons.

According to the description provided by the prosecution, the plan envisaged engaging an operative source codenamed “Leptiri” to obtain compromising materials about Kurti and exert pressure on him to persuade him to cooperate with RDB.

In addition to espionage, Sheholli is also accused of blackmailing a Kosovar businessman.

The indictment states that he possessed video recordings of the businessman and allegedly, relying on these materials, demanded a sum of money exceeding 13,000 euros.

The prosecution says that in this case it has photographs, recordings and other evidence obtained through special investigative measures, including monitoring and wiretapping.

Fatmir Sheholli was arrested on October 9, 2025 and, according to published reports, has been in pretrial detention since then.

He has worked as a journalist and served as an adviser at the Municipality of Graçanica and at the Ministry for Return. He has also headed a non-governmental organization and has frequently appeared in the media as a political analyst.

All the allegations included in this article are part of the indictment filed by the Special Prosecution. Fatmir Sheholli is presumed innocent until the court reaches a final decision.

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Within a two-year period, Kosovo authorities have arrested several individuals suspected of cooperating with Serbia’s Security and Information Agency (BIA).

Taken together, the investigations reveal a broad range of topics that, according to Special Prosecution data, aroused curiosity: from structures of the Kosovo Police and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (AKI), to political dynamics, electoral processes, members of specific groups and influential figures.

Some of these proceedings are still ongoing in courtrooms, while in other cases convictions have already been handed down.

The facts themselves do not necessarily confirm the existence of a single operation or of a synchronized BIA structure in Kosovo. Nevertheless, they raise the question of what objectives the agency has and how it might use data once it has obtained it.

“The main focus is recruiting people. Whether to extract information or to exert influence through institutions,” says Dushan Janjiq, founder of the Forum for Ethnic Relations in Belgrade, in a conversation with Radio Free Europe.

One of the most recent cases will begin to be examined on September 7 at the Basic Court in Pristina, where defendant Fatmir Sheholli faces charges of espionage and blackmail.

Kosovo’s Special Prosecution asserts that he was engaged by BIA to collect data on the political scene, the security climate and the functioning mechanisms of the Kosovo state.

According to the indictment file, Sheholli is suspected of having participated in a scheme to compromise local officials and to manipulate the 2025 local elections.

On his mobile device, the Prosecution claims, a photograph was found of material classified as “Top secret 2,” the text of which talks about a plan aiming to instrumentalize the Islamic faith in order to divide Albanians and to change Kosovo’s image in the eyes of the West.

The origin and authenticity of this document remain unclear to the public, while the Islamic Community of Kosovo has rejected its claims and insisted on a full investigation.

The spread of the content sparked uproar and fierce clashes on social platforms, including speculation about relations between Serbian intelligence and Muslim believers in Kosovo.

However, the indictments do not shed light on what later happens to information that, according to Prosecution claims, is collected and passed to the Serbian secret service.

Intelligence specialists stress that data collection is simply one link in a service’s activity. Equally crucial are the quality of the source, the level of access it has, and the way in which information and the network built may later be exploited.

Daniel Lomas, lecturer in intelligence and security at the University of Nottingham in England, explains that the cycle usually begins with the collection phase. “In the first step you aim to obtain information from sources, that is, about a state’s politics, economic situation, hierarchies, corridor rumors, weaving networks of people throughout society,” he tells Radio Free Europe.

According to him, networks can later take on an additional role: to be used as tools to exert political pressure.

What does BIA represent?

The Security and Information Agency constitutes Serbia’s national civilian intelligence service and operates as a separate entity within the Serbian government. Established by law in 2002, it was separated from the Ministry of Interior as a result of the split of the civilian service from the police service.

According to Serbian legislation, its mandate covers protecting Serbia’s security, identifying and preventing activities aimed at undermining the constitutional order, as well as seeking, collecting, analyzing and assessing intelligence information significant for national security. The legal framework also gives BIA the right to interact with counterpart agencies of other states and international organizations, in line with government guidelines and Serbian security policy.

Radio Free Europe has requested a response from BIA regarding these issues and the claims about its operations in Kosovo, but has so far received no reply.

Type of information targeted

The indictments filed offer some indications about the category of data believed to have been targeted. Bedri Shabani and Muharrem Qerimi are accused of obtaining and passing on information related to the KLA, Kosovo police forces and AKI. According to prosecutors, Shabani had also gathered material on the Reçak events, while Qerimi had collected data on witnesses of the Special Court. Both have pleaded not guilty and proceedings against them continue.

In another case, Fehim Sali is suspected of having gathered and forwarded files and notices about certain persons in Kosovo during 2024 and 2025, including individuals whom authorities describe as linked to Wahhabi currents. Among those already sentenced for espionage are Aleksandar Vllajiq and Jellena Gjukanoviq.

Janjiq stresses that an intelligence agency’s interest does not stop only at documents or concrete figures. Equally important are the individuals who have access to them. According to him, BIA is interested both in sources that supply data and in people who have influence. “It is known that Albanians are the dominant population in Kosovo and it is known who carries weight in the economy,” he notes, adding that the goal is to secure “quality information sources.”

However, the usefulness of a source within an institution is not simply linked to what it can get from there. Lomas uses the police as an example. “A police officer can do more than an ordinary citizen. He has supervisory powers and can have access to certain categories of data,” he explains. Such a person can also help identify other people who may be recruitment targets or create ground for other operations.

Destination of information

When asked what concretely happens with information that reaches BIA, Janjiq is measured. “To be honest, I can only imagine,” he says. In principle, he explains, data pass to analytical sectors, where they are “systematized, categorized” and then used according to an assessment, mainly political. He mentions blackmail and influence as some of the possible uses.

Lomas sees the process through the prism of the general functioning of intelligence services. Data on politics, institutions and individuals, he says, can reveal to a foreign service weaknesses or divisions within a government, party or society. “Intelligence enables you to create rifts within governments, political parties and broader society, because it gives you clear knowledge of how to exploit a particular society,” he emphasizes.

The next step, he continues, may be what in intelligence language is known as “covert action”: you are no longer satisfied with gathering information, but take concrete actions based on what you have learned. This does not mean that the cases uncovered in Kosovo prove such a coordinated BIA strategy. Court proceedings concern individual responsibility, and some of the Prosecution’s claims have not yet been proven by final rulings.

Radio Free Europe contacted the Special Prosecution to find out the number of persons under investigation, the number of indictments or proceedings for espionage in favor of Serbia, possible shared connections and tactics among the cases, as well as suspicions of involvement within public bodies, but without success. The Kosovo Intelligence Agency also remained silent. Radio Free Europe asked it for an assessment of the extent of BIA’s activity and the threat it poses to the country’s institutions.

Can espionage destabilize a state?

Lomas warns against the idea that espionage, on its own, can bring down a state. “I think espionage only takes you so far,” he stresses. Foreign services, according to him, do not need to invent divisions or grievances within a society; they can simply detect them and use them for their own purposes.

To illustrate this mechanism, Lomas takes as an example Russia and the debates over migration in Germany. He notes that the real concerns of part of German society on this topic were not produced by Russia, but external Russian actors amplified these tensions, including through social media. He compares this to a fire: grievances exist, and external intervention acts as “fuel,” giving it bigger and more dangerous flames.

Lomas does not claim that the cases in Kosovo reflect the same pattern, but in the Western Balkans context, he sees this also in light of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the broader confrontation with the West. According to him, Russia may have an interest in spaces where existing tensions can be kept burning and where NATO’s attention can be diverted by another crisis.

In Kosovo, the controversy triggered by the “Top secret 2” document, whose origin and authenticity remain unclear, showed how quickly a sensitive issue can bring polarization. For Janjiq, information leaks, infiltration into institutions and attempts to exert influence are closely linked phenomena. He links intelligence activity with Serbia’s policy of not recognizing Kosovo and with an interest in data that can be used to discredit it. “When you do not recognize Kosovo, then you have to collect as much negative material as possible about the situation there,” Janjiq says.

Defense avenues for Kosovo

For Lomas, defense is not limited only to detecting and arresting suspects. Another powerful tool is the public exposure of the methods of foreign intelligence services. He refers to the experience of Western European countries, where making espionage cases public has served to increase the vigilance of citizens and institutions toward recruitment techniques and related risks.

“The very fact that you have carried out these arrests and that they have been made public is a way to make clear to people that these foreign intelligence services are a real threat. They are not going to disappear,” Lomas stresses. Equally essential, according to him, is counterintelligence: identifying the most vulnerable people and institutions, detecting recruitment attempts and exchanging information with international allies.

Janjiq also emphasizes strengthening intelligence and security capacities in Kosovo, but adds that the responsibility does not belong only to official Pristina. According to him, NATO, the US and European partners have a role in raising security standards, strengthening Kosovo’s institutions and creating better mechanisms for cooperation and information sharing.

However, the cases brought to light so far do not offer a complete picture of the real scale of BIA’s activity in Kosovo. It is not publicly known how many people may have been recruited, how long links with the Serbian secret service may have continued, or the amount of information that may have ended up in its hands. For some defendants, even the Prosecution’s own claims still await proof in court.

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The initial hearing against Fatmir Sheholli will be held today at the Basic Court in Prishtina, starting at 09:30. The Special Prosecution of the Republic of Kosovo accuses him of the criminal offenses “Espionage” and “Blackmail.”

According to the indictment, the case relates to suspicions of Sheholli’s involvement in attempts to influence electoral processes in Kosovo, cooperation with a foreign intelligence service, and pressure against a businessman.

The prosecution claims that Serbia’s Security and Intelligence Agency – BIA, had given Sheholli 5,000 euros and audio materials, with the aim of influencing local elections within the Serb community in Kosovo.

The indictment states that, a few days before last year’s local elections, he had received materials containing audio conversations and transcripts of senior officials from the Ministry for Communities and Return, which was headed by Nenad Rashiq.

According to the prosecution, these materials were intended to be published in Kosovar media to damage the image of Kosovo’s officials and institutions, as well as to influence the outcome of the electoral process.

The charging document claims that Sheholli handed the materials to journalist and analyst Milaim Zeka, along with 1,000 euros, also telling him the manner and timing for their publication on the show “Pa Rrotlla.”

The prosecution says Sheholli had declared to Zeka that the materials were secured from the German Development Agency – GIZ.

The “Top Secret 2” document and claims of Islamic radicalization

Among the materials found on Sheholli’s phone, according to the indictment, was a photograph titled “Top Secret 2.”

The prosecution describes it as an action plan aimed at creating the impression that Kosovo is a radicalized and extremist state.

According to the claims included in the indictment, the plan foresaw securing funds from Islamic embassies in Belgrade and using them to build mosques in prominent locations. The stated goal, according to the prosecution, was to create a climate of insecurity and drive away a portion of young people from Kosovo.

It is also claimed that this strategy aimed to change the stance of Western powers towards Kosovo and create circumstances for the country’s return under Serbia’s jurisdiction.

The “Butterfly” document and the mention of Albin Kurti

Another document found on Sheholli’s phone, according to the indictment, bears the title “Leptiri” (Butterfly).

The prosecution claims the document was prepared by Serbia’s State Security structure – RDB, in 2001, and described a plan for compromising and recruiting the acting prime minister, Albin Kurti, during the period he was serving a sentence in Serbian prisons.

According to the description provided by the prosecution, the plan foresaw the use of an operational source codenamed “Butterfly” to secure compromising materials against Kurti and to exert pressure on him, with the aim of cooperation with the RDB.

Suspicions of blackmail against a businessman

In addition to the espionage charge, Sheholli also faces a charge of blackmail.

The indictment says he was in possession of video recordings of a Kosovar businessman and is suspected of having demanded a sum of over 13,000 euros from him, based on these materials.

The prosecution declares it has secured photographs, recordings, and other evidence through special investigative measures, including monitoring and interception.

Fatmir Sheholli was arrested on October 9, 2025, and according to published reports, has been in detention since then.

He has been a journalist, an advisor in the Municipality of Graçanica and at the Ministry for Return. Sheholli has also led a non-governmental organization and has frequently appeared in the media as a political analyst.

Today’s session marks one of the first stages of the judicial procedure. During it, the court is expected to address procedural matters and the parties’ positions on the indictment.

The claims described in this text are based on the indictment of the Special Prosecution. Fatmir Sheholli is presumed innocent until a final court decision.

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Avni Islami, a professor of security sciences, has warned of threats related to espionage and national security, calling on Kosovo’s institutions not to tolerate any element that harms the state’s interests.

In a post, Islami referred to the case of Vladan Kostiq, whom he said publicly displays admiration for war criminals. He also raised the alarm over what he described as efforts to turn the OSCE into “a nest of Russian and Serbian agents.”

In his assessment, there are attempts to use international missions as a shield for carrying out destabilizing agendas.

Islami praised the engagement of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, the Kosovo Police and the Special Prosecution in confronting espionage.

“The past two years have demonstrated that the joint success of the KIA, the Police and the Special Prosecution is not accidental, but the result of an ironclad strategy to purge the country of subversive elements,” he wrote.

According to the professor of security sciences, Kosovo’s territory must not be used as a refuge by hostile espionage networks or by individuals who, as he puts it, work against the interests of the state.

Declaring that “the era of impunity is over,” Islami called for every informant, agent or collaborator of foreign secret services to be identified and brought to justice.

“Every informant, agent or collaborator of theirs will be exposed, arrested and receive the punishment they deserve,” Islami wrote.

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The Special Prosecution Office of Kosovo has indicted Fatmir Sheholli, accusing him of suspected cooperation with Serbia’s Security and Information Agency (BIA), as well as blackmailing an individual for an amount exceeding 13,000 euros.

Sheholli is facing charges of “espionage” and “blackmail.”

The case has reopened a sensitive debate over Kosovo’s national security: whether espionage networks disappeared after the end of the war, or whether, 26 years later, they have adapted their methods, forms and objectives.

Speaking to “Bota sot,” retired General Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj analyzed the issue. According to him, the end of the war did not also bring an end to the activities of espionage networks.

Racaj says the main change concerns the way they operate and the instruments used to collect information and exert influence.

“Espionage networks have not disappeared 26 years after the war, but have taken other forms. The Sheholli case has brought back into focus the question of whether these networks ended with the war, or whether their methods, forms and objectives changed over these 26 years. It should also be examined whether Kosovo’s institutions, the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, the Kosovo Police and other structures have been strengthened to detect and combat secret services operating against Kosovo and within it,” Racaj said.

The retired general believes that Kosovo’s security should not be analyzed solely through the lens of one particular state or service. According to him, the presence of numerous international actors in the country also brings different intelligence interests, some of which may conflict with Kosovo’s interests.

“A limited perspective, which links intelligence activities to only one state or service, should not be used. The many embassies and diplomatic missions also imply the presence of different intelligence interests. Alongside the services of friendly countries that cooperate with Kosovo’s institutions on security, there may also be foreign actors whose interests conflict with those of the state of Kosovo.

Contemporary espionage should be understood as part of a broader geopolitical competition, in which information has become a fundamental instrument of power. In addition to the traditional recruitment of people, social networks, disinformation, influence over public opinion, economic pressure, political influence, cyber operations and institutional weaknesses are now being used,” Racaj said.

He emphasizes that today’s threats to national security are not linked solely to classic espionage. Information and influence, he says, have become important tools in the confrontation between various powers and geopolitical actors.

“Information warfare and influence operations can be just as dangerous as traditional threats. If classified information falls into the wrong hands, an operation, an institution or even the strategic interests of the state may be harmed,” he stresses.

Referring directly to the case of Fatmir Sheholli, Racaj called on Kosovo’s institutions to address it with seriousness, professionalism and care, distinguishing suspicions from facts proven during legal proceedings.

“The Sheholli case should be handled with institutional responsibility, professionalism and restraint. It is not in Kosovo’s interest to create panic or rely on unconfirmed allegations. However, any suspicion of unlawful intelligence activity must be investigated by the competent authorities and, if proven, dealt with according to the law.

The Kosovo Intelligence Agency has a particular responsibility in this regard. Detecting and preventing activities that threaten national security is one of its main challenges. When security institutions identify and neutralize such networks or activities, this should not be seen only as a problem, but also as an indication that counterintelligence mechanisms are functioning and that Kosovo is building more sustainable capacities to protect its interests,” Racaj said.

According to him, confronting espionage cannot rely solely on a response after a case has been uncovered. Institutions must work continuously on prevention, capacity building and the protection of security structures.

“Counterintelligence requires prevention, professionalism, control of classified information, protection of strategic institutions, awareness among officials and continuous cooperation with international partners.

The 1999 war has ended, but the clash of interests surrounding Kosovo continues. Today it appears in more sophisticated forms, through information, intelligence, cyberspace, diplomacy and political influence,” the retired general said.

Racaj considers Kosovo’s institutions’ ability to detect and prevent intelligence threats an important indicator of the state’s strength and maturity.

“The main question should not only be ‘Who is spying on Kosovo?’ but also ‘How capable are Kosovo’s institutions of detecting, preventing and neutralizing any activity that threatens national security?’

The answer to this question is one of the most important measures of the maturity of the state of Kosovo. In the 21st century, protecting the state is not carried out only at the borders and through military means; it also requires protecting information, institutions and citizens’ awareness,” Prof. Dr. Muhamet Racaj concluded in an interview with “Bota sot.”

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Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office filed an indictment against Fatmir Sheholli on August 25, 2026, accusing him of the criminal offenses of espionage and blackmail.

According to the prosecution’s allegations, Sheholli was recruited by the Serbian Intelligence Agency (BIA) and, until October 9, 2025, operated under the direction of BIA official Bojan Dimiç. He has remained in detention since October 2025 on suspicion of espionage.

The prosecution alleges that he collected and transmitted data and documents concerning political developments, the security situation and the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions.

The indictment also includes the offense of blackmail, alleging that Sheholli demanded money from an individual while threatening to publish videos and information damaging to that person’s reputation. The alleged financial damage exceeds 13,000 euros. The case has now been referred to the Basic Court in Pristina for review.

Arben Fetoshi, director of the “Octopus” Institute, says that espionage cases demonstrate that the activities of Serbian networks against Kosovo have become more sophisticated, while at the same time Kosovo has strengthened its capacity to detect and dismantle them through inter-institutional cooperation.

According to him, the Sheholli case and others show that these networks did not end with the war, but have become more complex within the context of Serbia’s hybrid strategy, and that Kosovo has developed the capacity to neutralize them. He notes that espionage networks serve as instruments for influence operations, manipulation, blackmail and religious radicalization, and that dismantling them highlights the importance of cooperation among the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, the Police and the Special Prosecution Office.

Fetoshi emphasizes that the indictment against Sheholli reveals the BIA’s “modus operandi,” which aims to collect or disseminate information for influence, delegitimize the Kosovo Liberation Army and NATO, and, above all, invest in religious radicalization in order to turn Kosovo into “Kandahar.” Within the framework of Serbia’s hegemonic goals, these are considered hybrid threats aimed at destabilizing and sabotaging the Republic of Kosovo; therefore, counterintelligence capabilities are vital to national security.

Meanwhile, security expert Valdet Hoxha explains that state espionage networks are complex and operate through a structured cycle: recruitment, the collection of information, its transmission and its use for subversion or destabilization.

He emphasizes that, in the case of Serbian services operating against Kosovo, the espionage network appears to function by exploiting financial needs, family pressure, compromising information, or ideological and ethnic beliefs, often through NGOs or individuals with access to institutions who are funded through shell companies or unofficial transfers.

Hoxha adds that, regardless of the methods used, the goal of Serbian intelligence services remains the same: spreading fake news, inflaming interethnic tensions and creating narratives designed to sow fear and panic among citizens, with the ultimate aim of damaging Kosovo’s image on the international stage.

Nevertheless, he assesses that Kosovo’s security structures, including the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, the Police and the Special Prosecution Office, have established strong operational capabilities and cooperate closely with international partners, including KFOR and allied services, to identify, pursue and neutralize these espionage networks through counterintelligence measures.

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Vetëvendosje MP Ilir Kërçeli has reacted to the Special Prosecution’s indictment against Fatmir Sheholli, who is suspected of “espionage” and “blackmail.”

He raised questions about the possibility that Sheholli did not act alone, calling for the identities of other people who may have been part of the scheme to be revealed.

“How many others collaborated with Sheholli, and how many of them relayed narratives delegated by the ‘Sheholli-Dimiq’ source?” Kërçeli wrote.

Following the publication of the indictment, allegations became public about a scheme linked to Serbia’s BIA intelligence agency, which is suspected of having sought to influence political developments and damage political figures in Kosovo. According to the indictment, Sheholli allegedly acted under the instructions of a BIA official.

Kërçeli said it was known that Sheholli had been a collaborator of the Serbian state security service. According to him, many public figures had met with him, had photographs with him, and he had been present in various settings.

He also mentioned individuals who, even during the war, had facilitated meetings specifically with the head of the Serbian state security service.

According to Kërçeli, the main issue is to uncover how many other people collaborated with Sheholli and how many of them relayed narratives delegated by the “Sheholli-Dimiq” source.

“How did this cooperation operate?”

The questions requiring answers concern where this information was published, who financed it, and which individuals may have been paid besides Sheholli. Kërçeli is also calling for clarification as to whether others were involved.

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The Special Prosecution Office of Kosovo has recently filed an indictment against Fatmir Sheholli on two criminal charges, “espionage” and “blackmail”. According to the indictment, he is suspected of having collaborated with Serbia’s Security and Information Agency (BIA), while in another case he is alleged to have blackmailed a person for more than 13,000 euros.

Commenting on this development, commentator Xhevat Mustafa expressed concern that foreign intelligence services may have recruited Albanians. In his reaction, he also recalled a statement attributed to Hitler about spies in Albania, saying that, regardless of whether the statement is authentic, history has recorded interventions and recruitments of this kind.

Mustafa said that the authenticity of the statement attributed to Hitler during World War II cannot be asserted with complete certainty. According to the statement, while spies in other countries had to be bought at a high price, in Albania they offered themselves and did so without payment. Nevertheless, he said, the events that took place for decades before and after that statement, whether fabricated or genuine, show that its content is not entirely unfounded or a product of fantasy. He added that Hitler, as has been said and written, at least through his words and the majority of his actions, was not shown to be malicious, hysterically contemptuous or racist toward the Albanian nation.

According to the commentator, the recruitment of spies, whether paid or unpaid, in the “ALBANIAN WORLD” is not a random phenomenon, an isolated tradition or a story belonging only to the distant past.

He said that during the more than 114 years of the existence of the Albanian state, particularly over the last 35 years and especially in the more recent years, this phenomenon has developed rapidly, on a scale comparable to corruption, the spread of cannabis, tower-building, political and ordinary prostitution.

In this context, Mustafa mentioned OZN-UDB-BIA and other agencies of the Serbian Secret Service, as well as the Greek intelligence service EYP. According to him, these structures feel and operate as if they were at home in Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, because quite a few Albanian politicians, people in power, officials and ordinary citizens are easily sold and bought at low prices.

As the most recent cases in Kosovo, he listed Fehim Salin and Fatmir Sheholli. Regarding Salin, Mustafa mentioned his acquaintances and photographs with Ivica Dačić, Vjosa Osmani and Albin Kurti.

At the conclusion of his reaction, the commentator called for increased vigilance regarding the possible activities of foreign intelligence services in Albanian-speaking areas. He warned that institutions must exercise greater caution in the face of any attempt at espionage or influence from abroad.

Referring to Albania, Mustafa said that perhaps SHISH, headed by Vjosa Hyseni, during these weeks of intense heat and summer holidays, has still not caught a “big espionage fish” on a hook or in a net. He expressed hope that the day will not be far off when spies from neighboring or more distant countries will be shown that in Albania they will fall into traps not like rabbits, but like “mice”.

Mustafa also recalled a figurative expression and “alarm bell” from Hajro Limaj, his friend and fellow publicist, who is also the author of several academic books. According to him, the statement has been repeated by both of them in several published articles and warns that “Serbian, Greek, Russian… spies dance around the monument to Skanderbeg on horseback!”.

He explained that this means their presence in Tirana and Krujë as well, in Pristina and other places, from Ksamil to Mitrovica.

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