He said that the final OSCE/ODIHR reports on Albania have repeatedly highlighted concerns related to vote-buying, pressure on voters and public employees, the use of administrative resources, campaign financing, as well as the need for an effective response from law enforcement institutions.

In this regard, the SPAK chief said that electoral crime appears with greater intensity during election years, but its investigation is not limited only to the campaign period or voting day.

He further added that the 2025 strategy should not be seen as an instrument that definitively solves the phenomenon of electoral crime, but as a step toward a more structured, more preventive, and more risk-analysis-oriented model.

Braho stated that electoral corruption should not be seen as an isolated and individual act, since in many cases, someone does not buy a vote for a narrow personal interest.

According to him, the benefit is intended for a political subject, a candidate, an interest group, or a structure seeking to influence the political outcome.

Full speech:

Thank you for the invitation and for the opportunity for SPAK to present its institutional position within the framework of the work of the Electoral Reform Commission. For SPAK, protecting the integrity of elections is not a matter of political debate, but an issue of the rule of law, public trust, and the ability of institutions to respond to every form of electoral crime.

In this hearing session, SPAK’s contribution will focus on issues related to criminal law, the jurisdiction of the Special Prosecution, the investigation of criminal offenses that affect the electoral process, and the problems identified in practice.

From the outset, I want to stress that SPAK does not come to this session to assess the political race, electoral subjects, or to make evaluations about the election result. This is neither our role nor our constitutional mandate. Our role is related to the enforcement of criminal law, the exercise of criminal prosecution within the jurisdiction defined by law, and the identification of issues that require procedural and interinstitutional attention for the purpose of preventing and effectively investigating electoral crime.

Consequently, our position today aims to make a meaningful contribution to the Commission’s work by sharing with you the data administered by SPAK for the 2021-2026 period, the preventive and investigative experience of the 2025 parliamentary elections, the implementation of the Strategy for the Investigation and Prevention of Electoral Crime, as well as the issues that can be addressed through legal and institutional improvements.

Honorable deputies,

Before turning to the specific data, I consider it necessary to clarify the limits of SPAK’s subject-matter jurisdiction with regard to electoral crimes.

The Criminal Code, in Chapter X, provides for criminal offenses affecting free elections and the democratic electoral system. This chapter contains 15 criminal offenses. Pursuant to Article 75/a, first paragraph, letter “a”, of the Criminal Procedure Code, SPAK has subject-matter jurisdiction only for the exercise of criminal prosecution for the criminal offenses of active corruption in elections and passive corruption in elections, provided for under Articles 328 and 328/b of the Criminal Code.

Meanwhile, the other criminal offenses related to electoral crime, in principle, fall under the jurisdiction of the general prosecution offices. Exceptions are cases where the criminal act is connected to special subjects or where the offense has been committed by organized crime.

Likewise, the misunderstanding should be avoided that every public allegation, every political statement, or every piece of information conveyed during the electoral period can automatically be translated into criminal proceedings by SPAK or into a criminal charge. Not every electoral violation falls under our jurisdiction and not every irregularity during the electoral process constitutes a criminal offense.

However, we are aware that public expectations of SPAK in this field are often broader than the institution’s legal jurisdiction. This is also linked to the high level of citizens’ trust in SPAK’s work and integrity. It is precisely for this reason that every piece of information administered has been assessed seriously, but always within the limits of jurisdiction, the evidentiary standard, and the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Code.

From the assessment of the three electoral cycles held during the period of SPAK’s operation, namely the 2021 parliamentary elections, the 2023 local elections, and the 2025 parliamentary elections, a clear picture emerges of the recurring problems in this area.

The final OSCE/ODIHR reports on Albania have repeatedly highlighted concerns related to vote-buying, pressure on voters and public employees, the use of administrative resources, campaign financing, as well as the need for an effective response from law enforcement institutions.

These findings must be read with seriousness and professional care. They are not, in themselves, criminal findings of guilt against specific individuals. But they are important risk indicators that help institutions understand where prevention, monitoring, verification, and criminal investigation should be focused.

For the period from 2021 to 2025, SPAK handled a total of 233 electoral materials. Of these, 157 were registered as criminal proceedings. These data show that, despite the limits of SPAK’s direct jurisdiction, the volume of materials administered in this area has been considerable.

In 2021, 63 criminal proceedings were registered; in 2022, 5 criminal proceedings were registered; in 2023, 36 criminal proceedings were registered; in 2024, 7 criminal proceedings were registered; while in 2025, 46 criminal proceedings were registered. For 2026, as of today, 2 criminal proceedings have been registered.

These figures show two important elements.

First, electoral crime appears with greater intensity during election years, but its investigation is not limited only to the campaign period or voting day.

Second, a considerable part of SPAK’s work is related to the initial assessment of jurisdiction, distinguishing between an administrative violation and a criminal act, verifying the source of information, and identifying cases where concrete elements exist for registering criminal proceedings.

From this perspective, the experience of the years 2021 to 2024 served as the basis for a more structured approach in the 2025 parliamentary elections. Precisely for this reason, in line with Parliament’s recommendations and the repeated OSCE/ODIHR findings, SPAK approved and implemented the Strategy for the Investigation and Prevention of Electoral Crime for the 2025 Parliamentary Elections, with the aim that the institutional response would not come only after a report had been filed, but earlier, more coordinated, and more risk-oriented.

Honorable deputies,

The 2025 strategy should not be seen as an instrument that definitively solves the phenomenon of electoral crime. The strategy was a first step in moving SPAK from a mainly reactive model, based on reports and notifications from other entities, toward a more structured, more preventive, and more risk-analysis-oriented model.

The 2025 data show that this approach produced a high volume of work and a broad information base. For the parliamentary elections of May 11, 2025, 194 materials, alerts, complaints, referrals, and pieces of information linked to suspicions of electoral crimes were administered.

The origin of these materials shows an important change. In 2025, of the 46 criminal proceedings registered, 47.8 percent were initiated on the basis of referrals from the State Police and 23.9 percent were initiated ex officio by SPAK, while 28.3 percent came from complaints by citizens, the general jurisdiction prosecution offices, political subjects, and the Internal Control Service of Prisons.

The main difference in 2025 was that the institution did not merely wait for complaints to arrive. It sought to read the risk earlier, coordinate information more quickly, and direct the response according to jurisdiction and evidence. The fact that 23.9 percent of the proceedings were initiated ex officio by SPAK is an important indicator.

Of the total proceedings registered in 2025, 5 proceedings involving 9 defendants were sent to court with a request for trial, 9 were sent with a request for dismissal, 5 were sent to the general jurisdiction prosecution offices for competence, 1 was suspended, 4 were merged with other proceedings, and 22 remain under investigation to date.

During 2026, 7 people were convicted for criminal offenses affecting elections, showing that the judicial handling of these cases continues even after the end of the electoral cycle.

Another element that deserves attention within the framework of the reform is criminal policy for these offenses. From the analysis of persons convicted of electoral criminal offenses, excluding cases where later appellate decisions led to acquittals, it emerges that the main type of punishment imposed by the courts is imprisonment. In the group of cases analyzed, the average prison sentence is around 13 months, and a considerable portion benefited from alternatives to imprisonment. This shows that the deterrent effect of the criminal sanction may not always be in line with the weight of the phenomenon and the impact these offenses have on the integrity of the electoral process.

For this reason, one of the issues that can be assessed within the framework of the reform is the review of criminal policy, both in relation to the level of punishment and in relation to the profile and role of the perpetrator in the electoral corruption scheme. This review should be neither general nor mechanical. It should differentiate between the voter, the representatives of political subjects, the candidate, the high-ranking official, and the public employee.

Honorable deputies,

In implementation of Parliament’s recommendations, SPAK, the General Prosecution Office, and the Central Election Commission are in the process of finalizing the joint analysis on the investigation and prevention of electoral crime for the 2025 parliamentary elections.

The interinstitutional working group is in the final stage of this process and the analysis will be officially submitted to Parliament. For this reason, today I will not dwell exhaustively on every conclusion of the report, but I will share some key findings that emerge from the joint discussions, from the data administered, and from SPAK’s institutional experience during this process, which I believe are important for the work of this commission.

Cooperation between SPAK, the General Prosecution Office, and the Central Election Commission proved to be one of the most important elements of the 2025 approach. The cooperation protocol, the designation of contact points, and the exchange of information in real time created a more functional mechanism for directing cases according to jurisdiction, avoiding overlaps, and responding more quickly to indications related to electoral crime.

The presence of SPAK’s nationwide task force, coordinated with the temporary special sections set up in each general jurisdiction prosecution office by the Prosecutor General, proved practically valuable. This organization made it possible for the institutional response not to be only central, but also territorial, closer to the source of information and closer to the real dynamics of the electoral process. The integration of this approach with denunciation and monitoring mechanisms within the CEC created a better basis for early risk identification.

The experience of 2025 showed that the early and visible presence of institutions has a preventive effect. The very fact that SPAK, the General Prosecution Office, the CEC, and law enforcement structures were more coordinated, more present on the ground, and more active in public communication created a higher level of attention to criminal liability for conduct affecting the integrity of elections. This preventive effect is important and must be preserved, but it cannot rely only on presence on voting day. For this reason, the cooperation mechanism should be activated earlier, at least four months before the election date, and continue until after the completion of vote counting.

The analysis shows that electoral corruption should not be seen as an isolated and individual act. In many cases, someone does not buy a vote for a narrow personal interest. The benefit is intended for a political subject, a candidate, an interest group, or a structure seeking to influence the political result. Therefore, the investigation cannot be limited only to the giver or the recipient of the benefit. It must expand toward the source of financing, the organizers, the intermediaries, the people who coordinate the scheme, and its real beneficiaries.

This is why, for the next elections, the focus should be clearer on the financial trail. Vote-buying, administrative favors, cash payments, logistical support, services, or other benefits should not be seen separately from one another. They should be analyzed as parts of a chain linking the source of the money, the method of distribution, the intermediaries, the area where influence is exercised, and the political or electoral beneficiary of the scheme.

In this sense, the main finding is that the 2025 model worked, but it must be further consolidated by orienting it toward financial tracing and identifying the real beneficiaries of electoral corruption.

Honorable deputies,

From the experience of 2025, SPAK believes that electoral reform should produce three concrete results.

First, consideration may be given to drafting a National Strategy for the Prevention, Identification, and Investigation of Electoral Crime. Experience shows that electoral crime is not only an issue for one institution and is not dealt with solely through a criminal response after a complaint is filed. It requires an integrated approach in which prevention, administrative monitoring, citizen reporting, police verification, criminal investigation, and financial control function as parts of the same institutional mechanism.

Second, the interinstitutional cooperation protocol should move from being a temporary instrument for one electoral cycle to a stable and permanent mechanism regulated by law. This mechanism should include not only SPAK, the General Prosecution Office, and the CEC, but also the State Police, the Financial Intelligence Agency, and other law enforcement institutions that have a role in verifying indications, tracing financial sources, and documenting cases. Likewise, interinstitutional cooperation should be activated earlier and last longer.

Third, consideration may be given to reviewing criminal policy for the most serious forms of electoral crime. This should not be understood as a mechanical increase in punishments for every case, but as a need to assess whether the current sentencing ranges are appropriate for cases where the offense is committed in cooperation or more than once.

Likewise, the individualization of punishment should differentiate between the vulnerable voter, the representative of political subjects, the candidate and his electoral staff, the campaign financier, the high-ranking official, and the public employee. The higher the person’s organizational, political, administrative, or financial role, the clearer the criminal response should be.

Honorable deputies,

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that the experience of 2025 was not a theoretical model, nor a formal institutional exercise. It arose from the real need to respond more quickly, more clearly, and with greater responsibility to a phenomenon that directly undermines citizens’ trust in elections.

This proactive model showed that when institutions act earlier, share information in real time, and are present on the ground, the response is more effective and the preventive effect is more visible. For this reason, what was built in 2025 as a practical response to the needs of the electoral process should serve as the basis for a more sustainable national policy against electoral crime.

For SPAK, the ongoing focus remains clear: evidence-based investigation, not perceptions. A swift response, but always within procedural standards.

SPAK will seek to have a more proactive approach in investigating electoral crimes, more in-depth investigations, and criminal prosecution in a systematic manner, not limiting itself only to the electoral period, while also being guided by risk analysis regarding the presence of this phenomenon in parts of the territory.

Above all, the investigation of electoral crime must follow the money trail.

When the source of financing, the method of distribution, and the real benefit are traced, then not only the giver and the recipient of the benefit are identified, but also the intermediaries, the organizers, and those who benefit from distorting the will of the voter.

If the reform manages to link criminal investigation with financial control, institutional cooperation, and early response, then the fight against electoral crime will no longer be only a reaction after the fact, but a real protection mechanism for the vote.

SPAK remains ready to contribute data, analysis, and institutional expertise to the work of the Commission, in support of a stronger legal and institutional framework for protecting free elections and the integrity of the vote.

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