Deputy Commander of the NATO-led KFOR mission, Brigadier General Federico Collina, and the Chief of Staff of the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU), Lieutenant Colonel Massimo Ienco, held a meeting today with the mayor of South Mitrovica, Faton Peci.

According to a KFOR statement, the discussion included an exchange of views on strengthening cooperation.

KFOR said that Brigadier General Collina presented information about the mission’s activities and reiterated its continued commitment to helping maintain a safe environment for all residents of Kosovo.

On the same day, Collina also met with the mayor of North Mitrovica, Milan Radojevic.

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France’s ambassador to Kosovo, Olivier Guerot, said that any decision to allow vehicles to travel across the Ibër Bridge should be made only after discussions with all relevant stakeholders.

According to him, the bridge is currently open to pedestrians and is regularly used by citizens. Guerot recalled that he has crossed it often, and that during the festival in Mitrovica last year he saw families crossing the bridge with baby strollers. He emphasized that the situation is no longer what it was in the past, as the bridge is functional for pedestrians.

The outgoing French ambassador stressed that the issue of opening the bridge to vehicles should be considered with local residents, elected officials, the police and KFOR, which, he said, will continue to have a general role in Kosovo. Guerot said that the way a decision is reached may be more important than the decision itself, and that this process should be conducted in consultation with all stakeholders.

Guerot described the security situation as calmer, but still fragile. He praised KFOR’s contribution over the past 26 years to creating a safe environment for all citizens of Kosovo.

The ambassador explained that recent assessments could lead to a reduction or further optimization of the scale of KFOR’s presence, but that this does not mean its withdrawal. According to Guerot, KFOR will remain a key element for Kosovo and the security of its citizens, while a calmer, albeit fragile, situation represents a positive sign.

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The gradual transition from KFOR’s permanent presence on the Iber Bridge in Mitrovica has caused concern for Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić.

During an interview given on Friday to a Serbian media outlet, Vučić spoke about the bridge over the Iber River and revealed that regarding its opening, he had written to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.

“I believe Rutte wants to guarantee security for all people in the Balkans and, accordingly, I myself requested respect for the rights of Serbs and implementation of the Brussels agreements. Had the Association of Serb-majority municipalities been established, none of this would have happened. The Iber Bridge was part of the dialogue, and now they want to remove it because it bothers them that a Serb does not want to recognize the so-called Kosovo. It is unbelievable that someone would think that sovereign Serbia would give up a part of its territory; it was important that I also use my personal integrity to warn Rutte about what is happening,” Vučić declared.

The Serbian president described Rutte as an intelligent person, who, according to him, has more information than anyone else.

“He is smart enough that when everyone pushes him into conflict with Trump, he won’t enter into conflict. I believe he will act rationally now as well,” Vučić said.

Professor Sadri Ramabaja assesses that the statement of the Serbian president clearly reflects the political and spiritual state of Belgrade in the face of recent developments in northern Kosovo.

According to Ramabaja, Vučić’s reaction shows that the Iber Bridge has not been considered by Belgrade merely as an infrastructural work or an ordinary security issue. He sees it as a political element for preserving the status quo and as one of the symbols of contested sovereignty in the north.

“The Iber Bridge and the end of a strategic illusion! From Vučić’s statement to the failure of the project to partition Kosovo,” Ramabaja says.

“The bridge over the Iber River was part of the dialogue, now they want to remove it.”

“This statement by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić speaks more than many other statements about the spiritual and political state of Belgrade in the face of recent developments in northern Kosovo. In fact, it is clear evidence that the bridge over the Iber has not been seen by Belgrade simply as an infrastructure object or a technical security issue. It has been treated as a political asset of the status quo and, consequently, as one of the symbols of the contested space of sovereignty in the north,” Ramabaja tells “Bota Sot.”

He emphasizes that the gradual change of KFOR’s permanent presence should be analyzed as part of a broader reorganization of the political and strategic reality in northern Kosovo.

“Therefore, the warning about the gradual withdrawal of KFOR’s permanent presence from the bridge and the transfer of security responsibility to the Kosovo Police cannot be interpreted solely in operational terms. It should be seen in the context of a deeper transformation of the political and strategic reality in the north.

For about 27 years, the bridge over the Iber has been one of the most powerful symbols of Mitrovica’s division. On the physical level, it separated two parts of the city; on the political level, it embodied a much deeper dividing line: the boundary between an institutional order that the Republic of Kosovo aimed to extend throughout its territory and a parallel reality that Belgrade had nurtured, financed, and politically supported.

In this sense, the bridge was much more than a bridge. It was the symbol of a status quo. And the status quo, for Belgrade, was not neutrality. It was a strategic opportunity,” the professor emphasizes.

On August 10, the NATO mission in Kosovo, KFOR, announced that it had begun the gradual transition of its permanent presence on the Iber Bridge in Mitrovica. According to KFOR, this process is taking place due to the improvement of the security situation in Kosovo and is part of the gradual reduction of the mission’s presence.

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Acting Minister of Defence Ejup Maqedonci has stated that the gradual change in KFOR’s presence at the Ibar Bridge is linked to the improved security situation in Kosovo.

In a Facebook post, he said that Kosovo now has professional and reliable security institutions, while stressing that coordination with KFOR and international partners remains close.

Maqedonci said that the optimization process, including the adjustment of the presence at the bridge over the Ibar, is the result of professional assessments of the situation on the ground. According to him, this does not mean a reduction in the level of security for any citizen or community in the Republic of Kosovo.

“The gradual optimization of KFOR’s presence, including the adjustment of its presence at the bridge over the Ibar, is above all a reflection of the improved security situation in Kosovo and the increased capacities of our security institutions. This is a process based on professional assessments of the situation on the ground and does not represent a reduction in security for any citizen or community in the Republic of Kosovo. Over the years, Kosovo has built professional and reliable security institutions, while cooperation and coordination with KFOR and international partners continue to be close. The security of all citizens of Kosovo, regardless of ethnicity, is and remains the responsibility and priority of our institutions,” Maqedonci wrote.

He added that efforts by the Serbian leadership to interpret the optimization of KFOR’s presence as a threat to the Serbian community or as evidence of an unstable situation in Kosovo do not reflect the reality on the ground.

“On the contrary, they seek to create the perception of a crisis where professional security assessments show progress,” Maqedonci said.

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President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic has announced that he will send a letter to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, asking him not to allow the opening of the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica.

Vucic said the letter would be sent this evening and expressed hope that the NATO chief would consider his request.

The Serbian president reiterated that Serbia would continue to oppose the opening of the bridge, declaring that he would “fight as much as he can” over the issue.

Meanwhile, KFOR earlier began a gradual process to change its presence at the main bridge over the Ibar.

According to reports, this development is linked to the improvement in the security situation and the gradual adjustment of NATO’s mission in Kosovo.

Islami: Vucic is trying to move the bridge issue from the local to the international level

Avni Islami, a professor of security sciences, told “Bota sot” that Aleksandar Vucic has intensified his rhetoric against plans to open the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica.

According to him, the Serbian president is expected to send Mark Rutte an official letter requesting that the bridge not be opened to traffic.

“Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, a former propaganda minister during the time of Milosevic, has toughened his position toward plans to open the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica.

He has announced that he will send NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte an official letter with the clear request that the bridge’s opening to traffic be prevented,” Islami said.

He assesses that this approach aims to increase international pressure on Kosovo and directly involve KFOR in decision-making concerning the Ibar Bridge.

Islami believes that Belgrade is trying to create the impression that opening the bridge could endanger the security of Serbs in Kosovo. In this way, according to him, Vucic’s narrative as the “protector” of this community is also reinforced.

“This move clearly demonstrates Vucic’s strategy of shifting the issue from the local level to the highest international and diplomatic arena.

By addressing the NATO chief directly, Belgrade aims to strip Kosovo of its decision-making authority and place NATO and KFOR face-to-face with direct responsibility for maintaining the status quo.

The warning that an official letter will be sent represents a new political escalation and is accompanied by a dangerous security equation. Through this rhetoric, Vucic is pursuing three main objectives: pressuring KFOR and directly implicating NATO troops in blocking the sovereign decisions of Kosovo’s institutions.

At the same time, the aim is to construct a narrative in which the opening of the bridge is portrayed as a threat to the security and stability of the Serbian community, using fear as a tool of pressure. The third objective is to strengthen the image of the “protector” through domestic propaganda claiming that Belgrade remains the sole guarantor of the security and existence of Serbs in Kosovo,” Islami concluded to “Bota sot.”

Shala: The bridge is not merely a road, but a symbol of Mitrovica’s division

Security expert Drizan Shala said in a conversation with “Bota sot” that Vucic’s opposition to the opening of the bridge cannot be explained solely by security arguments, as it also contains political and strategic elements.

According to Shala, the bridge represents the division of Mitrovica, while its opening would weaken this reality and narrow Belgrade’s sphere of influence in northern Kosovo.

“Aleksandar Vucic’s statement that he will address Mark Rutte with a request that the main bridge over the Ibar in Mitrovica not be opened should be analyzed beyond the symbolic importance of the bridge itself.

The first reason Vucic opposes the opening is linked to the fact that the Ibar Bridge is not simply an infrastructure facility. For more than two decades, it has become a symbol of Mitrovica’s physical, political and psychological division.

Opening it would have consequences far broader than allowing vehicles to pass, because it would weaken the bridge’s role as a dividing line.

For Belgrade, preserving this division is politically important. A divided Mitrovica can more easily be presented as evidence of a reality that has not yet been consolidated and as an argument for Serbia’s continued intervention in the affairs of northern Kosovo.

Therefore, opposition to the opening should not be viewed solely as concern for the security of the Serbian community. It has a clear political and strategic background,” Shala said.

He considers Belgrade’s request for NATO involvement in the bridge issue an attempt to intervene in an area that falls under the jurisdiction of Kosovo’s institutions.

Shala emphasizes that Serbia has the right to express security concerns, but it cannot transfer to NATO the authority to decide whether infrastructure in Kosovo should be opened or not.

“If the purpose of the request is for an external authority to stop a decision concerning the operation of territory and infrastructure located under the jurisdiction of Kosovo’s institutions, then we are dealing with interference.

Serbia’s concerns about the security of Serbs in Kosovo can be expressed, and NATO/KFOR should treat them seriously. Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between raising a security concern and requesting that the fate of infrastructure in Kosovo be determined.

In this case, Belgrade is attempting to shift decision-making from Kosovo’s institutions to NATO. This is the issue that must be carefully examined,” he said.

According to Shala, NATO should seriously assess Vucic’s request, but it should not be turned into a political veto over Kosovo’s institutions.

He adds that, in the absence of concrete security threats, the bridge should not continue to remain a symbol of political division.

“NATO should neither disregard the request nor treat it as a political order.

The most professional approach would be to hear it and analyze it from a security perspective, while any attempt to use KFOR as an instrument of Belgrade’s political decision-making should be rejected.

KFOR is responsible for security and stability, but this does not mean that it should assume the powers of Kosovo’s institutions.

The European position has also been that the bridge should be opened, but in coordination with security partners. For this reason, the main question should not be whether Vucic wants the bridge opened, but whether there is a concrete and verifiable threat that would justify keeping it closed.

If there is a concrete threat, it should be addressed with concrete security measures. If no such threat exists, then the security argument cannot be used to preserve a political division.

Belgrade opposes the opening in an area where Kosovo’s institutions have responsibility because the bridge carries symbolic weight far greater than its physical function.

Its opening would convey the message that northern Mitrovica should not be treated as a separate political zone isolated from the rest of Kosovo. This message directly contradicts Belgrade’s political narrative.

From a security perspective, reducing the issue to an Albanian-Serb confrontation must be avoided. The main problem is whether public infrastructure can be kept closed indefinitely simply because it has become a symbol of a political conflict.

The message from the perspective of national security must be clear: Kosovo’s institutions should have primary responsibility for public order and the functioning of infrastructure in Kosovo’s territory. KFOR should guarantee security within its mandate, while political issues should be addressed through political dialogue.

A model must not be allowed to emerge in which every decision by Kosovo’s institutions in the north is blocked through the political pressure Belgrade exerts on NATO. Such a practice would create a dangerous precedent.

Ultimately, the Ibar Bridge is not merely a matter of concrete, asphalt and traffic. It is a test to determine who establishes normality in northern Kosovo. If security can be guaranteed, free movement should be the objective. If threats exist, they must be neutralized, but security must not be used as a pretext for preserving political division.

For this reason, Vucic’s request should be treated with diplomatic seriousness, but it must not be allowed to turn into a political veto over Kosovo’s institutions,” Drizan Shala concluded to “Bota sot.”

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The European Union’s demand that the opening of the main bridge over the Ibër River take place only after coordination among Kosovo’s central institutions, the northern municipalities with a Serb majority, and the local community has prompted numerous reactions. Political scientist Adnan Qaka describes Brussels’ position as one-sided and harmful to Kosovo, calling for the same standards on individual and collective rights to apply to Albanians in the Preševo Valley as well.

On August 18, European Commission spokesperson Anita Hipper stated that the EU’s position had not changed. According to her, any action concerning the bridge must be preceded by effective coordination and meaningful consultations. Hipper also called on the Kosovo Police to guarantee the security of all communities, in accordance with democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law.

At present, pedestrians can cross the bridge, while vehicle traffic remains prohibited. Brussels’ position became public a few days after KFOR confirmed that it had begun a gradual transition of its permanent presence at the site.

The bridge over the Ibër connects the southern part of Mitrovica, where most residents are Albanians, with the northern part, where Serbs make up the majority. For years, it has been one of Kosovo’s most sensitive political and security flashpoints. Its opening to vehicles was envisaged as part of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and, under the 2016 implementation plan, was supposed to take place in January 2017.

Although work to revitalize the bridge was completed in 2018, following an investment of 1.5 million euros, vehicles have never been allowed to use it. Kosovo institutions’ efforts have been opposed by local Serbs, while international partners have called for any changes to be undertaken in coordination with them.

Qaka says the bridge’s opening cannot be reduced to a physical or political act, as it must be part of a broader process of security management and risk assessment.

“The opening of the bridge over the Ibër River should not be assessed merely as a physical, political, or institutional act, but as the result of a much broader process of security management, situation assessment, and the development of operational capabilities. Beyond the symbolic moment of the opening, what matters professionally is the security environment that has been created, how the risk has been analyzed, how potential indicators of escalation have been identified, and how structures have been organized to prevent any situation that could jeopardize public order and security,” political scientist Adnan Qaka said.

However, he calls the EU’s reaction unacceptable, describing it as harmful and one-sided. According to Qaka, the rights of the Serb community in Kosovo should be measured against the situation of Albanians in the Preševo Valley, where, he claims, discrimination, segregation, and a lack of rights continue.

“The reaction of the European Union is extremely unacceptable and extremely harmful to the state of Kosovo, and it is one-sided. All the individual and collective rights enjoyed by Serb minorities in Kosovo should, at the very least, also be enjoyed by Albanians in the Preševo Valley region, who are facing segregation and ethnic cleansing, an almost total lack of rights, intimidation by Serbia’s security authorities, obstruction of investment by the state of Kosovo in that region and by the Serbian state itself, leaving the region as the most underdeveloped region in Serbia,” Qaka told Bota sot.

One of the problems he highlights is the deactivation of addresses. Qaka claims that through this practice, Serbia is systematically contributing to the depopulation of the Preševo Valley.

“Through the deactivation of addresses, the Serbian state is systematically depopulating that region. Albanians are leaving because of this ongoing systematic Serbian terror. In the Preševo Valley, Medveđa, and Bujanovac area, the plebiscite will expressed and manifested through the referendum of March 1–2, 1992, for equality and the enjoyment of individual and collective rights, as well as political and territorial autonomy for Albanians in Preševo, Bujanovac, and Medveđa, is not being respected,” he said.

The political scientist emphasizes that, in his view, the sacrifice of the Albanians of this area in defense of their homes, dignity, and identity is also being ignored, including the armed struggle of the UÇPMB.

He also states that Serbia is not implementing the Končulj Agreement of May 20, 2001. In his assessment, the agreements signed with political representatives of the Albanians of this province in 2001, 2009, 2013, and 2022 have likewise not been fully implemented.

“The sacrifice made in defense of one’s home, dignity, and identity is being disregarded, as is the defense through the armed struggle of the UÇPMB. Serbia is not implementing the Konçulj Agreement of May 20, 2001, and all the agreements signed with the political representatives of the Albanians of this province in 2001, 2009, 2013, and 2022 are also not being implemented,” Qaka said.

Qaka again raises the issue of the addresses of Albanian citizens in the Valley. According to him, more than 25,000 Albanians have been affected by address deactivation, and roughly one in every four residents of the area does not appear in civil records.

“More than 25,000 Albanian citizens have had their addresses deactivated, meaning that one in every four citizens of this area does not appear in civil records; we have an alarming deactivation of addresses,” he said.

Among the other problems he lists are the lack of university education in the mother tongue, the absence of a regional hospital for Preševo, Medveđa, and Bujanovac, the failure to return the memorial to UÇPMB martyrs in Preševo, and the need to restore the court in Preševo.

He also calls for reserved seats for Albanians in the Serbian Parliament, as well as proportional representation in state structures and local and central institutions.

“Not only is university education in the mother tongue being denied, but there is also no regional hospital for patients from Preševo, Medveđa, and Bujanovac; the memorial to the UÇPMB martyrs in Preševo has not been returned; the court in Preševo must be restored; there must be reserved seats in the Serbian Parliament; unfortunately, we have a lack of proportional representation in state structures and at all local and central levels,” he said.

The security sector is another source of concern, according to the political scientist. He says there is no police station in the Preševo Valley and claims that no Albanian police officer has been hired in Serbia since 2016.

“There is no police station in the Preševo Valley and, since 2016, not a single Albanian police officer has been accepted into the police force in this state. Among other things, Serbia continues to spread fear and use hate speech, racism, and xenophobia, as well as discrimination in culture, information, and investment—systematic state denial and classic discrimination,” Qaka said.

He also links the situation to the considerable military and security presence along the border area.

“There is higher militarization than almost anywhere in the EU, with 48 mini-bases in the Ground Safety Zone in this region, and a psychological climate has been created amid constant tendencies toward displacement, educational deprivation, and ethnic cleansing,” Qaka said.

In this context, he accuses the EU of tolerating systematic discrimination against Albanians in the Preševo Valley and sees this as evidence of double standards.

“The EU is now allowing this systematic discrimination; it is classic, structured discrimination and a test of credibility, since standards are being respected in only one direction. Reciprocity must be practiced: the same standard for all the individual and collective rights enjoyed by Serb minorities in Kosovo should, at the very least, also apply to Albanians in the Preševo Valley region and throughout Serbia,” he said.

According to Qaka, Serbs in Kosovo have a broad range of political and institutional rights guaranteed by the Constitution. He mentions reserved seats in the Assembly, official language use, local self-government, and proportional representation in institutions.

“Serb minorities in Kosovo enjoy broad rights guaranteed by the Constitution, at a level of political and institutional rights more advanced than anywhere in the EU, including representation in the Kosovo Parliament through reserved seats, official language use and local self-government in municipalities, proportional representation in the Government, Parliament, courts, prosecution service, municipal leadership, commanders of Kosovo Police stations, and the chain of command of the Kosovo Police and the KSF,” he said.

He also mentions educational institutions and symbols of Serb cultural heritage in Kosovo. According to his claim, the Serb community has universities in North Mitrovica, while statues and memorials have been erected in the areas where it lives.

“Serb minorities in Kosovo have universities in North Mitrovica, and they have also erected various statues from their cultural heritage and memorials to Serb criminals who took part in Serbia’s genocidal crimes against Albanians in Kosovo; in other words, they are represented in every sphere of life. In short, no EU country implements or provides minority rights to the extent enjoyed by the Serb minority in Kosovo,” the political scientist said.

Qaka’s criticism also extends to EU envoys involved in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. He believes that all of them have used the same discourse and, in his view, applied double standards toward Albanians in Serbia and Serbs in Kosovo.

“All EU envoys, without exception, for the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, have followed the same discourse of double standards by the EU toward the Albanian minority in Serbia and the Serb minority in Kosovo,” Qaka said.

Returning to the bridge, the political scientist interprets the European demand as political pressure on Kosovo and as an attempt to minimize what he considers the success of Kosovo’s institutions in the north.

“The European Union’s demand can be understood as political pressure on the state of Kosovo to diminish or minimize almost Kosovo’s complete success in that part of the country in fighting Orthodox Serb terrorist organizations, organized crime, the informal economy, and smuggling, and in establishing security, although there is still much work to be done for the state of Kosovo to create full security and strengthen its sovereignty,” he said.

According to him, pressure from international actors should focus on Belgrade and local Serbs in Kosovo so that they accept the reality of an independent Kosovo and do not obstruct coexistence through divisions and blockades.

“I believe political pressure should be directed at Belgrade and local Serbs in Kosovo so that they accept reality and live together in an independent Kosovo, rather than creating divisions and blockades, as Serbs have done for more than two decades since the postwar period in Kosovo,” Qaka said.

He describes the Ibër Bridge as a psychological border that for many years divided the city and restricted residents’ free movement.

“The Ibër Bridge has been a psychological, not state, border that unfortunately divided the country and prevented the free movement of Albanian citizens by any vehicle. On this occasion, the EU wants to prolong the matter and send Belgrade a signal that it does not have our support, although behind the scenes the opposite may be true; in any case, this is their call for delay, and there is a great risk that the bridge issue will move from a technical decision to a political one,” he said.

Qaka calls on Kosovo’s institutions to communicate directly with the EU and make clear that opening the bridge does not pose a threat to the security of Serbs, but could contribute to community integration and economic development.

“The state of Kosovo must communicate with the European Union and make it clear that building bridges and opening them does not threaten the security of the Serb citizens living there; it represents security, community integration, and economic prosperity,” he said.

The political scientist claims that local Serbs have refused to integrate into the state of Kosovo for nearly three decades and continue to serve as a destabilizing instrument of Belgrade.

“It is the Serbs themselves who, for almost three decades since the postwar period in Kosovo, have not wanted to integrate into the state of Kosovo and continue to be a destabilizing instrument of Belgrade against the state of Kosovo,” Qaka said.

In conclusion, he says the bridge must not remain hostage to policies that produce divisions and different standards. In his view, if the EU demands democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and security for all communities, these principles must be applied equally.

“The issue of the bridge over the Ibër cannot remain hostage to a policy that produces divisions, fear, and double standards; if the European Union demands democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and security for all communities, then these standards must be the same, applicable, and measurable on both sides of the border. Kosovo cannot constantly be asked to prove its responsibility while systematic discrimination against Albanians in the Preševo Valley is treated as a secondary issue,” Qaka emphasizes.

He calls for community rights not to be used as a political tool only against Kosovo, but to be treated as a universal principle.

“Respect for community rights cannot be a political instrument used only when demanded of Kosovo; it must be a universal principle, without double standards, without tolerance for discrimination, and without relativizing realities. The opening of the bridge over the Ibër should be seen as a step toward integration, free movement, security, and the normal functioning of the state of Kosovo, while international pressure should be directed where the real obstacles to normalization, integration, and coexistence exist,” he said.

Qaka concludes his position by emphasizing that bridges should bring people closer rather than deepen divisions. In his assessment, European standards have value only if they are applied equally to everyone.

“Because bridges are built to bring people together, not to legalize divisions, while European standards have meaning only when they are applied equally to everyone, regardless of ethnic affiliation, territory, or political interest,” political scientist Adnan Qaka concluded.

The post Political Scientist Qaka on the Ibër Bridge: The EU Is Applying Double Standards; Pressure Should Be Put on Belgrade appeared first on Albeu.com.

The European Commission has reiterated the need for proper coordination and meaningful consultations between the affected municipalities and Kosovo’s central institutions before the Ibar Bridge is opened. The main bridge over the Ibar River connects South Mitrovica, where Albanians make up the majority, with North Mitrovica, which is inhabited mainly by Serbs.

European Commission spokesperson Anita Hipper told a press conference on August 18 that the European Union’s position on the issue remains clear.

According to her, the Kosovo Police must ensure the safety of all communities by acting in accordance with democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law, so that every citizen feels protected.

Hipper recalled that the bridge is currently open to pedestrians, while vehicle traffic is still not permitted. She said steps had been taken on the issue, but the EU continues to expect effective coordination and meaningful consultations, which she said need to improve.

The European Commission’s position was made public after KFOR announced on August 10 that it had begun the “gradual transition” of its permanent presence on the bridge.

The NATO peacekeeping mission linked the decision to an improvement in the security situation, emphasizing that the process would proceed in stages and depend on conditions on the ground. However, KFOR will continue to maintain a visible presence in South Mitrovica, North Mitrovica and northern Kosovo in general.

Security expert Fidair Berisha told “Bota sot” that opening the bridge to vehicles is of strategic importance to Kosovo, even though it is happening late and without any particular reason for the delay. He summed up the situation with the phrase “better late than never.”

Berisha believes no provocation is expected from the Albanian side, as the main objective is to guarantee freedom of movement and uphold the rule of law. At the same time, he expects that various destabilizing scenarios could emerge from the Serbian side.

According to him, Serbia may try to obstruct the process or close the bridge through provocations and diplomatic channels. Berisha says political structures in Belgrade know that the Kosovo Police and other security institutions have the situation under control and will not allow actions that undermine security in Kosovo.

Among the possible scenarios, the expert mentions staged interethnic provocations, roadblocks in the north using heavy vehicles, disinformation campaigns and staged incidents in which Serbian citizens could be portrayed as being endangered by Albanians or the security authorities.

Berisha believes the Kosovo Police have sufficient personnel and logistical capacity to guarantee public order and keep the situation under control, regardless of the nature of any provocations. He also considers tactical coordination with KFOR and EULEX important in order to avoid misunderstandings and send a clear message of unity.

Regarding a coordination plan before the opening, the expert proposes fixed monitoring points on both sides of the bridge, a direct line of communication between the two Mitrovica municipalities and the establishment of a joint operational center that would operate in real time.

He believes that, in the long term, opening the bridge could help reduce tensions and facilitate the integration of the north. However, Berisha identifies a deliberate attack on vehicles as the most dangerous scenario, as it could subsequently be used by Serbian structures and Serbia to seek the reinstatement of blockades through the international community.

The expert adds that Kosovo’s security institutions are prepared and capable of responding professionally. For this reason, he believes that any scenario will be detected in time and successfully managed.

Analyst Eduard Gashi says the EU’s demand for coordination should not become an obstacle to Kosovo exercising its sovereignty. According to him, the main question is no longer whether the bridge should be opened, but how it should be opened and what political message the decision will convey.

Gashi interprets the European Commission’s call for “effective coordination and meaningful consultations” not as a veto on opening the bridge, but as a demand for a politically and institutionally controlled process. He emphasizes that this demand should not be used as a formula for indefinite delay.

According to the analyst, Kosovo has the right to exercise its sovereignty, but a serious state should not demonstrate that sovereignty by surprising its allies. He notes that the EU has emphasized that the bridge should serve all communities and that the Kosovo Police must guarantee security for everyone.

Gashi recalls that only a few days earlier, the EU had confirmed that the conditions it had previously deemed necessary for opening the bridge had been met. At the same time, KFOR had begun the gradual withdrawal of its permanent presence from the bridge, linking the development to improved security.

He emphasizes that coordination is not permission and consultation does not constitute a veto. According to him, Kosovo’s institutions cannot make their sovereignty conditional on the approval of a municipality or a Serbian political party. Nevertheless, in a sensitive area such as North Mitrovica, listening to residents and local authorities is part of good governance.

Gashi considers it unacceptable for the Serbian List or Belgrade to have the power to grant or withhold consent for the bridge’s opening, as this would create a right of veto over the functioning of the Republic of Kosovo’s authority and infrastructure.

The analyst recalls that the bridge issue is not new. As part of the EU-mediated dialogue, Kosovo and Serbia agreed in 2015 that the bridge and the surrounding area would be revitalized, with the aim of opening it to all traffic no later than June 2016. According to Gashi, it is now 2026 and, ten years later, its opening is still being discussed.

He believes this situation demonstrates the weakness of European policy in the Balkans, as technical issues that are not resolved in time turn into political problems, then into security issues, and require even greater diplomatic engagement.

Gashi emphasizes that cooperation with the US, NATO and the EU should not be viewed as an infringement of sovereignty, but as a way to increase Kosovo’s strength. He underlines that a small state that is not yet a member of the UN, NATO or the EU multiplies its influence through alliances, and that Kosovo did not achieve its current position alone.

According to him, even if Kosovo has the legal right to open the bridge, state decision-making must take into account the consequences that the manner of implementation could bring. The question, he emphasizes, is not only whether an action is permitted, but also what is gained, what is put at risk and who will stand by Kosovo the day after the decision.

A unilateral opening contrary to the position of key international partners could provide Kosovo with immediate domestic benefits, but at the same time could cost it diplomatic capital in Brussels and other decision-making centers.

The analyst considers the concerns of the Serbian community in the north important and says Serbian citizens must feel safe if the bridge is opened. However, he distinguishes between listening to that community and granting it a political veto over the operation of the Republic of Kosovo’s roads, bridges and institutions.

Gashi says a Serbian resident of North Mitrovica should feel just as safe crossing the bridge as an Albanian resident from the south. According to him, guaranteeing that safety is Kosovo’s responsibility, but no community should decide which parts of the Republic’s infrastructure or institutions may function.

He calls on the EU to provide greater clarity about what “meaningful consultations” entail. If further consultations are needed, he says Brussels should specify with whom they will be held, what they will include and the deadline by which they must be completed, so that they do not turn into an endless process.

Gashi believes the ultimate goal should be for the Ibar Bridge to no longer be treated as a political issue, but simply to serve as a link between the two parts of the city. For this reason, he proposes immediate consultations, concrete security guarantees, coordination with KFOR and the EU, and a clear deadline for the opening.

“Kosovo should open the Ibar Bridge, but it should not burn political bridges with its allies in the process,” the analyst concludes, describing this approach as statecraft rather than weakness.

The main bridge over the Ibar was blocked after the 1999 war and over the years became one of the main flashpoints of ethnic tension.

Kosovo and Serbia agreed to open it as part of the EU-mediated dialogue. The implementation plan, agreed in 2016, stipulated that the bridge would open to traffic in January 2017.

Work to revitalize the bridge, in which around 1.5 million euros was invested, was completed in 2018. Despite this, it was never opened to vehicles.

In 2024, initiatives by the Kosovo government to open the bridge were opposed by local Serbs. At the time, the international community demanded that any action be taken in coordination.

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Following KFOR’s decision to begin a gradual transition away from its permanent military presence on the main bridge over the Ibar River in Mitrovica, the European Union has confirmed that the necessary criteria for opening it have been met. This development is considered significant for northern Kosovo and for efforts aimed at normalizing life in Mitrovica.

For years, the Ibar Bridge has represented one of the most visible symbols of the city’s division into two parts. For this reason, any change in its status carries political, social and security implications. However, it remains unclear whether the EU’s position means its opening is now only a matter of time and what effect the transition in KFOR’s presence could have on stability in the area.

Professor Nijazi Halili, speaking to “Bota Sot,” described the European Union’s confirmation as an important step, but warned that it should not automatically be interpreted as a sign that the bridge will open soon.

According to Halili, the Ibar Bridge has long been more than simply a piece of infrastructure, as it has become a symbol of the political and social division in Mitrovica. For this reason, he believes the decision on opening it should be made carefully and in full coordination with international and security mechanisms.

Commenting on the gradual change to KFOR’s permanent presence at the site, the professor said the process should not be viewed as a withdrawal from its responsibilities for maintaining security. He described it as a planned and coordinated transition.

Halili emphasized that stability in the north remains essential, and therefore any change on the ground should be implemented cautiously to avoid creating new tensions.

According to the professor, opening the bridge under safe conditions and through coordination could have a significant impact on ensuring freedom of movement and restoring normal life for Mitrovica’s residents.

However, he stressed that merely removing the physical barriers on the bridge would not be enough to overcome the long-standing divisions between the communities. According to him, this step should be accompanied by other measures that help build mutual trust.

Concluding his remarks to “Bota Sot,” Nijazi Halili said the goal should be to transform the bridge from a dividing line into a place that brings citizens closer together. He added that normalization in Mitrovica cannot be achieved solely by opening the bridge, but also requires security, dialogue, freedom of movement and the political will to overcome divisions.

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KFOR has said that any decision on the possible reopening of the Ibër Bridge in Mitrovica to vehicle traffic must take into account the needs of all communities. The NATO mission in Kosovo also said it is supporting the European Union’s diplomatic efforts, while referring questions about the bridge’s status to the EU and Kosovo’s institutions.

In a response to the media following a meeting between KFOR Commander Ozkan Ulutash and the EU representative in Kosovo, Eva Palatova, a NATO official said the mission is providing the European Union with the necessary security support to advance the diplomatic process.

“KFOR also continues to provide the necessary support in the security field so that EU-led diplomatic efforts can move forward.”

For any position regarding the status of the Ibër Bridge, KFOR instructed that questions be directed to the European Union and Kosovo’s institutions.

“For any further comment regarding the status of the bridge, I refer you to the EU and Kosovo’s institutions.”

KFOR has begun a gradual withdrawal of its permanent presence from the main bridge over the Ibër River. According to the NATO mission, this process is linked to the improved security situation in Kosovo and the optimization of troop deployment.

This development was made public at a time when the European Union said the conditions had been met for opening the bridge to vehicles as well. KFOR clarified that the transition would take place step by step, depending on the situation on the ground, and could be reversed if security circumstances require it.

“The process is being closely coordinated with all relevant stakeholders, including representatives of Kosovo’s institutions and international organizations, as well as representatives of the Kosovo Police and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).”

According to KFOR, local stakeholders have been regularly informed and involved in this process. They include the Serbian List, the main party representing Serbs in Kosovo.

Commander Ozkan Ulutash most recently met with representatives of the party on August 11. In addition to the Serbian List, he continues to communicate with other stakeholders involved in the issue.

“Regarding the overall optimization process, Major General Ulutaş, the commander of the KFOR mission, continues to maintain close contact with all his key counterparts in Kosovo’s institutions, international organizations and the Serbian Armed Forces.”

Although its permanent presence on the bridge is undergoing a transition, KFOR emphasized that it would continue to maintain a presence in southern and northern Mitrovica, as well as in northern Kosovo.

“Our personnel are well positioned to respond to any significant developments, in accordance with KFOR’s longstanding UN mandate. KFOR will maintain a visible presence in South and North Mitrovica, as well as in northern Kosovo, and will continue contributing to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment for all communities.”

The NATO mission reiterated that it is closely monitoring the situation on the ground and remains focused on implementing its mandate, as established by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999. The mandate is aimed at ensuring a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all communities in Kosovo.

Following the start of the transition of KFOR’s presence on the Ibër Bridge, Kosovo Police officers were seen in the area and are now expected to assume responsibility for ensuring security there.

The European Commission addressed a message to the institution. EC spokesperson Anita Hipper said at a press conference that the European Union’s position was clear: the conditions for reopening the bridge to vehicles had been met.

“What we are also asking is for the Kosovo Police to guarantee the security of all communities, in accordance with democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law, so that everyone feels safe.”

The EU also said it expects Kosovo’s institutions to coordinate with all communities.

“We have made our assessment, steps have been taken in this direction, and our position remains that we still expect effective coordination and meaningful consultations, which must be improved,” Hipper said.

Meanwhile, Belgrade announced that it would submit a complaint to the NATO Secretary General. Serbian President Aleksandar Vuçiq said he would send Mark Rutte an official letter regarding the opening of the Ibër Bridge and expressed dissatisfaction with the KFOR commander.

“The Turk, the KFOR commander, is doing this. Today I will write to Mark Rutte, and I hope he responds to my letter and accepts my request that this not be done. For me, this is a great disgrace and a disappointment. This shows us that nervousness has entered their ranks; they do not know how to force Serbia to recognize an independent Kosovo.”

The bridge over the Ibër River, which allowed pedestrians but not vehicles to cross, has for years been considered a symbol of Mitrovica’s division.

During 2024, the Kosovo Government’s initiatives to open it were opposed by local Serbs. The European Union had asked the Kosovo authorities to coordinate their actions before taking such a step. The Government later built two bridges parallel to the main bridge to serve as alternative routes.

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The European Union has announced that NATO informed it about the gradual transition away from the permanent presence of the KFOR mission at Ibri Bridge in Mitrovica.

The EU clarified that the process involves a step-by-step change in KFOR’s engagement at this strategic location. During the transition, attention is expected to be paid to the security situation on the ground, while coordination and the guarantee of security and stability in northern Kosovo remain essential.

Lun Gacaferi, a member of Guxo, welcomed NATO’s move away from Ibri Bridge and Deçan Monastery, although he considers it delayed.

According to him, the withdrawal of NATO troops from these two locations demonstrates that the security situation in Kosovo has stabilized to an extraordinary degree. Gacaferi said the development also reflects NATO’s confidence in the Kosovo Police, which, he said, is carrying out its duties excellently and with a high level of professionalism.

He told “Bota sot” that the decision regarding Ibri Bridge should have been made earlier, but added that it is better for it to happen late than not at all.

Gacaferi stressed that the main reason for celebration is the transfer of Ibri Bridge under the control of the Kosovo Police. According to him, this action extinguishes every hope among Serbs and Serbia that the border between Kosovo and Serbia could be established over Ibri Bridge. For Kosovo, he described this as the culmination of the Kurti Government’s achievements in extending sovereignty to every part of the country’s territory.

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