In the first court session held at the Basic Court in Pristina, Fatmir Sheholli, accused of espionage, pleaded not guilty to all charges brought by the Special Prosecution.

His defense lawyer, Mentor Neziri, announced that his client and the legal team have decided to withdraw the request to challenge the indictment, aiming to proceed directly to the judicial review phase. According to Neziri, the decision was made considering the time spent in detention and the volume of evidence to be examined during the process.

Prosecutor Bekim Kodraliu presented the main submissions of the indictment, emphasizing that the defendant is suspected of having acted continuously and with direct intent as a collaborator of Serbia’s Intelligence Service (BIA). According to him, Sheholli followed the instructions of a senior official of this service, Bojan Dimic, who headed the Department against Terrorism and International Organized Crime.

The indictment describes that for a period up to October 9, 2025, Sheholli collected and transmitted through electronic communication channels sensitive information related to political life, the security situation, and the functioning of Kosovo’s state institutions.

A central point of the investigation is an action plan that, according to the prosecution, was prepared by the BIA to damage the country’s interests and to manipulate the local elections of October 12, 2025. The indictment describes that on September 26, 2025, Sheholli traveled accompanied by a relative in a vehicle toward North Mitrovica. There, in a parking lot near the Technical School, close to the “Sindikata” café, he allegedly received from an unidentified individual audio recordings and transcripts of conversations of senior officials in the Ministry for Communities and Return.

The prosecution claims that these materials were intended to discredit those officials and that Sheholli was rewarded with 5,000 euros for this action. Further, following directives, the same materials along with 1,000 euros were delivered to a journalist, whom he instructed on how and when to make them public, just hours before election day.

Continuing with the claims, Kodraliu stressed that these actions have seriously damaged state interests, incited social division, and enabled direct interference by a foreign agency in a Kosovo electoral process. Details of the 80-page dossier include a wide range of evidence, such as phone interceptions extracted from the defendant’s device, video recordings from security cameras, seized documents, numerous testimonies, and a financial report.

In addition to the espionage charge, Sheholli is also charged with the criminal offense of blackmail. According to the claims, he possessed compromising video recordings of a Kosovar businessman and demanded a sum of over 13,000 euros from him in exchange for not publishing them.

The investigative file also mentions documents found on Sheholli’s phone, such as the one coded “Top Secret 2,” which describes a plan to portray Kosovo as a radicalized state, and the “Leptiri” file, an old plan by the Serbian secret service to compromise the current prime minister, Albin Kurti, during the time he was in Serbian prisons.

When asked by the court about guilt, Sheholli responded briefly that he does not feel guilty. Today’s session marked the first procedural step of this judicial process, which is expected to involve numerous witnesses and evidence in the coming stages.

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At the first court hearing, held on September 7, 2026, Fatmir Sheholli denied all the charges brought against him by Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office. He clearly told the panel of judges at the Basic Court in Pristina that he considered himself completely innocent of both the criminal offense of espionage and that of blackmail.

Special Prosecutor Bekim Kodraliu argued in court that the defendant had carried out a genuine plan aimed at harming Kosovo’s state interests and manipulating the electoral process held on October 12, 2025. Acting Minister for Communities and Return Nenad Rashiq was also present at the hearing as the injured party.

According to an 80-page indictment, Sheholli is suspected of having been recruited by Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) and of reporting directly to Bojan Dimiq, who heads the Directorate for Combating Terrorism and International Organized Crime. The prosecution claims that, during an unspecified period up until his arrest on October 9, 2025, he systematically collected and passed on data about the country’s political developments, security situation and institutional functioning.

The indictment details that the Serbian intelligence service had entrusted Sheholli with 5,000 euros and audio materials intended to influence local elections within Kosovo’s Serb community. The materials, which contained intercepted conversations and transcripts of senior officials from the ministry headed by Rashiq, were intended for distribution in the media to discredit Kosovo’s institutions. According to the prosecution, Sheholli handed the recordings to journalist Milaim Zeka, along with 1,000 euros, instructing him on when and how to publish them on the program “Pa Rrotlla,” on the pretext that the documentation had come from the German Development Agency (GIZ).

Another central element of the case file is a photograph found on the defendant’s phone, nicknamed “Top Secret 2.” According to the prosecutor, the document describes a strategy to create the perception of a radicalized and extremist Kosovo by collecting funds from an Islamic embassy in Belgrade to build mosques in prominent locations. The ultimate goal, the indictment states, was to generate insecurity, encourage young people to leave and gradually return the country to Serbian jurisdiction, thereby changing Western allies’ stance toward Kosovo.

A document titled “Leptiri” was also found on Sheholli’s mobile device. The prosecution describes it as a 2001 plan drafted by the structures of Serbia’s State Security Directorate (RDB). The plan envisaged compromising and recruiting the current prime minister, Albin Kurti, during the period when he was serving a sentence in Serbian prisons, using an operational source nicknamed “Leptiri” to obtain compromising material.

In addition to the espionage charge, Sheholli also faces the criminal offense of blackmail. The prosecution claims that he possessed video recordings of a local businessman and used them as leverage to demand a sum exceeding 13,000 euros. Investigators have secured photographs and other material evidence, including intercepts obtained through special investigative measures.

Fatmir Sheholli, who has been held in pretrial detention since October 2025, has a professional background that includes working as a journalist, serving as an adviser to the Municipality of Graçanica and the Ministry of Return, and heading a nongovernmental organization. Today’s hearing marked the first procedural step, as the court is expected to examine the parties’ claims. He is presumed innocent until a final verdict is issued.

The case adds to a series of espionage investigations conducted by Kosovo authorities in recent years. In June last year, Aleksandar Vllajiq was sentenced to five years in prison after pleading guilty as a member of the BIA, while Bedri Shabani and Muharrem Qerimi are standing trial on similar charges. Most recently, in August this year, Fehim Sali was arrested on suspicion of espionage on behalf of Serbia, with the prosecution alleging that he had collected information about individuals linked to the Wahhabi sect.

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The initial hearing against Fatmir Sheholli has begun at the Basic Court in Pristina. He is facing charges of “Espionage” and “Blackmail,” while acting minister Nenad Rashiq is also present in the courtroom as the injured party.

The hearing was scheduled for 9:30 a.m. and represents one of the first steps in the legal process, during which procedural issues and the parties’ positions on the indictment filed by the Special Prosecution of the Republic of Kosovo are expected to be examined.

According to the prosecution’s allegations, Sheholli acted as a person recruited by Serbia’s Security and Intelligence Agency, BIA, carrying out the orders and tasks of Bojan Dimiq, whom the indictment identifies as director of BIA’s Directorate for Combating Terrorism and International Organized Crime. According to the indictment, his activities extended from an unspecified date until October 9, 2025.

The prosecution alleges that during this period Sheholli collected and forwarded data and documents concerning political activities, the security situation and the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions.

The case is also linked to allegations of cooperation with BIA, while the investigative file includes materials and communications that the prosecution considers evidence.

According to the indictment, BIA gave Sheholli 5,000 euros and audio materials, with the aim of influencing local elections among Kosovo’s Serb community.

The prosecution says that, several days before last year’s local elections, he received materials containing audio conversations and transcripts of several senior officials from the Ministry for Communities and Return, an institution headed by Nenad Rashiq.

The alleged plan was to publish these materials in Kosovo’s media in order to damage the reputation of Kosovo’s officials and institutions and influence the electoral process.

The indictment states that Sheholli handed the materials to journalist and analyst Milaim Zeka, along with 1,000 euros, and also instructed him on when and how to publish them on the program “Pa Rrotlla.”

According to the prosecution, Sheholli told Zeka that the materials had been obtained from the German Development Agency, GIZ.

Another important part of the indictment concerns a photograph found on Sheholli’s phone bearing the inscription “Top Secret 2.” The prosecution alleges that it was an action plan aimed at creating the impression that Kosovo is a radicalized and extremist state.

According to the prosecution, the document envisaged collecting funds from Islamic embassies in Belgrade and using them to build mosques in prominent locations. According to the prosecution, the purpose described in the document was to create insecurity and drive some young people away from Kosovo.

The prosecution further alleges that the plan aimed to change Western powers’ stance toward Kosovo and create circumstances for the country to return under Serbia’s jurisdiction.

Among the materials mentioned in the indictment is also a document titled “Leptiri,” found on Sheholli’s phone.

The prosecution alleges that the document was drafted by Serbia’s State Security structure, RDB, in 2001, and described a plan to compromise and recruit acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti during the period when he was serving a sentence in Serbian prisons.

According to the description provided by the prosecution, the plan envisaged engaging an operative source codenamed “Leptiri” to obtain compromising materials about Kurti and exert pressure on him to persuade him to cooperate with RDB.

In addition to espionage, Sheholli is also accused of blackmailing a Kosovar businessman.

The indictment states that he possessed video recordings of the businessman and allegedly, relying on these materials, demanded a sum of money exceeding 13,000 euros.

The prosecution says that in this case it has photographs, recordings and other evidence obtained through special investigative measures, including monitoring and wiretapping.

Fatmir Sheholli was arrested on October 9, 2025 and, according to published reports, has been in pretrial detention since then.

He has worked as a journalist and served as an adviser at the Municipality of Graçanica and at the Ministry for Return. He has also headed a non-governmental organization and has frequently appeared in the media as a political analyst.

All the allegations included in this article are part of the indictment filed by the Special Prosecution. Fatmir Sheholli is presumed innocent until the court reaches a final decision.

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Within a two-year period, Kosovo authorities have arrested several individuals suspected of cooperating with Serbia’s Security and Information Agency (BIA).

Taken together, the investigations reveal a broad range of topics that, according to Special Prosecution data, aroused curiosity: from structures of the Kosovo Police and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (AKI), to political dynamics, electoral processes, members of specific groups and influential figures.

Some of these proceedings are still ongoing in courtrooms, while in other cases convictions have already been handed down.

The facts themselves do not necessarily confirm the existence of a single operation or of a synchronized BIA structure in Kosovo. Nevertheless, they raise the question of what objectives the agency has and how it might use data once it has obtained it.

“The main focus is recruiting people. Whether to extract information or to exert influence through institutions,” says Dushan Janjiq, founder of the Forum for Ethnic Relations in Belgrade, in a conversation with Radio Free Europe.

One of the most recent cases will begin to be examined on September 7 at the Basic Court in Pristina, where defendant Fatmir Sheholli faces charges of espionage and blackmail.

Kosovo’s Special Prosecution asserts that he was engaged by BIA to collect data on the political scene, the security climate and the functioning mechanisms of the Kosovo state.

According to the indictment file, Sheholli is suspected of having participated in a scheme to compromise local officials and to manipulate the 2025 local elections.

On his mobile device, the Prosecution claims, a photograph was found of material classified as “Top secret 2,” the text of which talks about a plan aiming to instrumentalize the Islamic faith in order to divide Albanians and to change Kosovo’s image in the eyes of the West.

The origin and authenticity of this document remain unclear to the public, while the Islamic Community of Kosovo has rejected its claims and insisted on a full investigation.

The spread of the content sparked uproar and fierce clashes on social platforms, including speculation about relations between Serbian intelligence and Muslim believers in Kosovo.

However, the indictments do not shed light on what later happens to information that, according to Prosecution claims, is collected and passed to the Serbian secret service.

Intelligence specialists stress that data collection is simply one link in a service’s activity. Equally crucial are the quality of the source, the level of access it has, and the way in which information and the network built may later be exploited.

Daniel Lomas, lecturer in intelligence and security at the University of Nottingham in England, explains that the cycle usually begins with the collection phase. “In the first step you aim to obtain information from sources, that is, about a state’s politics, economic situation, hierarchies, corridor rumors, weaving networks of people throughout society,” he tells Radio Free Europe.

According to him, networks can later take on an additional role: to be used as tools to exert political pressure.

What does BIA represent?

The Security and Information Agency constitutes Serbia’s national civilian intelligence service and operates as a separate entity within the Serbian government. Established by law in 2002, it was separated from the Ministry of Interior as a result of the split of the civilian service from the police service.

According to Serbian legislation, its mandate covers protecting Serbia’s security, identifying and preventing activities aimed at undermining the constitutional order, as well as seeking, collecting, analyzing and assessing intelligence information significant for national security. The legal framework also gives BIA the right to interact with counterpart agencies of other states and international organizations, in line with government guidelines and Serbian security policy.

Radio Free Europe has requested a response from BIA regarding these issues and the claims about its operations in Kosovo, but has so far received no reply.

Type of information targeted

The indictments filed offer some indications about the category of data believed to have been targeted. Bedri Shabani and Muharrem Qerimi are accused of obtaining and passing on information related to the KLA, Kosovo police forces and AKI. According to prosecutors, Shabani had also gathered material on the Reçak events, while Qerimi had collected data on witnesses of the Special Court. Both have pleaded not guilty and proceedings against them continue.

In another case, Fehim Sali is suspected of having gathered and forwarded files and notices about certain persons in Kosovo during 2024 and 2025, including individuals whom authorities describe as linked to Wahhabi currents. Among those already sentenced for espionage are Aleksandar Vllajiq and Jellena Gjukanoviq.

Janjiq stresses that an intelligence agency’s interest does not stop only at documents or concrete figures. Equally important are the individuals who have access to them. According to him, BIA is interested both in sources that supply data and in people who have influence. “It is known that Albanians are the dominant population in Kosovo and it is known who carries weight in the economy,” he notes, adding that the goal is to secure “quality information sources.”

However, the usefulness of a source within an institution is not simply linked to what it can get from there. Lomas uses the police as an example. “A police officer can do more than an ordinary citizen. He has supervisory powers and can have access to certain categories of data,” he explains. Such a person can also help identify other people who may be recruitment targets or create ground for other operations.

Destination of information

When asked what concretely happens with information that reaches BIA, Janjiq is measured. “To be honest, I can only imagine,” he says. In principle, he explains, data pass to analytical sectors, where they are “systematized, categorized” and then used according to an assessment, mainly political. He mentions blackmail and influence as some of the possible uses.

Lomas sees the process through the prism of the general functioning of intelligence services. Data on politics, institutions and individuals, he says, can reveal to a foreign service weaknesses or divisions within a government, party or society. “Intelligence enables you to create rifts within governments, political parties and broader society, because it gives you clear knowledge of how to exploit a particular society,” he emphasizes.

The next step, he continues, may be what in intelligence language is known as “covert action”: you are no longer satisfied with gathering information, but take concrete actions based on what you have learned. This does not mean that the cases uncovered in Kosovo prove such a coordinated BIA strategy. Court proceedings concern individual responsibility, and some of the Prosecution’s claims have not yet been proven by final rulings.

Radio Free Europe contacted the Special Prosecution to find out the number of persons under investigation, the number of indictments or proceedings for espionage in favor of Serbia, possible shared connections and tactics among the cases, as well as suspicions of involvement within public bodies, but without success. The Kosovo Intelligence Agency also remained silent. Radio Free Europe asked it for an assessment of the extent of BIA’s activity and the threat it poses to the country’s institutions.

Can espionage destabilize a state?

Lomas warns against the idea that espionage, on its own, can bring down a state. “I think espionage only takes you so far,” he stresses. Foreign services, according to him, do not need to invent divisions or grievances within a society; they can simply detect them and use them for their own purposes.

To illustrate this mechanism, Lomas takes as an example Russia and the debates over migration in Germany. He notes that the real concerns of part of German society on this topic were not produced by Russia, but external Russian actors amplified these tensions, including through social media. He compares this to a fire: grievances exist, and external intervention acts as “fuel,” giving it bigger and more dangerous flames.

Lomas does not claim that the cases in Kosovo reflect the same pattern, but in the Western Balkans context, he sees this also in light of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the broader confrontation with the West. According to him, Russia may have an interest in spaces where existing tensions can be kept burning and where NATO’s attention can be diverted by another crisis.

In Kosovo, the controversy triggered by the “Top secret 2” document, whose origin and authenticity remain unclear, showed how quickly a sensitive issue can bring polarization. For Janjiq, information leaks, infiltration into institutions and attempts to exert influence are closely linked phenomena. He links intelligence activity with Serbia’s policy of not recognizing Kosovo and with an interest in data that can be used to discredit it. “When you do not recognize Kosovo, then you have to collect as much negative material as possible about the situation there,” Janjiq says.

Defense avenues for Kosovo

For Lomas, defense is not limited only to detecting and arresting suspects. Another powerful tool is the public exposure of the methods of foreign intelligence services. He refers to the experience of Western European countries, where making espionage cases public has served to increase the vigilance of citizens and institutions toward recruitment techniques and related risks.

“The very fact that you have carried out these arrests and that they have been made public is a way to make clear to people that these foreign intelligence services are a real threat. They are not going to disappear,” Lomas stresses. Equally essential, according to him, is counterintelligence: identifying the most vulnerable people and institutions, detecting recruitment attempts and exchanging information with international allies.

Janjiq also emphasizes strengthening intelligence and security capacities in Kosovo, but adds that the responsibility does not belong only to official Pristina. According to him, NATO, the US and European partners have a role in raising security standards, strengthening Kosovo’s institutions and creating better mechanisms for cooperation and information sharing.

However, the cases brought to light so far do not offer a complete picture of the real scale of BIA’s activity in Kosovo. It is not publicly known how many people may have been recruited, how long links with the Serbian secret service may have continued, or the amount of information that may have ended up in its hands. For some defendants, even the Prosecution’s own claims still await proof in court.

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The initial hearing against Fatmir Sheholli will be held today at the Basic Court in Prishtina, starting at 09:30. The Special Prosecution of the Republic of Kosovo accuses him of the criminal offenses “Espionage” and “Blackmail.”

According to the indictment, the case relates to suspicions of Sheholli’s involvement in attempts to influence electoral processes in Kosovo, cooperation with a foreign intelligence service, and pressure against a businessman.

The prosecution claims that Serbia’s Security and Intelligence Agency – BIA, had given Sheholli 5,000 euros and audio materials, with the aim of influencing local elections within the Serb community in Kosovo.

The indictment states that, a few days before last year’s local elections, he had received materials containing audio conversations and transcripts of senior officials from the Ministry for Communities and Return, which was headed by Nenad Rashiq.

According to the prosecution, these materials were intended to be published in Kosovar media to damage the image of Kosovo’s officials and institutions, as well as to influence the outcome of the electoral process.

The charging document claims that Sheholli handed the materials to journalist and analyst Milaim Zeka, along with 1,000 euros, also telling him the manner and timing for their publication on the show “Pa Rrotlla.”

The prosecution says Sheholli had declared to Zeka that the materials were secured from the German Development Agency – GIZ.

The “Top Secret 2” document and claims of Islamic radicalization

Among the materials found on Sheholli’s phone, according to the indictment, was a photograph titled “Top Secret 2.”

The prosecution describes it as an action plan aimed at creating the impression that Kosovo is a radicalized and extremist state.

According to the claims included in the indictment, the plan foresaw securing funds from Islamic embassies in Belgrade and using them to build mosques in prominent locations. The stated goal, according to the prosecution, was to create a climate of insecurity and drive away a portion of young people from Kosovo.

It is also claimed that this strategy aimed to change the stance of Western powers towards Kosovo and create circumstances for the country’s return under Serbia’s jurisdiction.

The “Butterfly” document and the mention of Albin Kurti

Another document found on Sheholli’s phone, according to the indictment, bears the title “Leptiri” (Butterfly).

The prosecution claims the document was prepared by Serbia’s State Security structure – RDB, in 2001, and described a plan for compromising and recruiting the acting prime minister, Albin Kurti, during the period he was serving a sentence in Serbian prisons.

According to the description provided by the prosecution, the plan foresaw the use of an operational source codenamed “Butterfly” to secure compromising materials against Kurti and to exert pressure on him, with the aim of cooperation with the RDB.

Suspicions of blackmail against a businessman

In addition to the espionage charge, Sheholli also faces a charge of blackmail.

The indictment says he was in possession of video recordings of a Kosovar businessman and is suspected of having demanded a sum of over 13,000 euros from him, based on these materials.

The prosecution declares it has secured photographs, recordings, and other evidence through special investigative measures, including monitoring and interception.

Fatmir Sheholli was arrested on October 9, 2025, and according to published reports, has been in detention since then.

He has been a journalist, an advisor in the Municipality of Graçanica and at the Ministry for Return. Sheholli has also led a non-governmental organization and has frequently appeared in the media as a political analyst.

Today’s session marks one of the first stages of the judicial procedure. During it, the court is expected to address procedural matters and the parties’ positions on the indictment.

The claims described in this text are based on the indictment of the Special Prosecution. Fatmir Sheholli is presumed innocent until a final court decision.

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